On Nov 18, 5:10 am, Rex Allen <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 5:38 AM, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Nov 16, 3:27 am, Rex Allen <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> >> If logic and reason reduce to causal laws, then ultimately causal laws
> >> alone explain the result.
>
> > If causal explanation and rational explanation
> > are categoreally different, they don't exclude each other.
> > We can explain the operation of a calculator in terms of
> > electrical currents, or we could explain it in terms of
> > the laws of arithmetic. The two operate in parallel.
>
> The law of electromagnetism (or whatever physical law it approximates,
> if any) operates in the world and has causal power.
> The laws of arithmetic operate only in your mind and have no causal power.
>
> So, the two don't really operate in parallel. In fact the laws of
> arithmetic don't "operate", in any literal sense, at all.
That doesn't stop them being a valid explanation
> > What makes a calculator a calculator is that its
> > operation is susceptible to an arithemtic description.
>
> Arithmetic description exists only in the mind of a describer.
It's a valid description of that is true and false of
different things for objective reasons.
There is an important differrence between things that
exist in the mind qua useful high level descriptions (horses, logic)
and
things which exist only in the mind qua complete fictions (unicorns,
magic)
> One man's calculator is another man's hammer.
>
> One man's kindling is another man's slide rule.
>
> What makes a calculator a calculator is that you use it as a
> calculator. It's only a calculator in the sense that it's a
> calculator to you.
>
> There is some Putnam mapping that would let you use a rock as a
> calculator. But since you don't know this mapping, the rock is just a
> rock. Unlike the calculator, the rock wasn't designed to have easily
> interpreted inputs and outputs.
There is an occam's razor principle too. Most of these
Putnam mappings are too complex to be cognitively accessible
to us.
> > How can you infer from that that there is no valid arithimetical
> > description?
>
> Where did I say that there are no valid arithmetical descriptions? I
> certainly never meant to say that.
Then what is the point of claiming that they are in the mind?
> Though I do claim that you can't justify your belief in valid
> arithmetical descriptions...
>
<snip>
> My point being that, even assuming scientific materialism, trees and
> forests only exist in your mind. They are part of how things seem to
> us. They are part of us.
But not in the sense unicorns and magic are.
What this is all about is whether we can say things happen because of
rationality.
If rationality is a valid description of a particular event we can say
that the event
occurred because of rationality. We can avoid that, as you have been
doing,
by requiring that "because" only applies to some absolutely basic
physical causality.
But then we probably wouldn't ever know if any "because" statement was
valid. The sceptical
conclusion would follow, but only because of an initial decision to
raise the bar
and make things difficult for ourselves.
>Like logic and reason and arithmetic
> descriptions.
> >>> OTOH, it *is* obvious that being the result of causal
> >>> laws is exclusive of being freely chosen. You need, but
> >>> don't have, an argument to the effect that free choice is essential
> >>> to rationality.
>
> >> Actually I would say that the burden of proof is on you to show that
> >> abstract concepts, like logic and rationality, can also be causal
> >> forces.
>
> > Not at all. If L&R were causal, then they *would* exclude other
> > causal explanations. But their compatibility with causal
> > explanations is based on the fact that they are not a kind of
> > casual explanation.
>
> Well, here we are pretty close to agreement.
>
> So, either there are causal laws that have some sort of independent
> existence and account the order we see in the world - OR there aren't,
> and the order we observe is either the accidental result of random
> events or perhaps a product of our minds.
>
> However, logic and reason have no independent existence. They are
> part of our experience of the world, not part of the world.
They have mind-independent criteria of applicability even if they
don't have mind-independent
existence
> >> Is a computer executing a chess program logical or rational? Does
> >> logic cause the computer to select one move instead of another?
>
> > It doesn't cause it but it does explain it. It may be "just"
> > description but it is a valid description.
>
> How do you justify your belief in it's validity as a description?
It's concise, explanatory and predictive
> A very good quote:
>
> "The mind actively processes or organizes experience in constructing
> knowledge, rather than passively reflecting an independent reality.
> To speak metaphorically, the mind is more like a factory than a mirror
> or soft wax.
> [...]
>
> Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its
> object. In consequence of this mere nominal explanation, my
> cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object.
> Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by
> cognizing it...Since the object is outside me, the cognition in me,
> all I can ever pass judgment on is whether my cognition of the object
> agrees with my cognition of the object."
>
> -- Lee Braver, "A Thing of This World"
OTOH, scientific epistemology does not aim at a once-and-for
all overview of the mind-world relation. It is incremental, piecemeal
and based on predictive ability rather than correspondence
> > Talk of forests can be
> > replaced with talk of tress, but that doesn't mean there is no
> > forest.
>
> See my comments above.
>
> >> Logic and rationality are in the mind beholder if they are anywhere,
> >> and certainly not in the quarks and electrons of computers, which are
> >> the same as the quarks and electrons of rocks or clouds, and are
> >> *literally* unmoved by reason.
>
> > There are objective facts underpinning the applicability
> > of the concept "logical" There are objective facts
> > underpinning the applicability of the concept "quark"
>
> How do you know?
If you want to explain intesubjective agreement,
it seems a likelier hypothesis than the alterantives
>What underpins the objective facts then? Why can't
> the concept of a quark be fundamental?
If it is, the concpet of a quark is still a concept. Being "in the
mind"
doesn;t stop concepts having an objective basis.
> > There is a sense in which all concepts are in the head,
> > but it is not useful to look at things that way.
>
> "Not useful" in what sense?
In the sense that it doesn;t distinguish horse type
concepts from unicorn type concept
> With respect to what goal?
> And why do you have that goal instead of some other goal?
>
> >>> If double checking is unmiraculous, it can be caused as well
> >>> as anything else.
>
> >> But how do you double check your double check? If you doubt the
> >> assumptions and reasoning that led to your initial belief, why
> >> wouldn't those doubts apply equally to your double checking process?
>
> > I don't disupute that. If you think scepticism follows
> > from the fact that you can't infinity-check, then it follows,
> > since you can't. But I don't think that is a strong form of scepticism
>
> What would be a stronger form of skepticism?
That you can;t check at all, or that nothing is true
> > since it only means you can't be certain, not that you can't be right.
>
> I said as much in my second post to this thread, in response to SPK.
>
> Skepticism doesn't mean that we're necessarily wrong about anything,
> but rather that we can't justify our belief that we're right.
justify at all or infinity-check?
> >>>> Put succinctly, if we have knowledge we must accept beliefs only
> >>>> because we understand them to be true; but if determinism is correct,
> >>>> then we automatically accept whatever beliefs that our constituent
> >>>> micro-particles impose on us.
>
> >>> But there is nothing to stop them imposing understanding
> >>> and justification too. Our beliefs aren't necessarily true
> >>> or justified under determinism, but they aren't anyway.
> >>> What would be the difference between the deterministic
> >>> universe and the free will universe? Are you seriously
> >>> assrting that in the FW universe, our beliefs would be more
> >>> universally true and justified?
>
> >> NO! I'm not arguing for free will. I'm arguing for skepticism.
>
> >> 1. If there is no free will, then all that's left is skepticism.
>
> >> 2. There is no free will.
>
> >> 3. All that's left is skepticism.
>
> > But your arguments for scepticism actually have nothing to
> > do with FW!
>
> I quoted Bryan Caplan's argument that determinism entails skepticism
> in support of my more general claim that if we exist in a universe
> that is governed by unchanging causal laws (deterministic or
> otherwise) then we can't have justified, true, beliefs.
And I have criticised his argument
> Existing in such a universe also precludes the possibility of free will.
>
> Let me quote that earlier post:
>
> "If an entity exists in a universe that is subject to unchanging causal
> laws, how can it have justified true beliefs (a.k.a. knowledge)
> either?
>
> If the entity's beliefs are the result of some more fundamental
> underlying process, then those beliefs aren't held for reasons of
> logic or rationality.
>
> Rather, the entity holds the beliefs that are necessitated by the
> initial conditions and causal laws of it's universe.
>
> Those initial conditions and causal laws *may* be such that the entity
> holds true beliefs, but there is no requirement that this be the case."
And the "aren't held" of the second paragraph
isn;t justified by the "no requirement" of the fourth.
> >>>> It might be the case that those
> >>>> micro-particles coincidentally make me believe true things, but the
> >>>> truth would not be the ultimate causal agent acting upon me.
>
> >>> Or it might be the case that you have FW and freelly choose
> >>> to make mistakes. How would that look different? FW
> >>> can't force people to be correct and justified and right
> >>> all the time -- where's the freedom in that?
>
> >> Free will isn't a coherent concept so there's no point in spending
> >> much time on it.
>
> > If it isn't a coherent concept, how can its absence imply scepticism?
>
> If I said "free will implies X", then I would need free will to be a
> coherent concept.
>
> Since I'm saying "absence of free will implies skepticism", I don't
> need free will to be a coherent concept.
Yes you do, because "absence of squarglefax implies scepticism" is not
a valid argument.
> Incoherence is consistent with absence.
Incoherence doesn't imply absence, presence or anything else.
> Though, really my argument is more:
>
> Determinism entails skepticism. Determinism is a coherent concept.
>
> Indeterminism entails skepticism. Indeterminism is a coherent concept.
>
> So, I think I'm fine.
But neither argument is valid. You only have an argument
that you, all other things being equal, don;t
necessarily have justified true beliefs. THat doesn't mean
you don't actuall have justified true beliefs. Moroever
you need to look at the specifics of causal laws, eg
evolution.
> >> What does evolution add to a deterministic universe? Either the
> >> initial conditions and causal laws lead to some particular outcome
> >> (e.g., intelligence) -or- they don't. There's nothing for evolution
> >> to do.
>
> > It's a kind of anthropic principal. Since you are an evolved
> > being, you must have evolved from a long line of organisms
> > that weren't massively deluded.
>
> Why couldn't the universe have come into existence 1 minute ago with
> us fully formed as part of it's initial conditions?
It's a poor scientific hypothesis.
> What about Boltzmann Brains? Boltzmann universes?
>
> If we apply the principle of indifference to the universe's current
> macrostate, what should we conclude about the universe's entropy level
> yesterday? Should we conclude that it had higher or lower entropy
> than today?
>
> > The fact that you are in the universe
> > tells you something about the universe. You could not just pop up
> > in any old universe.
>
> Why not? What would stop that from happening?
The selfsame causal laws that are supposed to be preveting
you from having justified beliefs
> >> What's more, evolution adds nothing to a probabilistic universe either.
>
> >> What is evolution, beyond causal laws acting on state over time?
>
> > A specific kind of causal law that tends to promote rationality.
>
> Evolution is a causal law? Like electromagnetism, or the strong
> force, or gravity?
>
> Are there evolution fields? Evolution particles? "Evolvitons"?
>
> No.
>
> Evolution is a *consequence* of causal laws and initial conditions.
> It isn't a causal law itself.
That makes no difference. Organisms in a universe with evolution
will tend to be rational. It doesn't matter whether evolution
is a higher level law or description. The forest is still there even
if it is
really just trees.
> It is an "emergent" law, like the laws of thermodynamics. They are
> consequences, not causes.
> >> Again, you've taken a figure of speech (natural selection) and
> >> interpreted it literally.
>
> >> No "selection" actually takes place. Things just happen, per the
> >> governing causal laws (if there are any).
>
> > That's a massive non-sequitur. If causal laws cause
> > dinosaurs to die out that's selection occuring.
>
> No, that's just events transpiring in accordance with causal laws and
> initial conditions. There is no additional "selection" process above
> and beyond the usual fundamental laws of physics.
I didn't say there was. The forest isn;t over and above
the trees. If selection is an adequate high-level descriptio
of lower level processes, and those processes are occuring,
then "selection occurs" is true.
To assert of some thing X that it exists is not
to asser that it exists fundamentally.
> Which don't include evolution.
> > That the forest is a bunch of trees does not
> > mean there is no forest.
>
> It means that the forest only exists in your mind.
Of course not. The trees don;t exist only in my mind. The forest is
the trees.
THerefore the forest doesn't exist only in my mind.
>Like evolution.
> They are all descriptions, abstractions, representations - short cuts.
Descriptions can be and often are true.
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