On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 9:48 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > That's assuming I believe some things are true in some absolute sense > unrelated to usefulness. I don't.
I am having the experience of seeing a red book. This is absolutely true, regardless of usefulness - and regardless of whether I am actually seeing a book or just hallucinating. The experience exists, even if the book doesn't. I am NOT having the experience of seeing a blue pen. This is also absolutely true, even if I am suffering from "blind-sight" and there's actually a blue pen here that I would react to correctly if pushed to do so. Truths about conscious experience are absolute truths, regardless of what (if anything) generates the experience. >> Just like there is no "red" in the world (in the sense that I >> experience it), there is no "time" in the world (in the sense that I >> experience it). >> >> Time is like red. Both only exist as aspects of experience. > > But (according to you) that is the only way anything exists. So time and > red exist if "exist" has any meaning at all. When I say time and red are aspects of consciousness, I mean it in the same way that a scientific realist means that spin is an aspect of an electron. >>>> On 5/1/2010 6:15 PM, Rex Allen wrote: >>>> I would expect an honest physicalist to say that he believed it >>>> because, given the initial conditions of the universe plus the >>>> causal laws of physics as applied over ~13.7 billion years, it >>>> could not be otherwise. >>>> He has no *choice* except to believe it. To not believe it would >>>> require different initial conditions, or different causal laws. >>> >>> >>> I thought you were not believing it because there were no initial conditions >>> or causal laws or universe. It's all what a physicalist would call an >>> illusion - i.e. a seemingly coherent series of experiences that do not refer >>> to anything but just are. But then you seem to switch viewpoints and want >>> to use the consistency of a solipist know-nothing position to argue about >>> which universes might exist?? >> >> I'm not switching positions, I'm saying that the "honest physicalist" >> should believe that his beliefs are determined only by the initial >> conditions and causal laws of the universe. > > Why would he be a determinist? If he's a physicalist, why wouldn't he believe that his beliefs are determined by the nature of the physical world? What else would they be determined by? > And what if they were? According to the > best physical models we have they are mostly determined by the recent > history of the universe plus probabilistic laws (QM) - Probabilistic laws are still causal laws, right? > and this explains why they are "true" in the sense of useful Which brings me back to the point that I made in the "no miracles" argument against scientific realism thread. Which you never responded to. > to those purposes we imagine we have. We *imagine* we have? What do you mean by that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
