On 9/6/2011 3:23 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Let me try it this way. Could we say that universals exist already in the 3d person view and they are independent from the 1st person view?


On 06.09.2011 09:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I
guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as
well). A simple example:

A is a person; B is a person.

Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all
different persons. Yet then the question would be if something
universal and related to a term "person" exists in A and B.

Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so
in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and
materialism), nominalism that they are just notation and do not
exist as such.

It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says


Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals.
 Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly,
according to it the universals do exist literally.

I am not sure. UDA shows that we can take elementary arithmetic as
theory of everything (or equivalent). In that theory only 0, s(0),
s(s(0)), ... exist primitively (literally?).

Then you can derive existence of objects, among the numbers, which
have special property (like the prime numbers, the universal numbers,
the Löbian Universal numbers). Do they exist literally? I don't know
what that means. Do they exist primitively? That makes sense: s(s(0))
exists primitively and is prime.

Then you have the epistemological existence, defined by the things
the numbers, relatively to each other believes in (this includes the
 physical universes, the qualia, persons, etc.). They does not exist
 primitively, but their properties are still independent of the mind
of any machines. This is epistemological realism. Pain exists, in
that sense, for example.

All what you have, in the 3-pictures, are the numbers and their
relations and properties. This is enough to explain the "appearances"
of mind and matter, which exist from the number's perspective (which
can be defined by relation between machines' beliefs (defined
axiomatically) and truth (which is assumed, and can be approximated
from inside).

Now with comp, the primitive object are conventional. You can take
combinators, Turing "machines" or java programs instead of the
numbers. That will change nothing in the theory of mind and matter.



Does the existence of said universals act as a guarantor of the definiteness of the properties of the universals? As I see it, existence per say is neutral, it is merely the necessary possibility to be. We seem to be stuck with thinking that 3p = not-1p. What if 3p is the invariant over 1p instead? I.e. the objective world is what all observers hold as mutually non-contradictory, a sort of intersection of their 1p's. I worry that in our rush to toss out the subjective and illusory that we are discarding the essential role that an observer plays in the universe. Is it any wonder why we have such a 'hard problem' with consciousness because of this?

OTOH, it is incoherent to say that the Universals = 'what the nominals have in common' since we cannot prevent nominals that can entirely contradict each other. A possible solution to this is to consider how communication between observers works out.



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