I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not
sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy
idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to
notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them.
On the other hand, if we are to write a program that should classify
objects, then this program should have some dictionary with categories.
That dictionary in some sense should exist. This was my second
naive/crazy thought. It would be interesting to look how
realism/nominalism is translated into the object-oriented programming.
On 06.09.2011 05:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 9/5/2011 6:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/5/2011 1:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/5/2011 3:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/5/2011 12:02 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to
universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered
as universals as well). A simple example:
A is a person; B is a person.
Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all
different persons. Yet then the question would be if
something universal and related to a term "person" exists in
A and B.
Realism says that universals do exist independent from the
mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical
realism and materialism),
I think of that as Platonism. I think of realism as just the
theory that things exist independent of minds.
How does realism explain the means by which knowledge of these
'things that exist independent of the mind" obtains? Is there
some form of interaction between those 'independent things' and
our minds? If so, that mechanism is this and how does it work?
Those things interact with a brain which instantiates the mental
processes. At least that's the theory.
So the mind is merely epiphenomena? OK... Are you truly satisfied
with that explanation?
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