Jason Resch-2 wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 1:07 PM, benjayk > <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>wrote: > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> > On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 10:48 AM, benjayk >> > <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Imagine a computer without an output. Now, if we look at what the >> >> >> computer >> >> >> is doing, we can not infer what it is actually doing in terms of >> >> >> high-level >> >> >> activity, because this is just defined at the output/input. For >> >> >> example, no >> >> >> video exists in the computer - the data of the video could be other >> >> >> data as >> >> >> well. We would indeed just find computation. >> >> >> At the level of the chip, notions like definition, proving, >> inductive >> >> >> interference don't exist. And if we believe the church-turing >> >> >> thesis, they >> >> >> can't exist in any computation (since all are equivalent to a >> >> >> computation of >> >> >> a turing computer, which doesn't have those notions), they would be >> >> >> merely >> >> >> labels that we use in our programming language. >> >> > >> >> > All computers are equivalent with respect to computability. This >> does >> >> > not entail that all computers are equivalent to respect of >> >> > provability. Indeed the PA machines proves much more than the RA >> >> > machines. The ZF machine proves much more than the PA machines. But >> >> > they do prove in the operational meaning of the term. They actually >> >> > give proof of statements. Like you can say that a computer can play >> >> > chess. >> >> > Computability is closed for the diagonal procedure, but not >> >> > provability, game, definability, etc. >> >> > >> >> OK, this makes sense. >> >> >> >> In any case, the problem still exists, though it may not be enough to >> say >> >> that the answer to the statement is not computable. The original form >> >> still >> >> holds (saying "solely using a computer"). >> >> >> >> >> > For to work, as Godel did, you need to perfectly define the elements in >> > the >> > sentence using a formal language like mathematics. English is too >> > ambiguous. If you try perfectly define what you mean by computer, in a >> > formal way, you may find that you have trouble coming up with a >> definition >> > that includes computers, but does't also include human brains. >> > >> > >> No, this can't work, since the sentence is exactly supposed to express >> something that cannot be precisely defined and show that it is >> intuitively >> true. >> >> Actually even the most precise definitions do exactly the same at the >> root, >> since there is no such a thing as a fundamentally precise definition. For >> example 0: You might say it is the smallest non-negative integer, but >> this >> begs the question, since integer is meaningless without defining 0 first. >> So >> ultimately we just rely on our intuitive fuzzy understanding of 0 as >> nothing, and being one less then one of something (which again is an >> intuitive notion derived from our experience of objects). >> >> > > So what is your definition of computer, and what is your > evidence/reasoning > that you yourself are not contained in that definition? > There is no perfect definition of computer. I take computer to mean the usual physical computer, since this is all that is required for my argument.
I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that definition because a human is not a computer according to the everyday definition. -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34336029.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
