On 27 May 2012, at 09:46, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 26.05.2012 21:06 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 26 May 2012, at 16:48, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 26.05.2012 11:30 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 26 May 2012, at 08:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
In my view, it would be nicer to treat such a question
historically. Your position based on your theorem, after all,
is one of possible positions.
What do you mean by "my position"? I don't think I defend a
position. I do study the consequence of comp, if only to give a
chance to a real non-comp theory.
A position that the natural numbers are the foundation of the
world.
I don't defend that position. I show it to be a consequence of the
comp hypothesis + occam razor.
I do appreciate the clearness of your position. From this viewpoint,
the language of mathematics allows us to remove ambiguities indeed.
Yes, and that is not an argument for the truth of comp, but it is an
argument for the interest of comp. It like looking for your key under
the lamp, because out the light you can't find them.
But another reason, is that comp is more polite, with respect to the
machine, and so if they can be conscious, there is less risk to hurt
them, by betting on that.
...
When we talk with each other and make proofs we use a human
language. Hence to make sure that we can make universal proofs by
means of a human language, it might be good to reach an agreement
on what it is.
This is an impossible task. That is why I use the semi-axiomatic
method (in UDA), and math in AUDA. If you disagree with a method of
reasoning, you have to explain why. In english, no problem.
I also agree that human language in a way is a mess. Yet, somehow it
seems to work and this puzzles my, how it could happen when even
mathematicians failed to analyze it.
No machine at all can develop of semantics for its "living" language.
Language are living phenomenon, containing probably universal "memes".
It can be more clever than us. The brain is the most complex known
object in the universe. And brains (and machine) are already limited
in their self-study for logical reason.
A clever machine is a machine which understands that she know nothing,
really. But beliefs are possible and needed to survive.
...
I am not against non-comp, but I am against any gap-theory, where
we introduce something in the ontology to make a problem
unsolvable leading to "don't ask" policy.
We are back to a human language. It seems that you mean that some
constructions expressed by it do not make sense. It well might be
but again we have to discuss the language then.
I don't see why we have to discuss language, apart from the machines
and their languages.
It seems that there is a gap between the language of mathematics and
a human language.
Don't confuse the formal languages, OBJECT of study of logicians, and
the language of the mathematicians, and logicians, to prove things
about what they are interested in. That language is human language.
Formalism just means that we ask the opinion of some machine. We ask
ZF about the continuum hypothesis, and she answered that she does not
know (somehow).
It might be interesting to understand it. It might give us a hint on
how the Universe is made.
What do you mean by Universe? I am a bit skeptical about Universe.
You see, we must use a human language to communicate, with the
language of mathematics this would not work.
I do not know why.
?
There is no language of mathematics. It is the human languages, with
abbreviations. Don't confuse this with the formal languages of
logicians and computer scientist. They are very easy to communicate
with, as they are simpler (and sort of subset) of human language. In
english you will say to the secretary "could you print this document",
but you can ask formally the machine, by "print files" of "CONTROL-
Command", or something.
As for comp, I have written once
Simulation Hypothesis and Simulation Technology
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/09/simulation-hypothesis-and-simulation-technology.html
that practically speaking it just does not work. I understand that
you talk in principle but how could we know if comp in principle is
true if we cannot check it in practice?
The whole point is that we can check it, at least if you accept the
classical theory of knowledge. Physics arise from number
self-reference in a precise constrained way, and the logic of
observable already give rise to quantum-like logic. If mechanism is
false, we can know it. If it is true we can only bet on it, and the
bet or not on some level of substitution. The facts (Everett QM)
gives evidence that our first person plural is given by the
electronic orbital, our stories does not depend on the precise
position of electron in those orbitals.
I personally find an extrapolation of a working model outside of
its scope that has been researched pretty dangerous.
I am just showing that computationalism (widespread) and materialism
(widespread) are incompatible. I reason only, and I extrapolate less
than Aristotelians.
I am afraid that reason only is not enough to understand Nature.
All what I explain on comp start from the discovery that reason only
is not enough to understand the natural numbers.
Nor is reason enough to understand reason.
Universal machine can defeat all theories about them.
Just with the numbers we are confronted to the *big* unknown.
I am afraid you might still have a pre-Gödelian conception of machine
and numbers. before Gödel we thought they were easy, now we know that
just about them, we know about nothing, and actually, many are still
in the deny of that situation, apparently.
I am browsing now The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural
Philosophy. Let me give a quote that in an enjoyable way expresses
my thought above.
p. 19 "In 1277 Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, issued a
condemnation of several theses derived from Aristotelianism - that
God could not allow any form of planetary motion other than
circular, that He could not make a vacuum, and many more. The
condemnation of 1277 helped inspire a form of theology known as
voluntarism, which admitted no limitations on God’s power. It
regarded natural law not as Forms inherent within nature but as
divine commands imposed from outside nature. Voluntarism insisted
that the structure of the universe - indeed, its very existence - is
not rationally necessary but is contingent upon the free and
transcendent will of God."
OK. With comp, and Plotinus; there are three Gods. The outer-God,
which has no will and no power really. The Divine Noùs (Platonia), and
the Inner-God (or divine soul). What you describe might apply to the
inner-god, not the outer-god, which is the origin of both the Noùs and
the soul.
"One of the most important consequences of voluntarist theology for
science is that it helped to inspire and justify an experimental
methodology.
Yes. That's excellent. As long as that methodology is not confuse
with an instrumental or positivist philosophy, which leads to the
"don't ask" attitude, and lack of funds for fundamental inquiry.
For if God created freely rather than by logical necessity, then we
cannot gain knowledge of it by logical deduction (which traces
necessary connections). Instead, we have to go out and look, to
observe and experiment. As Barbour puts it:
That would lead to the confusion of physics (search for universal
laws) and geography (the contingent neighborhood). Not to mention
theology itself, which is put in danger by such moves (as it is the
case).
'The world is orderly and dependable because God is trustworthy and
not capricious; but the details of the world must be found by
observation rather than rational deduction because God is free and
did not have to create any particular kind of universe.'"
I doubt that the outer god is free. Open problem for me.
The inner god is free, but this is what makes the reality infinitely
complex, for the best and the worst.
Interesting quote. Thanks.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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