On 17 Nov 2010, at 12:27, 1Z wrote:



On Nov 16, 5:50 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 15 Nov 2010, at 20:24, 1Z wrote:





On Nov 14, 11:04 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 14 Nov 2010, at 19:39, 1Z wrote:

On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53 PM, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
If an entity exists in a universe that is subject to unchanging
causal
laws, how can it have justified true beliefs (a.k.a. knowledge)
either?

If the entity's beliefs are the result of some more fundamental
underlying process, then those beliefs aren't held for reasons of
logic or rationality.

That doesn't follow.

It follows by definition.

1.  IF a universe governed by causal laws -

2. THEN everything that occurs within that universe is a result of
those laws acting on the universe's state.  Every change of state
happens according to some law.

3.  The entity's holding of some belief occurs within that
universe.

4. Therefore the entity's holding of some belief (whether rational *or* irrational) is a result of causal laws acting on the entity's
state, and nothing else.

What else could account for the entity's holding of some particular
belief?

"Logical" and "rational" are adjectives.  You're confusing
descriptive
labels with causal forces.

Your argument still doesn't work. You re tacitly assuming that
being the result of causal laws is exclusive of being the result
of logic/.reason. But that is , to say the least,  not obvioius.
OTOH, it *is* obvious that being the result of causal
laws is exclusive of being freely chosen.

? Are you saying that it is obvious that compatibilism is false?

It is obvious that if there is strict causal determinism, the will is
not
free from strict causal determinism.

It is not obvious for me (and the many compatibilists).

as stated, it's tautologous

Not so. Cf the use of the term "many". I was alluding to past discussions on this list, and to the fact that many philosophers are compatibilists. It is a debate which lasts since millennia.




Some people can premeditate crime, and this independently of the fact
that some genius in psychology, or God, could have predict their act.

If there choices are predicable because of determinism, they
are not free from determinism.

That's begging the issue. The point of compatibilism is that free-will exists even if there is determinism.





Either you throw the notion of person, or you ask for a 'magical'
notion of person.

Or there is not strict causal determinism

I don't see how low level indeterminacy (of any sort) could help in
bringing free-will.

I can

How?





On the contrary free-will is a form of partial
(from the point of view of the actor) self-determination.

and if the self is atomic, and if its self-determination is  tertium
datur that
is neither determinism nor indetermism, it is impossilbe

if the self is complex, its self-determination could be a regulated
form of low-level indeterminism

Which exists from a first person points of view. But it does not help to have free-will, except by letting emerge the type of stable observable reality we are used to.

I look forward for your explanation of how free will can be made possible by third person indeterminism. You could perhaps try to explain what is free will for you, so that we can avoid a vocabulary discussion. I use the term free will as a quasi synonymous as the ability to choose how to act in a context where we can see that many alternative actions are possible. For example I will choose freely in ten seconds if I will do a cup of coffee or a cup of tea, and I don't feel less free if it happened that some god has enough knowledge to predict my choice. It seems to me that if my decision is, even partially, based on third person indeterminacy (like if my brain was using some coin), then I am *less* free, with respect to my act.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to