On 5/1/2010 2:40 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 4:02 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>  wrote:
On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>

This argument is not
definitive mainly because we don't have a definitive theory of
consciousness, but to the extent we assume a physical basis for
consciousness it seems pretty good.

Ha!  As long as you assume there is no problem of consciousness, then
there's no problem!  That is pretty good.

So you do have a theory of consciousness in which we can have timeless
I'll go with Kant.  Time is an aspect of consciousness, not something
that exists independently of conscious experience.

So one possibility is that the universe exists and causes our
conscious experience...that our conscious experience is an aspect of
the physical world.

But what stops us from reversing that and saying that our
consciousnesses exist and the physical world is just an aspect of that
conscious experience?

How do you justify accepting the former while rejecting the latter?

I accept the latter and reject the former because I don't see what
introducing the "physical world" as something prior to and independent
of consciousness buys us in our attempts to explain our orderly
conscious experiences. If it is intended to explain the order and
consistency of our experiences, then what explains the physical
world's order and consistency? It seems to me that we've just changed
the question, not answered it. And in the process introduced the
additional question of how consciousness arises from matter.

Fine. You solve all problems by postulating that your consciousness is fundamental, it just IS, and for some unknowable reason it is a sequence of experiences which happen to correspond to living in an orderly and time directed universe. And do you believe this sequence will persist in producing orderly and consistent experiences? When hungry do you still expect that eating will assuage it? Do you imagine you are discussing this question with someone named Brent?


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