Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) : > >> >> On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: >> >>> >>> COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing >>> everything on >>> computations. >> >> This is not correct. Comp is the assumption that the brain functions >> without extra magic, or that the brain is just a natural machine, >> like the heart or the liver. It might be false, but still is a >> widespread belief among rationalist since many centuries, and there >> are no sign that it might be refuted. >> >> Materialists are often using comp as a method to hide the mind-body >> problem. My own works shows that attempt to be incorrect, and I use >> comp to formulate precisely the mind body problem. Comp reduces >> indeed the mind-body problem to a purely mathematical body problem, >> and this makes comp a scientific (testable, refutable) hypothesis. >> >> >> >> >>> But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, >>> namely the very foundation of computations. We can define >>> computations in >>> terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in >>> terms of >>> +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is >>> 0? What >>> are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a >>> natural >>> number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no >>> successor, successor remains undefined. >> >> All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. >> Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. >> But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least >> natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. >> >> >> >>> >>> But if the very foundation is undefined, it can mean anything, and >>> anything >>> derived from it can mean anything. >> >> Then all the scientific endeavor is ruined, including the one done >> by the brains. This would mean that nothing can have any sense. This >> is an argument against all science, not just mechanism. >> >> >> >>> One might argue that even though 0 and >>> successor can not be defined it is a specific thing that has a >>> specific >>> meaning. But really, it doesn't. 0 just signifies the absence of >>> something, >> >> It might be intepreted like that. But that use extra-metaphysical >> assumptions. >> >> >> >>> which makes sense if we count things, but as a foundation for a >>> TOE, it is >>> just meaningless (absence of anything at all?), or could mean >>> anything (the >>> absence of anything in particular). Successor signifies that there >>> is "one >>> more" of something, which makes sense with concrete object, but >>> what is one >>> more of the "absence of something" (which could mean anything). >> >> 1 is the successor of 0. You are confusing the number 0 and its >> cardinal denotation. >> If you were true you could say that 2011 = 211. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> So even if we assume that COMP is correct, it is essentially empty, >> >> It is not empty to say "yes" to a doctor, for any operation proposed. >> >> >> >>> because >>> it's very foundation is undefined. Everything derived from it also is >>> undefined, that is, it is totally open to interpretation. We can >>> just name >>> the "undefinedness" of 0 as "matter" or "consciousness", >> >> No, we can't. or prove it. What you say here is meaningless. >> >> I remind you that comp is the proposition that brain are sort of >> machines naturally emulating digital machine. This is accepted by >> all cogniyive scientist, and it makes sense. Indeed it might be false. >> >> >> >>> and there we have >>> the very same mystery we wanted to explain. >> >> No. It follows from comp that we have to derive physics from Number >> theory. This is a theorem, and not an assumption. >> >> >> >> >> >>> Every computation could manifest >>> itself in arbitrary ways... COMP itself says that actual 1- >>> experience is >>> related to an "infinity" of computations. >> >> Comp proves this, but does not assume this. >> >> >> >> >>> That's even worse, so we have an >>> infinity of undefined computations. Every computation (or infinite >>> computations) can correspond to every (or none) experience, that is, >>> ultimately COMP says nothing about experience. If it would, it had >>> to give a >>> mapping of computation (/infinite computations) to experiences... >>> But since >>> experience is ultimately not divisible in chunks of concrete, >>> seperate >>> experiences, this attempt is bound to fail. >> >> On the contrary, comp maps the experience with the internal brain(s) >> processes. It just happens that, like QM confirmed already, the >> brain matter appears to be multiplied and distributed, in a >> mathematically precise way, in the dovetailing on all computations. >> The notion of universality behind the universal dovetailing is the >> only universality on which all mathematician agree, unlike set or >> categories, or any other notion of universality. >> >> >> >>> >>> The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought >>> construct >>> which essentially reveals its own emptiness. What can COMP possibly >>> mean? >>> For it to have any use we have to make a bet grounded on pure >>> faith... So we >>> could just as well believe in God, >> >> Why not if you make it enough precise so that people can see the >> scientific problem. usually God is used as an empty (indeed) answer. >> But with comp, both comp and God is a question, not an answer. >> >> >> >>> or - better -just take the stance of >>> observing whatever happens! Maybe that we have to bet on an >>> substitution >>> level for COMP to have any meaning, and our inability to know any >>> substitution level should lead us to conclude that there probably >>> is no >>> substitution level, or it is undefined, which would just make >>> sense, given >>> that apparently COMP is undefined in its very foundations. >> >> So how would react if your daughter want to say yes to a digitalist >> doctor? Or what if your doctor says that this is the only chance for >> her to survive some disease? >> >> You are using a machine to send this post, which would not even >> exist if comp did not make sense. > > I mean " ... if comp did not make sense for the reason you gave above". > > Obviously computer makes sense even if comp is false. But computer > would not have appeared if we did not grasp the elementary > arithmetical ideas. But we did grasp the elementary ideas. My point is just that it makes no sense to treat arithmetics as something that is meaningful without concrete objects. If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. 1, 2, 3,... make only sense in terms of one of something, two of something,... OK, we could say it makes sense to have one of nothing, two of nothing, etc, but in this case numbers are superfluous, and all numbers, and all computations are equivalent.
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