I am getting a bit tired of our discussion, so I will just adress the main points:
Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> But let's say we mean "except for memory and unlimited accuracy". >> >> This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY >> >> computers. >> >> >> >> >> > Is this like saying our brains are atoms, but we are more than atoms? >> I >> > can agree with that, our minds transcend the simple description of >> > interacting particles. >> > >> > But if atoms can serve as a platform for minds and consciousness, is >> there >> > a reason that computers cannot? >> > >> Not absolutely. Indeed, I believe mind is all there is, so necessarily >> computers are an aspect of mind and are even conscious in a sense >> already. >> > > Do you have a meta-theory which could explain why we have the conscious > experiences that we do? > > Saying that mind is all there is, while possibly valid, does not explain > very much (without some meta-theory). No, I don't even take it to be a theory. In this sense you might say it doesn't explain anything on a theoretical level, but this is just because reality doesn't work based on any theoretical concepts (though it obviously is described and incorporates them). Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> > Short of adopting some kind of dualism (such as >> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism , or the idea that >> God >> > has to put a soul into a computer to make it alive/conscious), I don't >> see >> > how atoms can serve as this platform but computers could not, since >> > computers seem capable of emulating everything atoms do. >> OK. We have a problem of level here. On some level, computers can emulate >> everything atoms can do computationally, I'll admit that. But that's >> simply >> the wrong level, since it is not about what something can do in the sense >> of >> transforming input/output. >> It is about what something IS (or is like). >> > > Within the simulation, isn't a simulated atom like a real atom (in our > reality)? There is no unambiguous answer to this question IMO. But it only matters that the simulated atom is not like the real atom with respect to our reality - the former can't substitute the latter with respect to reality. Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> since this is all that is required for my argument. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that >> >> definition >> >> >> >> because a human is not a computer according to the everyday >> >> >> >> definition. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > A human may be something a computer can perfectly emulate, >> therefore >> >> a >> >> >> > human could exist with the definition of a computer. Computers >> are >> >> >> > very powerful and flexible in what they can do. >> >> >> That is an assumption that I don't buy into at all. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Have you ever done any computer programming? If you have, you might >> >> > realize that the possibilities for programs goes beyond your >> >> imagination. >> >> Yes, I studied computer science for one semester, so I have programmed >> a >> >> fair amount. >> >> Again, you are misinterpreting me. Of course programs go beyond our >> >> imagination. Can you imagine the mandel brot set without computing it >> on >> >> a >> >> computer? It is very hard. >> >> I never said that they can't. >> >> >> >> I just said that they lack some capability that we have. For example >> they >> >> can't fundamentally decide which programs to use and which not and >> which >> >> axioms to use (they can do this relatively, though). There is no >> >> computational way of determining that. >> >> >> > >> > There are experimental ways, which is how we determined which axioms to >> > use. >> Nope, since for the computer no experimental ways exists if we haven't >> determined a program first. >> >> > You said computers fundamentally cannot choose which programs or axioms to > use. > > We could program a computer with a neural simulation of a human > mathematician, and then the computer could have this capability. That just would strengthen my point (note the words "we program" meaning "we choose the program"). Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> > If the computer program had a concept for desiring novelty/surprises, >> it >> > would surely find some axiomatic systems more interesting than others. >> Sure. But he could be programmed to not to have such a concept, and there >> is >> no way of determining whether to use it or not if we haven't already >> programmed an algorithm for that (which again had the same problem). >> >> In effect you get an infinite regress: >> How determine which program to use? ->use a program to determine it >> But which? ->use a program to determine it >> But which? ->use a program to determine it >> .... >> >> > Guess and check, with random variation, it worked for evolution. But which guessing and checking program to use? ->use a more general guessing and checking program to determine it But which? ->use an even more more general guessing and checking program to determine it etc.... You still never arrive at a program, in fact your problem just becomes more difficult each time you ask the question, because the program would have to be more general. Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> > You're crossing contexts and levels. Certainly, a heart inside a >> computer >> > simulation of some reality isn't going to do you any good if you exist >> on >> > a >> > different level, in a different reality. >> So you are actually agreeing with me? - Since this is exactly the point I >> am >> trying to make. >> Digital models exist on a different level than what they represent, and >> it >> doesn't matter how good/accurate they are because that doesn't bridge the >> gap between model and reality. >> > > But what level something is implemented in does not restrict the > intelligence of a process. This may be our main disagreement. It boils down to the question whether we assume intelligence = (turing) computation. We could embrace this definition, but I would rather not, since it doesn't fit with my own conception of intelligence (which also encompasses instantiation and interpretation). But for the sake of discussion I can embrace this definition and in this case I agree with you. Then we might say that computers can become more intelligent than humans (and maybe already are), because they manifest computations more efficiently than humans. Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> And this seems to be empirically true because there is pretty much no >> >> other >> >> way to explain psi. >> >> >> > >> > What do you mean by psi? >> Telepathy, for example. >> >> > Are you aware of any conclusive studies of psi? That depends on what you interpret as conclusive. For hard-headed skepticists no study will count as conclusive. There are plenty of studies that show results that are *far* beyond chance, though. Also the so called "anecdotal evidence" is extremely strong. Jason Resch-2 wrote: > >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> I am not saying that nature is infinite in the way we picture it. >> It >> >> may >> >> >> not >> >> >> fit into these categories at all. >> >> >> >> >> >> Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so >> by >> >> your >> >> >> own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > The UD also contains subjective randomness, which is at the heart of >> >> > Bruno's argument. >> >> No, it doesn't even contain a subject. >> >> >> >> Bruno assumes COMP, which I don't buy at all. >> >> >> >> >> > Okay. What is your theory of mind? >> I don't have any. Mind cannot be captured or even by described at the >> fundamental level at all. >> > > That doesn't seem like a very useful theory. Does this theory tell > you whether or not you should take an artificial brain if it was the only > way to save your life? Of course it is not a useful theory, since it is not a theory in the first place. To answer your question: No. There is no theoretical way of deciding that. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34348098.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
