Thanks Bruno for patiently explaining things. It's interesting that you bring up computer science as I am doing a career change right now and am going into computer science. I eventually want to work in brain simulation. A lot of the ideas in this group are relevant.
>From the paper, I'll quote again (mainly for myself when I look back at this message) >From page 17 "It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place." If the author is correct that would seem to drive a nail in the coffin for the digital generation of conscious awareness though in some way that might not prove that brain simulation is impossible. Perhaps brain simulation would occur in such a way that the simulation is never consciously self-aware but if that were the case, how good is that simulation?? If my doctor wanted to replace my brain with an artificial brain, I think I'd be scared out of my mind if LINUX wasn't an option hehe... Thanks Bruno. I know this might seem like a naive observation but the Bolshoi universe simulation recently done on a supercomputer at UC Santa Cruz in California produced some images of an early universe that had an uncanny resemblance to the human brain. It gives me hope that it is possible to simulate a brain on a classical computer. Perhaps the details would involve highly complex neural networks; the hope would be to rival the complexity of an actual brain. Here is a link that includes video http://hipacc.ucsc.edu/Bolshoi/ (Then of course we might get into some ethical quandaries regarding the personhood of a simulated brain such as can we run any experiment on it that we feel like running... is simulated suffering ethically equivalent to actual suffering... and that sort of thing.) On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 04 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Brian Tenneson wrote: > >> Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand. >> Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't >> mean a pile of gray and white matter. > > Suppose that you have a brain disease, and you doctor propose to you an > artificial brain, and he does not hide that this mean he will copy your > brain state at the level of the molecules, processed by a computer. he adds > that you can choose between a mac or a pc. > Comp assumes that there is a level such that you can survive in the usual > clinical sense with such a digital brain like you can already survive with > an artificial pump at the place of the heart. > > > >> Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? > > Well, it could be for those studying an analog version of comp. But unless > the analog system use actual infinities, it will be emulable by a digital > machine. The redundancy of the brains and its evolution pleads for the idea > that the brain is indeed digitally emulable. > > > >> Is >> digital more nonphysical than artificial? > > Not a priori, at all. Sellable computers are digital and physical. Today the > non physical universal machines are still free, and can be found in books or > on the net. You might find a lot by looking toward yourself, but the study > of computer science can accelerate that discovery a lot. > > Bruno > > >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> >>> On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: >>> >>>> From page 17 >>>> "It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny >>>> the >>>> initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular >>>> program >>>> can >>>> generate conscious awareness in the first place." >>>> >>>> What about the possibility of allowing for a "large number" of conscious >>>> moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, >>>> conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a >>>> radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are >>>> finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never >>>> acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left >>>> measures >>>> less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated >>>> conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous >>>> conscious >>>> awareness is the observed result. >>>> >>>> Earlier on page 17... >>>> "its program must >>>> only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments." >>> >>> I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible >>> with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). >>> >>> Consciousness is never generated by the "running of a particular >>> computer". >>> If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that >>> we >>> already "belong" to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain >>> just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual >>> normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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