On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:

I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn
blue or taste like broccoli.

Assuming non-comp.
There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say
arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say that
arithmetic has an internal view.

If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using non comp. If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense in which it is a category error.

It makes as much sense to say that a
concept has an internal view.
nternal view just applies to the only thing
that can have/is a view, namely consciousness.

It applies to person. It might be a category error to say that consciousness has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even cosmic consciousness.

This is not a belief, this is
just the obvious reality right now.

Obvious for you. But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for.

Can you find any number(s) flying around
that has any claim to an internal view right now?

Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest ourself relatively to each other.

The only thing that you
can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person that
consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in

Here you present a theory like if it was a fact. If that was obvious, we would not even discuss it. Consciousness, despite being an obvious fact for conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not think.

You abstract so much that you miss the obvious.

In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term "obvious". I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point of view of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon machine can emulate a conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)? Do you agree that this is not obvious for everybody (Craig believes it is false). I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is wrong.



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