On 23 December 2011 23:24, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> The argument cannot extend to an apparatus made of extended > multiversal objects, as the "inactive" parts are no longer > inactive. But it does require the supervenience to be extended across > multiple multiverse branches in a way that hasn't been made precise (but > presumably not magic!). Forgive me if I'm repeating myself here, but one might well think it at least as reasonable that - from the pov of the compartmentalisation of first-person experience - that the "parts" in the extended branches relevant to the experiences one is NOT having "here and now" are indeed effectively inactive. Given the mutual exclusivity of states of consciousness, it might seem almost perverse to postulate - as presumably a "brute fact" of MAT - that the total activity of parts across all branches is nonetheless relevant to the supervention of a particular state of consciousness on the branch (or branches) associated with a single observer moment selected from the ensemble. That said, if one indeed postulates that it simply is a brute fact that univocal conscious states must somehow supervene on primitively physical multiversal structures as a whole, I suppose this might well be defended against arguments from Turing-emulability, as the logic now seems to hinge on (primitively) physical structural facts, rather than purely computational ones. But perhaps this is why Bruno says that such a conclusion must lead in effect to non-comp. David > On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 11:15:36AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 22 Dec 2011, at 23:48, Russell Standish wrote: >> >> >On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 03:53:09PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> >>When I say that the movie is thinking, it is in the frame of both >> >>comp *and* the physical supervenience thesis, and it is to get the >> >>reductio ad absurdum. >> > >> >OK - but how does supervenvience cause the reductio in this case? Or >> >is it COMP that causes the reductio? Or must it be the conjunction. I >> >don't understand. >> >> It comes with the conjunction. The physical activity is shown to be >> arbitrary for the execution of an algorithm. This shows that if we >> keep comp, we cannot associate consciousness with the physical >> activity, but with the "causal" (in the computer science term) >> pattern which makes the computation, at the correct level. > > Maudlin's argument demonstrates that in a classical universe, we can > convert any computation into what is essentially a recording + a bunch > of physically inert parts. We reason that disabling, or removing, the > physically > inert parts cannot possibly affect the conscious process being > emulated, ie the apparatus with the parts disabled or enabled are > physically equivalent, therefore either the recording is conscious (which is > assumed to be a priori absurd), or supervenience is false > (conscious states differ with no real physical change). > > The argument cannot extend to an apparatus made of extended > multiversal objects, as the "inactive" parts are no longer > inactive. But it does require the supervenience to be extended across > multiple multiverse branches in a way that hasn't been made precise (but > presumably not magic!). > > Bruno's argument is that the multiverse can be emulated (well this is > an additional assumption to COMP ISTM, but I am happy to grant > it). Then this emulation can be run on a single classically > instantiated computer, and Maudlin's argument applies. But all that > shows is that consciousness cannot supervene on that classically > instantiated computer - it doesn't say anything about supervenience on > the original Multiverse. > > >> From a logical point of view, we can add a primitive matter as >> necessary, like we can add a God, or a primitive consciousness. What >> the argument shows is that comp makes those things playing no role >> from the first person points of view of the machine. > > This is quite true, but I don't see how that comes from the MGA. It > can be quite easily demonstrated by use of the compiler theorem, or > perhaps more accessibly by "Brain in a Vat" thought experiments - > where it can be shown that it is impossible to know anything about > "primitive" matter - any matter capable of universal computation will do. > > And if universal computation is the only necessary property, then we > can just as well use an immaterial system such as PA as our "primitive > matter". The question of "What breathes the fire into the equations" > (Steven Hawking's question) is simply not meaningful. > > > >> So why to add >> something we know nothing about (that kind of gap-explanation >> concept) when they can have no perceptible role. Occam does the >> rest. >> > > Agreed. As I said, I never had a problem with the conclusion, just the > argument. > > Also, I am concerned about any disproof of physical supervenience > (regardless of the primitivity question), as supervenience is an > important ingredient for the Anthropic Principle, and ISTM necessary > to avoid the Occam catastrophe. > > Cheers > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
