On 10/3/2011 2:42 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 October 2011 16:43, Stephen P. King<stephe...@charter.net>  wrote:

     But why some particular type of primitive rather than some other? It
seems to me, for symmetry reasons, that a truly ultimate primitive would
have no particular properties associated with it at all! I think that there
is a flaw in this reductionist idea, the idea that there exists a
fundamental primitive that both is irreducible (by definition!) and has some
properties rather than some others. We have been considering some form of
Number as our primitive and I have been raising objections to this because
while numbers definitely do seem to be irreducible primitives, the very
notion that they are numbers vanishes when we consider them at this
primitive level because the structure of Arithmetic, which gives meaning and
haecceity to them, was dissolved away by the Aqua Regia of Reduction.
     One cannot have properties and not the means that generates them, to
claim otherwise is a contradiction
Stephen, I don't know if the following will help (and I don't know
either if Bruno will agree with it), but there are a few intuitions
that have helped me to get intuitively closer to these topics (to the
extent that I can).  First, I try not to be too literal-minded about
"number", at least in any of its "local instantiations".  Obviously,
if we try to picture ourselves as being in some way literally "made
out of numbers" in any of their ordinary manifestations, it's very
difficult to make any sense of AR.  I'm not suggesting that you are
being this literal-minded, by the way.  But speaking for myself, I
tend to intuit comp's starting position on "ontology" as something
like: in order to make sense of CTM, assume some "primitive"
analytical-combinatorial principle which is equivalent to arithmetic
in *all relevant respects*.  What remains (almost everything!) is then
to discover whether and how, within precisely these limitations, we
can recover what we're ultimately in pursuit of - mind and matter -
also *in all relevant respects*.

It turns out that, to have any hope of doing this, some key
supplementary ideas are in fact required, and the easiest one to lose
sight of, perhaps, is the critical additional assumption (if indeed it
is correct to call it merely an assumption) of the knower - the
"inside view", or "epistemological reality".  Now, however one nuances
terms like "ontology" and "epistemology", we cannot but acknowledge
the personal manifestation of the knower - the first person - as some
intimate amalgam of knowing and being.  This "amalgam" I take to be an
irreducible fact, but nonetheless what comp seeks to show is how the
"logical ontology" of AR can both underpin (i.e. form the structural
basis of), and permit reference to, such epistemological facts.

This last point - i.e. that of reference - actually seems to me to be
the strongest motivation for a combinatorial approach to the mind-body
conundrum.  Try as I might, I have never succeeded in imagining
another ontologically primitive assumption capable of capturing the
fundamental aspects of reference (and particularly  self-reference);
and unless the basis of such reference is built into our foundational
assumptions, it seems to me that the possibility of recovering it
"later" (say, from the ramifications of a physicalist theory) is a
stark impossibility.

I hope this may help, or at least may lead to some helpful amplification.


Hi David,

I do appreciate your attempts to clarify a possible misunderstanding on my part. I think I do understand Bruno's UDA result and its ontological implications and admire the ingenuity of the ideas involved, but it seems that my critique of it is something that I am inadequately explaining. I see several problems and unanswered questions. 1) The explanation of how multiple minds, how ever they are defined in Lobian or whatever terms, can occur such that an appearence of coherent and concurrent communications occurs is not explained. 2) How does the result explain the appearance of a single physical universe such that 1) can occur within it? 3) How does Bruno's result differ from Berkeley's idealist such that it avoids its epiphenomena problem. It is true that I am pursuing a different explanatory model and thus might be accused of nitpicking Bruno's idea simply to score points for my arguments, but this is not the case. From what I have studied so far, Bruno's result fits almost completely inside the Stone duality based model (on the abstract algebra side of the duality) that I am exploring such that if Bruno's result is falsified then so is my own idea. The only real difference between Bruno's work and my own (other than my educational status!) is that Bruno seems to reject the physical world as having a necessary existence while I do not.



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