Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe
>> in mathematics exists "in platonia"?
> The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we
> are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe
> you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things,
> you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell
> paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence.
Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object?
The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary
combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and
thus have only the "content" that every utterance has by virtue of being
uttered: There exists ... (something).
So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the
existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent
I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem.
Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too
broad or "explosive" or vague to be of any (formal) use.
I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has
1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it
may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that
there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence
of the one number "two". 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7
objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for
example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3.
I don't think the omnipotence paradox is problematic, also. It simply shows
that omnipotence is nothing that can be properly conceived of using
classical logic. We may assume omnipotence and non-omnipotence are
compatible; omnipotence encompasses non-omnipotence and is on some level
equivalent to it.
For example: The omnipotent God can make a stone that is too heavy for him
to lift, because God can manifest as a person (that's still God, but an
non-omnipotent omnipotent one) that cannot lift the stone.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Like in Plotinus, the ultimate being (arithmetical platonia) is
>>> not a
>>> itself (nor is matter!).
>> Could you explain what you mean with that?
> Platonia, the platonia of Plato, is the Noûs, [...]
Many thanks for your effort to explain this to me. :)
Honestly your non-technical explanation is a bit vague for me and your
technical explanation is simply way to technical for me. Some things seem to
make sense, but overall it's still quite mysterious to me.
Frankly I am a bit afraid to ask questions concerning your technical
explanation, because I'm not sure if you can answer them succintly or
whether I understand your explanations and I don't want you to waste your
time explaining it to me in great detail and then still be not much more
Maybe I will try searching some terms that I don't understand (or that I
don't understand the context of) on the list or in the web. Or perhaps it
well help when I learn logic at the university, though I guess it will be
not so much in depth.
A have a few questions regarding the non-technical part of explanation,
What does it mean that the soul falls, falls from what?
Why is matter evil? Because it is not perfect as platonia is? As it provides
a field were truth can manifest itself, it seems like this is a good thing
for the soul to learn to know itself, even if some aspect of matter are bad.
The tension between the divine intellect and the soul is the gap between
truth and believability, right?
How can the One / matter be outside of existence? I have no clue what this
could mean. Is the "outside" of existence not existence as well?
Is the one conscious? What you write seems to imply it is (eg "the ONE and
the Divine Intellect are overwhelmed by the Universal Soul,"), but I thought
only the universal soul can experience?
Do you mean it literally that the soul leaves matter at some point? Why does
the one let matter eminate at all then?
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