On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Chalmers followed my talk on the UD Argument at ASSC 4 and leaved the room > at step 3, saying that there is no indeterminacy as he will feel to be at > both places. > Do you have a link to the discussion, or was it not on a public discussion forum? I wonder if Chalmers might have just meant that he would *define* both copies as "himself" and thus say that "he" would be at both places, while at the same time agreeing with you that each copy at a different location would have its own distinct subjective experience (qualia) and that neither would have any conscious awareness of what the other copy was experiencing. > > This made perhaps some sense in his dualist interpretation of Everett, (if > *that* makes sense), but makes no sense at all in comp. I guess that like > John Clark he confused the 1-view of the 1-view, with some 3-view on the > 1-view. > > I know only two people stopping at step 3. But if you know others, let me > know. (I don't count the person who stop at step 3 because they have > something else to do). > > Bruno > > > On 24 Aug 2012, at 02:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Jesse, > > This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second > Penrose argument, the one in my paper: > > " 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious > flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and > Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is > true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by > magic. One is tempted to say: "why couldn't F itself engage in just the > same reasoning?". But although there are various directions in which one > might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately > presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. > Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of > attention from supporters of AI. " > > Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also > assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way > around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which > Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is > incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. > > Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I > usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and > many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him > realizing it. > > Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he > did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet > learned. > Richard > > On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it >> says: >> >> 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my >> understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be >> self-referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in >> Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at >> a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be >> captured by any formal system”.' >> >> If you actually read Chalmers' paper at >> http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.htmlhe >> definitely does *not* "confirm" Penrose's argument! He says in the paper >> that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about >> consciousness, and at the end of the section titled "the first argument" he >> concludes that the first one fails: >> >> "2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of >> Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least >> convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the relevant class >> of computational systems are all straightforward axiom-and-rules system, >> Penrose is not taking AI seriously, and certainly is not doing enough to >> establish his conclusion that physics is uncomputable. I conclude that none >> of Penrose's argument up to this point put a dent in the natural AI >> position: that our reasoning powers may be captured by a sound formal >> system F, where we cannot determine that F is sound." >> >> Then when dealing with Penrose's "second argument", he says that Penrose >> draws the wrong conclusions; where Penrose concludes that our reasoning >> cannot be the product of any formal system, Chalmers concludes that the >> actual issue is that we cannot be 100% sure our reasoning is "sound" (which >> I understand to mean we can never be 100% sure that we have not made a >> false conclusion about whether all the propositions we have proved true or >> false actually have that truth-value in "true arithmetic"): >> >> "3.12 We can see, then, that the assumption that we know we are sound >> leads to a contradiction. One might try to pin the blame on one of the >> other assumptions, but all these seem quite straightforward. Indeed, these >> include the sort of implicit assumptions that Penrose appeals to in his >> arguments all the time. Indeed, one could make the case that all of >> premises (1)-(4) are implicitly appealed to in Penrose's main argument. For >> the purposes of the argument against Penrose, it does not really matter >> which we blame for the contradiction, but I think it is fairly clear that >> it is the assumption that the system knows that it is sound that causes >> most of the damage. It is this assumption, then, that should be withdrawn. >> >> "3.13 Penrose has therefore pointed to a false culprit. When the >> contradiction is reached, he pins the blame on the assumption that our >> reasoning powers are captured by a formal system F. But the argument above >> shows that this assumption is inessential in reaching the contradiction: A >> similar contradiction, via a not dissimilar sort of argument, can be >> reached even in the absence of that assumption. It follows that the >> responsibility for the contradiction lies elsewhere than in the assumption >> of computability. It is the assumption about knowledge of soundness that >> should be withdrawn. >> >> "3.14 Still, Penrose's argument has succeeded in clarifying some issues. >> In a sense, it shows where the deepest flaw in Gödelian arguments lies. One >> might have thought that the deepest flaw lay in the unjustified claim that >> one can see the soundness of certain formal systems that underlie our own >> reasoning. But in fact, if the above analysis is correct, the deepest flaw >> lies in the assumption that we know that we are sound. All Gödelian >> arguments appeal to this premise somewhere, but in fact the premise >> generates a contradiction. Perhaps we are sound, but we cannot know >> unassailably that we are sound." >> >> So it seems Chalmers would have no problem with the "natural AI" position >> he discussed earlier, that our reasoning could be adequately captured by a >> computer simulation that did not come to its top-level conclusions about >> mathematics via a strict axiom/proof method involving the mathematical >> questions themselves, but rather by some underlying fallible structure like >> a neural network. The bottom-level behavior of the simulated neurons >> themselves would be deducible given the initial state of the system using >> the axiom/proof method, but that doesn't mean the system as a whole might >> not make errors in mathematical calculations; see Douglas Hofstadter's >> discussion of this issue starting on p. 571 of "Godel Escher Bach", the >> section titled "Irrational and Rational Can Coexist on Different Levels", >> where he writes: >> >> "Another way to gain perspective on this is to remember that a brain, >> too, is a collection of faultlessly functioning element-neurons. Whenever a >> neuron's threshold is surpassed by the sum of the incoming signals, >> BANG!-it fires. It never happens that a neuron forgets its arithmetical >> knowledge-carelessly adding its inputs and getting a wrong answer. Even >> when a neuron dies, it continues to function correctly, in the sense that >> its components continue to obey the laws of mathematics and physics. Yet as >> we all know, neurons are perfectly capable of supporting high-level >> behavior that is wrong, on its own level, in the most amazing ways. Figure >> 109 is meant to illustrate such a class of levels: an incorrect belief held >> in the software of a mind, supported by the hardware of a faultlessly >> functioning brain." >> >> Figure 109 depicts the outline of a person's head with "2+2=5" appearing >> inside it, but the symbols in "2+2=5" are actually made up of large >> collections of smaller mathematical equations, like "7+7=14", which are all >> correct. A nice way of illustrating the idea, I think. >> >> I came up with my own thought-experiment to show where Penrose's argument >> goes wrong, based on the same conclusion that Chalmers reached: a community >> of "realistic" AIs whose simulated brains work similarly to real human >> brains would never be able to be 100% certain that they had not reached a >> false conclusion about arithmetic, and the very act of stating confidently >> in mathematical that they would never reach a wrong conclusion would ensure >> that they were endorsing a false proposition about arithmetic. See my >> discussion with LauLuna on the "Penrose and algorithms" thread here: >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/c92723e0ef1a480c/429e70be57d2940b?#429e70be57d2940b >> >> Jesse >> >> On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Stephen P. King >> <stephe...@charter.net>wrote: >> >>> Dear Richard, >>> >>> Your paper <http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf> is very >>> interesting. It reminds me a lot of Stephen Wolfram's cellular automaton >>> theory. I only have one big problem with it. The 10d manifold would be a >>> single fixed structure that, while conceivably capable of running the >>> computations and/or implementing the Peano arithmetic, has a problem with >>> the role of time in it. You might have a solution to this problem that I >>> see that I did not deduce as I read your paper. How do you define time for >>> your model? >>> >>> -- >>> Onward! >>> >>> Stephen >>> >>> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." >>> ~ Francis Bacon >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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