On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn
blue or taste like broccoli.
There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say
arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say
arithmetic has an internal view.
If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using
If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense
in which it is a category error.
It makes as much sense to say that a
concept has an internal view.
nternal view just applies to the only thing
that can have/is a view, namely consciousness.
It applies to person. It might be a category error to say that
consciousness has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even
This is not a belief, this is
just the obvious reality right now.
Obvious for you. But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think
so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her
point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for.
Can you find any number(s) flying around
that has any claim to an internal view right now?
Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer
only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number
can have. A person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not
anything 3-describable. But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as
tool for being able to manifest ourself relatively to each other.
The only thing that you
can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person
consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in
Here you present a theory like if it was a fact. If that was obvious,
we would not even discuss it. Consciousness, despite being an obvious
fact for conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not
You abstract so much that you miss the obvious.
In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term
I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point
of view of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon machine
can emulate a conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)? Do you
agree that this is not obvious for everybody (Craig believes it is
I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that
is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with
such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the
Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite
being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is
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