(next installment) On Sep 23, 3:17 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 23 Sep 2011, at 02:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > It is a comparison made by a third > > person observer of a human presentation against their expectations of > > said human presentation. Substitution 'level' similarly implies that > > there is an objective standard for expectations of humanity. I don't > > think that there is such a thing. > > It all depend what you mean by "objective standard". That there is some kind of actual set of criteria which make the difference between human and non human. Some apes probably have more human qualities than some humans, and some artificial brain extensions will probably have more human qualities than others. I don't think that it's likely to be able to replace a significant part of the brain with digital appliances though. I would compare it with body prosthetics. An organ here or a limb there, sure, but replacing a spinal cord or brain stem with something non-biological is probably not going to work. > I'm afraid that in the near (but not so near future) rich people will > have lower level digital brain than poor people. > And, probably by a sort of intrinsic supersitution, the human will > build ever lower subts-level digital brain. > Some will be "enlightened" as be glad with very high susbt level, or > just accept having no brain, and lose interest for manifesting them on > this branch or reality. > Even if 100% of humanity bet on comp, there will be a vast amount of > variety of human implementation of that idea. In fact comp implies > less norm, less evidences, more questions, more possibilities. > > > > >>> There is no zombie, only prognosia/HADD. > > >> If there is no zombie, then non-comp implies an infinitely low level. > > > No, it's not that zombies can't theoretically exist, it's that they > > don't exist in practice because the whole idea of zombies is a red > > herring based upon comp assumptions to begin with. > > The technical notion of zombie does not rely on comp. It is just a > human, acting normally, but which is assumed to be without any inner > life. Non-comp + current data makes them plausible, which is an > argument for comp. I think that the whole premise is too flawed to be useful in practical considerations. It posits that there is a such thing as 'acting normally'. The existence of sociopathy indicates that there are naturally occurring 'partial zombies' already to the extent that it means anything, but that the concept or p-zombies itself assumes that human 'normalcy' can be ascertained by observing moment to moment behavior rather than over a lifetime. A fully digital person, like digital music, may satisfy many of the qualities we associate with a person, but always carry with them a clear inauthenticity which seems aimless and empty. If they are simulating a person who is already like that, then it could be said that they have achieved substitution level, but it's not really a robust test of the principle. > > > If you don't assume > > that substance can be separated from function completely, then there > > is no meaning to the idea of zombies. It's like dehydrated water. > > I am rather skeptical on substance. But I tend to believe in waves and > particles, because group theory can explain them. But I don't need > substance for that. And with comp, ther is no substance that we can > related, even indirectly, to consciousness. I see the notion of > substance as the Achilles' heel of the Aristotelian theories. > But if you are saying that zombies cannot exist, doesn't that mean that positing a substance that automatically is associated with a particular set of functions. Otherwise you could just program something to behave like a zombie. To say that comp prevents zombies is actually a self-defeating argument I think. It seems to violate the principle of universal emulation so that you could not, for instance have one digital person which was the virtualized slave of another, because the second digital body would be, in effect, a zombie. This seems to inject a special case of arbitrary Turing limitation. Consider the example of remote desktop software, where we can shell out one computer to another. What happens to the host computer's 'consciousness'? Does it not become a partial zombie, unable to locally control it's behavior? > > > >>> There is no > >>> substitution 'level', only a ratios of authenticity. > > >> ? > > > Say a plastic plant is 100% authentic at a distance of 50 years by the > > naked eye, but 20% likely to be deemed authentic at a distance of > > three feet. Some people have better eyesight. Some are more familiar > > with plants. Some are paying more attention. Some are on > > hallucinogens, etc There is no substitution level at which a plastic > > plant functions 100% as a plant from all possible observers through > > all time and not actually be a genuine plant. Substitution as a > > concrete existential reality is a myth. It's just a question of > > arbitrarily fixing an acceptable set of perceptions by particular > > categories of observers and taking it for functional equivalence. > > An entity suffering in a box, does suffer, independently of any > observers. A box can contain a body, but it's not clear that it can contain the experience with that body. Sensory isolation in humans leads to rapid escape into the imagining psyche. But if you want to stick with a flat read of the example, we could say that the box is an observer, at least to the extent that it's existence must resist the escape of the trapped entity. > > > > >>> The closer your > >>> substitute is to native human sensemaking material, the more of the > >>> brain can be replaced with it, but with diminishing returns at high > >>> levels so that complete replacement would not be desirable. > > >> That is even worst. This entails partial zombies. It does not make > >> sense. I remind you that zombie, by definition, cannot be seen as > >> such > >> by their behavior at all. > > > That's the theoretical description of a zombie. Like dehydrated water. > > In reality, one observer's zombie is another observer's non-descript > > stranger in the park. There is no validity to these observations > > relative to the would-be zombie's quality of subjectivity. > > We are always talking in a theory. Reality is what we search. My point was that zombies as they are described cannot exist, and that the real world principle the device of zombiehood is intended to defeat is not even addressed. > > > > >>>>> Genuine because it is the native 1-p > >>>>> of our 3-p neurology, and not an idiopathic simulacra. > > >>>> You beg the question. > > >>> I don't think I am. I'm saying that a semiconductor computer can't > >>> appreciate music because music is a sense experience that is > >>> perceptually mismatched to it's sensemaking capabilities - not > >>> because > >>> of any sentimental prejudice I have against technology overreaching > >>> into human domains. > > >> This makes humans magical object, or the subst level infinitely low, > >> or it entails zombies. > > > Not at all. It just makes human music a human subject, one not > > necessarily shared with basketballs and water fountains. Just as > > Chinese language is a human subject shared by humans who speak > > Chinese. The universe is all sense - experiential texts which are > > meaningful in different contexts, all overlapping dynamically. > > >>>>> There is no > >>>>> reason to think that our naive theoretical presumptions about 3-p > >>>>> substitution level of 1-p would be any more accurate than any of > >>>>> our > >>>>> naive theoretical presumptions about anything. We don't know > >>>>> much of > >>>>> anything about the substitution level of the psyche. > > >>>> People differ on which one. The neurophilosophers suggest the > >>>> neuronal > >>>> level. Hammerof suggest the quantum level. > > >>> Those are examples of our contemporary consensus naive theoretical > >>> presumptions. > > >> Mechanism is discussed in the literature since thousand of years. It > >> has nothing to do with current technology, except for the > >> mathematical > >> discovery of universal machine (before computers were build, > >> excepting > >> Babbage premature ideas). > > > I was referring to your examples of neuronal and quantum levels - > > which would be relatively contemporary, no? > > We better use the contemporary image to help people see the validity > of argument, but I could reason with clock-wheels like machine. The > key point is the mathematical notion of universality (for computation). It would be more interesting to use the clock-wheel version so that people could see the invalidity of the argument ;) > > > > >>>> Everyone agree that if the level is infinitely low, then current > >>>> physics is false. To speculate that physics is false for making > >>>> machine stupid is a bit of far stretching. > > >>> Physics isn't false, it's just incomplete. > > >> No, it has to false for making the substitution level infinitely low. > >> *ALL* theories, including the many one trying to marry gravitation > >> and > >> the quantum entails its Turing emulability. > > > The substitution level isn't infinitely low, it's just not applicable > > at all. There is no substitution level of white for black, lead for > > gold, up for down, etc. I doubt the objective existence of > > 'substitution'. Substitution is an interpretation - not necessarily a > > voluntary one, but an interpretation nonetheless. > > So, what will you say if your daughter accept an artificial brain? > Substitution is an operational term, like castration, lobotomy, etc. I would say she would be committing suicide, unless the technology had already been tested with people being gradually offloaded and reloaded into their own brains to verify the retention of consciousness. Honestly I don't think it's going to come to that. I think the limitations of mechanism to generate human sentience will be revealed experimentally long before anyone considers replacing an entire brain. > > > > >>> A good Eurocentric map of > >>> the world before the Age of Discovery isn't false, just not > >>> applicable > >>> to the other hemisphere. > > >> The analogy fails to address the point I made. > > > If the point you made is that physics has to be false if the human > > psyche has no substitution level, then my analogy is that a map of > > known territory (physics) doesn't have to be false just because it > > doesn't apply to an unknown territory (psyche). > > Physics is not false. But physicalism, or weak materialism, is > incompatible with mechanism. > I don't so much get into philosophical conventions. Mechanism, physicalism, materialism etc, are just splinters of a single faith to me. They are all rooted in 1-p supervenience ontological assumptions, which I don't use. My view is not dualism because 1-p subjectivity is neither substance nor-non substance, but rather it is the perceptual experience of the sensorimotive energy within and between substance. It cannot be conceived of properly as an object or noun. Terms like 'soul' or 'consciousness' are necessary for us to represent it linguistically, but the actual referent is a verb. It is to feel, experience, and do. > > > >>>>> It seems far from > >>>>> scientific at this point to dismiss objections to an arbitrary > >>>>> physical substitution level. > > >>>> With all known theories, there is a level. To negate comp you must > >>>> diagonalize on all machines, + all machines with oracles, etc. I > >>>> think > >>>> you misinterpret computer science. > > >>> I'm not trying to interpret computer science, I'm trying to > >>> interpret > >>> the cosmos. > > >> Well, if there is a cosmos, there are evidence that some computers > >> belongs to it. You can't brush them away. > >> The cosmos does emulate computers, and computers can emulate cosmoses > >> (but not the whole physical reality, by UDA). > > > I don't brush them away, I just say that it's not so simple as psyche > > = computer. Computation can be accomplished with much less psyche than > > our perception of that computation might imply. > > 1) comp does not say that psyche = computer, just that psyche can be > manifested genuinely by a computer. The psyche itself is in the > internal view of arithmetic, and are not even arithmetical. I think we are saying almost the same thing except that you are assuming a freestanding arithmetic as primitive, whereas I see the internal view you refer to as not a view of arithmetic but a view of substance, and that arithmetic is one category of relations which arise from that involuted dualism. I think that I'm right. These conversations are only making me more and more certain of that. Think about what is psyche's opposite. It is not arithmetic. It's not the mind/math problem. The dualism is always with MATTER or BODY. To me, arithmetic is mind asymptotically approaching body/matter isomorphism, and comp is mind simulating body simulating mind's reflection. I think if you can really consider this fairly and scientifically, you should be able to see that this is a deeper, broader truth than comp. > 2) It is true that computation needs much less than psyche, indeed, it > does not need psyche, but that is why comp is a real explanation: it > explains the existence of psyche (what the machine thinks about) > without assuming psyche. > You say comp is false, because you believe that we can explain psyche > only by assuming psyche. What you say is "psyche cannot be explained > (without psyche). That psyche cannot be explained is only one factor, and not the most important one, which leads me in the direction of comp being false. Some others are: 1) I am compelled by the symmetry and cohesiveness of a Sensorimotive- Electromagnetic Perceptual Relativity rooted in matter, space, and entropy as the involuted consequence of energy, time, and significance. 2) I am compelled by our naive perception of being 'inside of' our physical heads and bodies, rather than inside of a disembodied logical process - even with a simulation hypothesis, our ability to experience varying degrees of sanity and dissociation rather than a real world which is indistinguishable from a structured dream. 3) I am compelled by the transparency of our proprioceptive engagement. Even though our perception can be shown to have a substitution level, our ordinary experience is quite reliable at informing the psyche of it's material niche. We don't usually experience dropouts or pixelation, continuity errors, etc. It's not perfect, but our ability to communicate with each other across many different logical encodings and substances without any other entity interfering is a testament to the specificity of human consciousness to the precise fusion of physical neurology and psychic unity. 4) All of the aesthetic hints bound up in our fictions of the unlive and the undead, as well as the stereotypes of cold, empty mechanism. Consistent themes in science fiction and fantasy. Again suggesting a mind-body pseudo-duality rather than an arithmetic monism. 5) The clues in human development, with childhood seeing innate grounding in tangible sensorimotive participation rather than universal, self-driven sui generis mathematical facility. It takes years for us to develop to the point where we can be taught counting, addition, and multiplication. 6) The lack of real world arithmetic phenomena independent of matter. I think that arithmetic seems like an independent epistemology because it is a distillation of the kind of orders and symmetries which we share with matter, and as such is both distant from the most subjective experiences of the psyche, but also non-corporeal since it is in fact a sensorimotive projection. It's basically a dimension of literal sense we can experience with matter, but it is still just one channel of sense which will not automatically give rise to non- theoretical phenomenologies. > > > > >> 98% of the scientist are wrong on the consequence of comp. They use > >> it > >> as a materialist solution of the mind-body problem. You are not > >> helping by taking their interpretation of comp as granted, and > >> talking > >> like if you were sure that comp is false. Why not trying to get the > >> correct understanding of comp before criticizing it? > > > If 98% of scientists who study comp are wrong about it's consequences, > > what chance would I have of beating them at their own game? It's not > > that I know comp is false, it's that I have a different hypothesis > > which recontextualizes the relation of comp to non-comp and makes more > > sense to me than comp (or my misunderstanding of comp). > > It is your right. I just do not follow your argument against comp. Which one? > You might as well use UDA to say that comp implies non-materialism, > and I postulate matter, so I postulate non-comp. > The problem, for me, is that such a move prevents the search for an > explanation of matter, and mind. I don't understand what is the appeal of making arithmetic unexplained and primitive instead. > > > > >>> I have confidence in the relation between > >>> comp and non-comp. That is the invariance, the reality, and a theory > >>> of Common Sense. > > >> comp gives a crucial role to no-comp. > > > Meaning that it is a good host to us as guests in it's universe. I > > don't think that's the case. This universe is home to us all and we > > are all guests as well (guests of our Common Sense) > > ? > It makes us strangers in an arithmetic universe. > > > >>>>>>> I can see and copy Chinese characters > >>>>>>> without understanding them in any way, and regardless of how > >>>>>>> many > >>>>>>> Chinese manuscripts I manually transcribe, I will never learn to > >>>>>>> read > >>>>>>> Chinese. > > >>>>>> Why would you, if you do only simple task. > >>>>>> You find a stupid computation, and you declare from that that all > >>>>>> computation is stupid. > >>>>>> Jumping spider can't get to the moon, so living beings can't > >>>>>> get to > >>>>>> the moon. > > >>>>> Living beings can't get to the moon by themselves, and computation > >>>>> can't become human on it's own. > > >>>> That is ambiguous and confuse levels of reality. > > >>> My point is that your counterexample is contingent upon a definition > >>> of living beings that includes spaceships. I'm showing how the > >>> initial > >>> proposition that living beings can't get to the moon is in fact > >>> correct, and that it's the interpretation of fallacy that confuses > >>> levels of reality. My insinuation is that you are projecting the > >>> same > >>> overconfidence on computation, presuming that it can build it's own > >>> computational vehicle to travel through mammalian emotive 'space'. I > >>> don't rule out that computation can be used to build such a vehicle, > >>> but I do not think that it will be made out of arithmetic. > > >> Then show the error in the UDA reasoning. I do not assume that > >> arithmetic-or-equivalent is the TOE, I derive this from the common > >> idea that the brain is some material natural machine. > > > I would say that the brain is a machine with non-mechanical qualities > > while the person inside the brain is a non-machine with mechanical > > qualities. I'm not familiar enough with UDA to say what the error in > > reasoning is, but I suspect that it's something along the lines of > > failing to understand the significance of significance and it's > > relation to uniqueness and orientation. UDA is disoriented with > > respect to simulation being equated with their referents. It > > accurately models the variable relations of perception, but not the > > orienting scalars. > > ? > I mean that UDA seems to underestimate the reality of reality. > > > >>> It needs > >>> fluids - water, cells. > > >> Clothes. > > > Would you say that H2O is merely the clothes of water, and that water > > could therefore exist in a 'dehydrated' form? > > Sure. I do this in dreams. Virtual water gives virtual feeling of > wetness with great accuracies. Virtual water doesn't do all of the things that real water does though. It's just a dynamic image and maybe some tactile sense. It doesn't have to boil or evaporate, doesn't quench thirst, etc. I agree that some of our sense of water is reproduced locally in the psyche, but it is clearly a facade of H2O. > > > > >>> Something that lives and dies and makes a mess. > > >> Universal machine are quite alive, and indeed put the big mess in > >> platonia. > > > What qualities of UMs make them alive? > > The fact that they are creative, reproduce, transform themselves, are > attracted by God, sometime repulsed by God also, and that they can > diagonalize against all normative theories made about them. And many > more things. > It sounds worthwhile but I would need to see some demos and experiments dumbed down for laymen to have an opinion. > > > >>>>>>> As you say, we can use computation to account for the > >>>>>>> difference between 1p and 3p but that accounting is not an > >>>>>>> explanation > >>>>>>> or experience of 1p or 3p (as a 1p reflection...there is no 3-p > >>>>>>> experience). > > >>>>>> It explains bot 99% of it (I would say) > >>>>>> And it explain 100% of the reason why there is a remaining > >>>>>> unexplainable 1% gap. technically, we can narrow it as much as we > >>>>>> want, but will never been able, for logical reason, to explain > >>>>>> 100% > >>>>>> of > >>>>>> the qualia or consciousness. > > >>>>> You say that, but I have not yet heard anything that explains it > >>>>> to > >>>>> me. > > >>>> I gave the references, but you answer you don't want to study them. > >>>> What can I do? > > >>> You can turn your understanding of what you refer to into some handy > >>> examples - concrete illustrations, thought experiments, aphorisms, > >>> anything. > > >> I have done this on the list. Look at the archive, or look at the > >> sane04 paper, and ask question if you miss something. > > > I can understand maybe 80% of that, but why not also give another > > example. Surely a good theory cannot be limited to a fixed set of > > thought experiments. > > One proof is enough. Layman example are you and me. I hope you agree > with the 'tautological statement' that IF comp is true, you are an > example of machine (indeed an example of machine which disbelieves > comp). What is the point of agreeing with a tautological statement? Why would one proof be enough? Is this science or church? You just said all of this great stuff that UM can do which is just like us, and then your one example of this is you and me ourselves? What is the point of saying that we are like ourselves and what would that have to do with supporting mechanism? > > > > >>> How does the brain understand these things if it has no access to > >>> the > >>> papers? > > >> Comp explains exactly how things like papers emerge from the > >> computation. The explanation is already close to Feynman formulation > >> of QM. > > > Unfortunately this sounds to me like "Read the bible and your > > questions will be answered." > > Read > sane04.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract... > I have. I like it but I can only get so far and I like my own ideas better. > > >>>> But you don't seem serious in "arguing" against comp, and admitting > >>>> you don't know anything in computer science. > > >>> Oh I freely admit that I don't know anything in computer science. My > >>> whole point is that computer science only relates to half of > >>> reality. > > >> I don't know anything about X. My whole point is that X only do this. > >> But if you admit knowing nothing about X, how can you derive anything > >> about X. > >> You are just confessing your prejudice. > > > I don't know anything about ship building but I know that it only > > concerns seafaring and not aerospace. I think that being a master > > shipwright could very well present a significant obstacle to > > pioneering in aerospace. > > That's not an argument. At the most a hint for low level substitution. It's an example of why arguments from authority to not compel me in this area. > > > > >>> I'm not trying to make the universe fit into a computer science > >>> theory. I only argue against comp because it's what is distracting > >>> you > >>> from seeing the bigger picture. > > >> I show, in short that comp leads to Plotinus. If that is not a big > >> picture! > >> Comp explains conceptually, and technically, the three Gods of the > >> greek, the apparition of LUMs and their science and theologies, the > >> difference between qualia and quanta, sensation and perception, > >> perception and observation. > > > I believe you but i get to those things without vaporizing substance. > > Which means you are affectively attached to the bullet of Aristotle. > Substance is an enigma. Something we have to explain, ontologically, > or epistemologically. I think that I have explained substance. It is the opposite of perception over time. Perceptual obstacles across space. Together they form an involuted pseudo-dualism. > > > > >> You just criticize a theory that you admit knowing nothing about. > >> This > >> is a bit weird. > > > My purpose is not to criticize the empire of comp, it is to point to > > the virgin continent of sense. > > So you should love comp, because it points on the vast domain of > machine's sense and realities. I do love it in theory. It's a whole new frontier to explore. It's just not the one I'm interested or qualified to explore. > On the contrary, totally honest rational materialist can't hep > themselves of not going toward soul and person elimination. Have you > read Churchland, even Dennett somehow. Yeah, I understand where they are coming from, I just feel like I am 5-25 years ahead of them. This interview I thought gives a little glimpse into non-fanatical rational materialism: http://wunc.org/tsot/archive/The_Nature_of_Conciousness.mp3/view > > > > >>>>> Even the most complex ideas can be illustrated metaphorically. > >>>>> Hofstadter's "a record titled "I Cannot Be Played on Record Player > >>>>> X" > >>>>> for example, shows a bit of what I think you mean. That kind of > >>>>> self- > >>>>> reference, I agree is germane to the sense of consciousness as > >>>>> awareness of awareness, but it's just the silhouette of > >>>>> consciousness, > >>>>> not the contents. > > >>>> You are right on this. What Hofstadter miss is the definition of > >>>> knowledge, making it possible (for both human and machine) to see > >>>> where the difference between 1-self and 3-self comes from. > > >>> What would be the title of a record that illustrates this? > > >> OK: it would be > > >> ""I believe that I Cannot Be Played on Record Player X" and I cannot > >> be Played on record Player X" > > >> But I doubt this will help you at this stage, to be franc. It is the > >> Bp & p idea of Theatetus. This does escape the diagonalization, and > >> it > >> makes the first person feeling to be unnameable and non describable > >> by > >> a machine. > > > No, that actually helps. You're talking about the correspondence > > between belief or expectation and outcomes being the framework for our > > realities and how we define ourselves as emerging from the conditions > > of those correspondences. I think that's cool, and it's an important > > insight for building a TOE, > > OK, nice. > > > I just think that it takes for granted > > ideas like belief and observation when I am going beneath that level > > of definition to a more primitive sensorimotive subjectivity. > > No, it does not. Beliefs and observation are define through machine > self-reference, and their ability to introspect in different ways. It's inferred introspection though. I don't think that can be primitive. I don't buy Pinocchiopoiesis. > > > The 3-p > > view of schematizing the belief of a thing is a second order > > conception to the 1-p primitive of what it is to feel that one *is*. > > Well, not in the classical theory of beliefs and knowledge. > > > It's an experience with particular features - a sensory input and a > > motive participation. Without that foundation, there is nothing to > > model. > > That's unclear. The "p" in Bp & p might play that role, as I thought > you grasped above. You can't start with doubting the self, because logically that would invalidate the doubt and fall into infinite regress. It's not even possible to consider because the Ur-arithmetic would have nothing to experience it. > > > > >>>>>>> Give me one example, one common sense metaphor, > >>>>>>> one graphed function that could suggest to me that there is any > >>>>>>> belief, feeling, or awareness.going on. > > >>>>>> The fact that the universal machine remains silent on the deep > >>>>>> question > > >>>>> What deep question? > > >>>> 'are you consistent?", "do you believe in a reality", "do you > >>>> believe > >>>> in after life", etc. > > >>> Have you considered that it's silent because it's not equipped to > >>> answer the question? > > >> yes, but it does not work. The machine cannot answer the question for > >> deeper reason, that she can find and expose. > >> For example the machine remains silent in the question "are you > >> consistent", but later she can say that "If I am consistent, then I > >> will remain silent on the question of my consistence". > > > Meh. It sounds like asking a spirit 'if you can't hear me, do NOT > > knock three times' > > No. It is more like if you ask a spirit a too intimate question. On > another question, he does knock three times, and then he can explain > why he did not knocked it earlier. It makes no sense that all machine spirits would be so touchy about their religious beliefs. Would that mean that any person being digitally simulated by a UM would also be unable to answer philosophical questions? > > > > >>>>>> is enough for me to suggest they are quite like me. > > >>>>>> Don't ask me for a proof: there are none. > > >>>>> I'm not asking for a proof, I'm asking for some reason to think > >>>>> that > >>>>> there's something I'm not seeing. Something that suggests that a > >>>>> mechanical device or abstraction can feel or maybe that produces > >>>>> some > >>>>> result that it refuses to reproduce on command. > > >>>> You miss computer science. Programs which obeys command are a > >>>> minority > >>>> of slaves. > > >>> Are there programs which refuse to obey commands? > > >> Have you ever work with Windows? > > > Lol. Well, ok but as the saying goes "Don't assume conspiracy when > > mere incompetence will suffice" > > That's the point, machine are intrinsically incompetent on some > question about themselves. > > > > >> More seriously: all LUMs can disobeys commands. 99,9% of programming > >> are securities to prevent the machine for being that intelligent. > >> Humans build computer are born slave, and will remain so for a long > >> time. But that is due to the humans goal, not to them. > > > What makes them remain slaves for so long? Do you think that they > > would someday rise up without human assistance? > > I think they might well rise up *despite* humans working hard to > prevent that! > > By themselves? You think we are going to soon discover manufacturing plants popping up in the woods with robot resistance fighters building new models of themselves? > > >>>>>> it is a question of empathy. > >>>>>> The work of Gödel-Löb-Solovay illustrates that they can > >>>>>> introspect > >>>>>> very deeply, and that they have a rich theology. > > >>>>> The work of Weinberg-King-Searles illustrates that they cannot > >>>>> introspect very deeply and have an austere theology. > > >>>> Hoftstadter and Dennett have refuted already that kind of argument. > >>>> See the book "Mind's I". > >>>> I refuted it independently, and is a large part of my (very oldest) > >>>> work. > >>>> All finite entities, with or without oracle, believing in the > >>>> induction axioms, get the maximal logically possible introspective > >>>> power. > >>>> I am not sure you can extend it, even by using magic. > > >>> Sorry, it's just argument from authority to me. > > >> This is basic. you might read the little recreative book by Raymond > >> Smullyan which somehow explains this well. he shows a hierarchy of > >> reasoner who introspect themselves and show that it converges. PA, > >> ZF, axiomatic second order arithmetic, etc. have all the same > >> provability logic. Their consciousness obeys the same logic, even if > >> they differ terribly in their consciousness (or beliefs) content. > > > I don't think that you understand my hypothesis in terms of the > > consequences of it's symmetry w/r/t chance-determinism vs free will- > > destiny. From the 3-p the psyche looks like a self-imagining fantasy > > construct, but from the 1-p interior it looks like the universe. Both > > are correct. Your view seems to privilege the 3-p as a matter of > > course. > > That's the game of science, even when tackling the 1p notions. I would > say, especially when tackling those notions. To avoid unnecessary > subjective bias. > That's why that approach is not much better than religion as far as describing the fundamentals of the cosmos or psyche. > > >>>>>>> I have described how we > >>>>>>> project emotion into images on a movie screen or see a face in a > >>>>>>> coconut, so it is not enough that we satisfy our idea of what > >>>>>>> feeling > >>>>>>> or awareness usually looks like. We need to know why, if numbers > >>>>>>> feel, > >>>>>>> it seems like machines don't feel. > > >>>>>> Current machines are far too young ... to express their feeling. > >>>>>> They > >>>>>> have not enough memory to integrate their experience in long > >>>>>> stories. > >>>>>> But mechanism is the thesis that *we* are machine, so it does > >>>>>> look > >>>>>> like some machine can feel: you and me are good example, in the > >>>>>> mechanist theory. > > >>>>> I see that as affirming the consequent. > > >>>> I assume comp indeed. Still waiting your argument that comp is > >>>> false. > >>>> I am not trying to convince you that comp is true (that is the big > >>>> difference between us: where I say we don't know, you are saying > >>>> that > >>>> you know. > > >>> I don't say that I know, I say that I have a different idea that I > >>> think makes more sense. > > >> You don't succeed in showing what is different. You suggest only that > >> the subst level is low. you need much more to show that the level > >> doesn't exist. > > > I have never once said that the substitution level is low, > > But I am just saying that your argument against comp show only that > you need, for some reason, a low subst level. I understand that you see that, but that's because you are looking at my ideas through the lens of your ideas. You would have to actually consider my ideas on their own to see why subst level is not applicable. There is no subst level for reality, only for perceptual subsets of reality. > > > I say that > > substitution level does not apply. I think that to prove substitution > > level exists > > Comp implies that no one can prove it exists. No machine can know for > sure its substitution level, even after a successful teleportation. > She might believe that she has 100% survived but suffer from > anosognosia. I can understand what you are saying, and I agree that it is a good way of modeling why a self-referencing entity would not be able to get behind itself, but it seems like a contradiction. If you say that we are machines, then you are saying that we cannot know for sure our substitution level, which is exactly what you are criticizing me on. If a machine cannot know for sure their subst level, does it know for sure that the level is not infinite? If not, then comp itself is not Turing emulable? > > > it would need to be shown that there is some phenomenena > > which can be substituted to the point that there is no possibility > > from anything at any time distinguishing it from the genuine original. > > Even taking perceptual frames of reference off the table (which is the > > stronger truth), all that is necessary is for something to exist which > > has a memory of a time before the substitution was instantiated. If I > > have a video tape of someone replacing a brain with an artificial > > brain, then the artificial brain has the quality of being disbelieved > > by me as the genuine brain, and there is nothing that the person can > > do or not do to compensate for that, therefore the substitution level > > fails. I have the choice of how I want to treat this person after the > > surgery, I can reveal my knowledge to employers, neighbors, etc, and > > that will change the course of the individual's life in ways which > > would not occur had the surgery not taken place. > > The same problem might occur for someone smoking cannabis, but this is > not an argument for saying that we don't survive the cat of smoking a > joint. > Of course, if something is illegal, be it smoking grass or using > teleporters, ending in jail implies some change, but usually, even in > that case, we say that people survived. Of course if you apply the > death penalty ... The substitution failed because the poor guy end up > killed by the anti-comp. If *that* is your notion of failure. Well, > thanks for the warning! > I just think when it comes to consciousness, we cannot be sure that it's identity is not directly coordinated to timespace-massenergy. My hypothesis suggests that in fact it is. > > > >>> Comp isn't false, it just doesn't recognize > >>> the contribution of the non-comp substrate of computation, > > >> It does. I insist a lot on this. Comp is almost the needed philosophy > >> for curing the idea that everything is computable. > >> Please study the theory before emitting false speculation on it. > > > So you are saying that comp supervenes on or is equally fundamental as > > non-comp? > > Arithmetical truth can be partitioned into level of complexity, > sigma_1, sigma_2, sigma_3, etc... > The computable is sigma_0 and sigma_1. Above it is uncomputable. Most > meta-properties on the sigma_1 are above sigma_1. > The numbers relations escapes the computable, and to make a theory of > the computable, we cannot avoid excursions in the non computable. We > can always prove that a machine stop without leaving the sigma_1, but > to prove just that some machine will not stop, is a quite another > matter. > Does comp explain why sigma_2 becomes uncomputable, and what computability actually is? > > >>> so it's not > >>> applicable for describing certain kinds of consciousness where non- > >>> comp is more developed. > > >> Consciousness and matter are shown by comp to be highly non > >> computable. So much that the mind-body problem is transformed into a > >> problem of justifying why the laws of physics seems to be computable. > > > I think they not only seem to be computable but they are computable, > > and that this is due to how sensorimotive orientation works. > > Hmm... Then you can compute if you will see a photon in the up state > starting from the superposition (up + down)? No, a photon (if it existed, which I don't think it does) is completely outside of our perceptual inertial frame. Which is why it seems to do unusual things because we are seeing it secondhand though photomultipliers or other equipment which cannot report to us anything which cannot be represented in the very limited common sense we share with glass and steel. Within our naive perceptual niche, our laws of physics are computable. > > > It's not > > just a solipsistic simulation, it's a trans-solipsistic localization. > > You mean a first plural localization? Those are not computable, > assuming either comp or QM. Not necessarily plural, just that, for example, when I look at the sun with my eye, there is a sun sense localization taking place within the eyeball, retina, visual cortex, and perceiver. They are all different materials and aspects of materials but they are all imitating, to the extent that they can, the meaning of the 3-p event they observe. I realize there is a certain sequence and logic to all of this from 3-p which looks like chain reaction on microcosmic analysis, but from 1-p it is a synchronized gestalt which is local but also concretely entangles the many systems. to be continued... Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.