On Sep 29, 10:31 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> There *is* a strictly neurological reason for the 3-P observable > behaviour. If we limit ourselves to talking about that, do you agree? I would say no, because I would not describe something like 'gambling' as strictly neurological reason in the sense that I think you intend it. Of course all of our feelings and perceptions are neurological experiences in the broad sense, but that's just because neurological structures feel and perceive. > > >> If a thought can > >> cause a movement in the absence of a physical event, for example if > >> ligand-dependent ion channels open and trigger an action potential in > >> the absence of the ligand, that would be observed as magical, like a > >> table levitating. > > > The thought *is* a physical event, it's just the subjective view of > > it. It's many physical events, each with a subjective view, but > > together, rather than forming a machine of objects related in space, > > the experiential side is experiences over time which are shared as a > > single, deeper, richer experience stream over time. > > But you can't see the thought. Restrict discussion for now to the 3-P > observable behaviour of a neuron being investigated by a cell > biologist. From the scientist's point of view, the neuron only fires > in response to stimuli such as neurotransmitters at the synapse > (depending on what sort of neuron it is). No, you can see in that brain animation that the neuron fires whenever it needs to /wants to. It's actions aren't inevitable or scheduled in some way, it's responding directly to the overall perceptions and motives of the person as a whole as well as all of the congruences and conflicts amongst the subordinate neural pathways. >Do you see that if the > thought makes the neuron do anything other than what the scientist > expects it to do from consideration of its physical properties and the > physical properties of the environment then it would be observed to be > behaving magically? > Only if the scientist knew nothing about neurology. What the neurons do, collectively *is* thought. It's no different than how bacteria use quorum sensing to make collective decisions. I understand why you might assume that neurons are passive receptacles to some kind of neurological law, but that is not the case. They are living organisms. Look at how heart cells synchronize: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RO4pAc21M24 They communicate with each other. They do things as a group. Neurons are much more complicated and unpredictable. They are able to do what they want to do, not just what they have to do. > > You are not answering my question. Why does there need to be > > 'understanding' at all? You are saying that neurology causes something > > to occur: understanding. What do you mean by that. What is it? Magic? > > Metaphysics? > > It's something which cannot be reduced to something simpler. > Irreducibility is just a characteristic of it. Saying that doesn't explain what it is. > > > > > > > >> Again I don't think you understand what would happen if you replaced > >> part of your brain with a qualia-less component that had the same > >> third person observable behaviour. Perhaps you could tell me in your > >> own words if you do. > > > What would really happen is that it could not have the same third > > person observable behavior. If someone is deaf, you cannot observe > > their lack of hearing by observing them, unless you intentionally try > > to test them. If you replace someones eyes with eyes which only see in > > the x-ray spectrum, then the visual cortex would pick it up in the > > familiar colors of the visible spectrum. If you replaced the visual > > cortex with something that processes optical stimulation in the eyes > > invisibly, then the patient would see nothing but would develop > > perceptual compensation from their other senses very rapidly compared > > with someone who went blind suddenly. They would have to learn to read > > their new optical capacity and it would not be visual, but it would > > enable them eventually to behave as a sighted person in most relevant > > ways. > > The replacement part reproduces the 3-P behaviour of the biological > part. I think that's a mistake to begin with. Does a plastic plant reproduce the 3-P behavior of a biological plant? If you don't know what the behavior is, how do you know that it's possible to reproduce it by other means? You're just assuming that it is like a metal washer that can be replaced with a plastic one, but we have no reason to think that this is anything like that. >This means the rest of the brain also has the same 3-P > behaviour, since it is subjected to the same 3-P environmental > influences from the replacement part (that is what was reproduced, > even if the qualia were not). So the subject behaves as if he has > normal vision and hearing and believes that he has normal vision and > hearing. It's jumping to a conclusion based on an incorrect assumption. I've already outlined exactly what I think would happen in the different replacement scenarios. None of them involve the subject immediately behaving as if they could see without seeing. It's a blatantly simplistic and overly theoretical proposition to see this replacement idea as illuminating. It's a bad example. It's not even good science fiction. > > You may object that the rest of the subject's brain does not behave > normally since it lacks the input from the qualia. But if the qualia > affect neurons directly, over and above what you would expect from the > qualia-less physical activity, that would mean that magical events are > observed. The qualia affect the experience of the neuron's interior. Whether that translates into some motive output behavior depends on the neuron's interpretation. You are not seeing that there is constant interaction between the sensorimotive interior and electromagnetic exterior - sometimes it's the sensorimotive inducing the electromagnetic, and sometimes it's the other way around. You can't always tell which is which from the outside or the inside. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. 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