On 3/15/2010 5:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15 March 2010 07:28, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
I don't think that's so clear. Everett's relative state interpretation
implies consciousness is not unitary but continually "splits" just as the
states of other quantum systems. So while these counterfactual states
(realized in the multiple worlds) may be significant for instantiating
consciousness, I don't think it would follow that the consciousness'es thus
instantiated would be aware of the splitting, i.e. decoherence. So if you
are subject to a probabilistic event which would cause a change in your
consciousness if it eventuated there would be a change in your consciousness
*in another branch of the multiple worlds*. If your brain were constructed
so there was no such chance (or it had much lower probability) what would be
the difference? Maybe you would have faded qualia, e.g. if you were color
blind you aren't aware of colors because there's zero probability of sensing
them and your consciousness is slightly diminished by this because you
aren't conscious of things being "not red" or "not blue".
I'm still not clear on what you mean. If I almost have an accident
which could have left me in terrible pain should I feel something in
this world as a result of the near miss? Surely I would if the
counterfactuals have an effect on consciousness.
The hypothesis is that it would have some effect, not necessarily that
you would feel a little pain. Maybe the effect is that a certain
thought comes into your consciousness, "I could have been really hurt
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