Hi Richard Ruquist 

My claim was a bit over simplified. 
Although numbers do not  have parts,
my thinking was of monads as numbers not
numbers as monads. So they have history, context,
desires, etc.  Monads have
all kinds of accessories. Power steering 
anti-skid brakes, you name it.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/3/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Richard Ruquist 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-03, 10:07:37
Subject: Re: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics


Roger,

Every natural number is distinct from all others.
So your characterization of them as simple
with no internal parts has to be incorrect.
Leibniz himself says that every monad is distinct:
"In a confused way they all strive after [vont a] the infinite, the whole;
but they are limited and differentiated
through the degrees of their distinct perceptions."
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/leibniz/monad.htm

Also nowhere in the Monadology do the words
extend, inextended, unextended or nonextended appear.
So could you give us a link to where he says they are inextended.
Richard

On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 9:36 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Natural numbers are monads because
>
> 1) the are inextended substances, which is redundant to say.
> 2) they have no parts.
>
> That's a definition of a monad. Except to add that monads are alive,
> except that numbers are not very alive. I imagine one could write
> an entire scholarly paper on this issue.
>
> OK-- thanks-- there is a level of description that is comp
>
> Yes, there are a number of differences between Aristotle's substances
> and Leibniz's. I would go so far as tpo say that they have
> little in common:
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei
>
> "Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in 
> a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An Aristotelian 
> individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally. The 
> accidental properties of an object are ones that can be gained and lost over 
> time, and which it might never have possessed at all: its essential 
> properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it possesses 
> throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's 
> monads梬hich is the name he gives to individual substances, created or 
> uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an 
> object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its existence 
> coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, even the 
> properties that an object possesses only for a part of its existence are 
> essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as part of its 
> nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it would have 
> been a different entity.
>
> Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to each 
> other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, from a 
> different perspective.
>
> For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the 
> general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce匒nd he 
> considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways卼he result of each 
> view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is卆 substance 
> which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66)
>
> So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective 
> emphasised. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the 
> features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own 
> time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance with 
> temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of perspectives 
> on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, 
> there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in which its 
> content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of 
> time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid.
>
> It is not possible to investigate here Leibniz's reasons for these apparently 
> very strange views. Our present concern is with whether, and in what sense, 
> Leibniz's substances are subjects of change. One can say that, in so far as, 
> at all times, they reflect the whole of reality, then they do not change. But 
> in so far as they reflect some parts of that reality more vividly than 
> others, depending on their position in space and time, they can be said to 
> change. "
>
> There are whole talks on monadic change on Youtube.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 9/3/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
> so that everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-09-02, 08:37:43
> Subject: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
>
> Hi Roger,
>
>
> On 01 Sep 2012, at 15:59, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>
> A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
>
>
> Abstract
>
> The principal conclusion of this discussion is that there is a striking
> similarity between comp and the metaphysics of Leibniz,
>
>
> I agree. that is why two years ago I have followed different courses on 
> Leibniz. But it is quite a work to make the relationship precise. It is far 
> more simple with Plato, neoplatonists, and mystics.
>
>
>
>
>
> for example that the natural numbers of comp are indeed monads,
>
>
> I am glad you dare to say so, but that could be confusing. You might define 
> monad, and define precisley the relationship.
>
>
>
> but a critical difference is that not all monads are natural numbers.
> And not all substances are monads. For students of comp,
> this should be of no practical importance as long as the
> computational field is confined to natural numbers.
>
>
> It is, by definition.
>
>
>
> Which is the basic method of comp. However, if one goes
> outside of that field, a reassessment of the
> additional mathematical forms in terms of substances
> would have to be made.
>
> ROGER (a Leibnizian): Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Perhaps I am misguided, but I thought that comp was moreorless
> a mechanical model of brain and man activity.
>
> BRUNO (a comp advocate):...
>
>
> I am not a comp advocate. I use comp because it gives the opportunity to 
> apply the scientific method to biology, philosophy and theology.
> I search the key under the lamp, as I know I will not find it in the dark, 
> even if the key is in the dark.
>
> I am just a technician in applied logic. I inform people that IF comp is 
> correct, then physics arise from elementary arithmetic, which includes a 
> theology of number. The fundamental science, with comp, is the thology of 
> numbers (that is: the study about the truth on numbers: this includes many 
> form of truth: provable, feelable, observable, knowable, etc. With the usual 
> classical definition. It masp closely with the theology of the neoplantonists 
> and of the mystics, and certainly some aspect of Leibniz.
>
>
>
>
> ... Not really. Comp is the hypothesis that there is a level of description 
> of my brain or body such that I can be
> emulated by a computer simulating my brain (or body) at that level of 
> description.
>
> ROGER: Very good. "At that level of description" is exactly the point of view 
> I have adopted regarding Leibniz's metaphysics,
> discussed below.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> This is wholly my own version, since a possible problem arises in 
> understanding what a Leibnizian substance is.
> The reason is that Leibniz describes a substance as potentially any "whole" 
> entity, that being either extended body
> or inextended mind. But because extended bodies (despite L's familiarty with 
> atomism)* can always be divided into
> smaller inextended bodies, extended bodies cannot be substances in L's 
> metaphysics. Hence L substances are
> the inextended representations of extended bodies.
>
>
> OK. (Of course here 'substances' are not the Aristotelian primary matter).
>
>
>
>
> *[In my view, the issue that fundamental particles cannot be subdivided, can 
> be replaced
> by the the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle, which in effect allows one to 
> consider corporeal
> bodies as inifinitely divisible in the sense that one cannot arrive at final 
> separate pieces without
> uncertainty. So one cannot come to a final state, holding up L's argument 
> that corporeal bodies
> cannot be sustances. There's nothing left that one can point to. ]
>
>
> I can agree, but Heisenberg uncertainties are an open problem in the comp 
> theory, as the existence of particles, space, physical time, etc.
>
>
>
> Natural numbers qualify as Leibnizian substances, since they are inextended
> and not divisible.
>
>
> Well, 24 is divisible by 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 and 24.
>
> OK, you can take it as a joke. But I fear you put too much importance in the 
> particular notion of numbers, ad we can use LISP programs instead of numbers. 
> This plays some role in the derivation of physics from the comp first person 
> indeterminacy.
>
> I do see your point that numbers "are not divisible", though. But Fortran 
> program, machines, neither, in such a similar sense.
>
>
>
> They also do not have parts, so in L's terms, they are simple substances,
> which is another name for monads. Natural numbers are thus (Platonic) monads, 
> although
> not all monads are natural numbers. A man-- me, for example-- is not a 
> natural number
> even in the Platonic realm, but yet is a monad, separates comp from L's 
> metaphysics.
>
>
> I'm afarid that your notion of monad becomes to general, as with comp, a term 
> like a man is ambiguous. Either we refer to his body, and that is a 
> (relative) number, or to its soul, in which case, comp prevents us to take it 
> as a number. It is nothing third person describable. Todays machines already 
> know that, if you listen carefully (which asks for work -la G?el-L?, but 
> terrribly simplified by the use of Solovay theorem on G and G*.
>
>
>
>
> In addition, not all substances are monads. Those with more than one part,
> for example. This critical difference also separates comp from L metaphysics.
> At the same time, I am only looking at the difference
>
> Since time and space are in extended form, they are similarly infinitely 
> divisible and hence
> are not substance and cannot be monads. The monadic world must then be 
> entirely Platonic.
>
>
>
> In comp, space and time are, like in Kant, in the understanding of a machine. 
> It is not ontologically real.
>
>
>
>
> We now turn to the "at that level of description" issue, since although 
> corporeal
> bodies are not substances, they can have physical parts.
> But a simple substance or monad is a mental substance without parts, so
> that we can only speak of a man as a whole thus as a monad.
> And that is precisely how Leibniz treats a man-- as a monad which is also a
> homunculus. With the traditional tripartite division into intellect, feeling, 
> and body.
> With no barriers between, since they are all mental representations.
>
>
>
> ? There can be barrier in mental representations, no?
>
>
>
>
> Thus
> there is no logical problem with having body act on intellect and feeling,
> vice versa, or in any combination.
> Leibniz goes further to treat all monads as homunculi-- but with levels
> of intellect, feeling and body both appropriate to the substance
> and individual. Thus men have all three divisions, some with greater
> intellect than others, and so forth.
> Animals do not have (any significant) intellect, only feeling and body.
>
>
> I don't think so. But it is out of topic. They do have feeling, body, and 
> intuition. Right, they have more limited intellect, but that might be an 
> advantage.
>
>
>
>
> Rocks only have body as a suignificant component.
> He does not rank vegetables but I personally would assign them
> to the animal category.
>
>
> Me too.
>
>
>
> BRUNO:-- either the idealistic or mental or inextended form of an extended 
> corporeal body as a whole -- or the extended
> body itself (which may at the same time have some variations in composition 
> and many types of substance).
>
> ROGER: No problem.
>
>
> I have no written the sentence above. Extended bodies are mental images.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> BRUNO: Comp is neutral on this level [of the properties of an extended body].
>
>
> I said only that the reversal between physics and machine's psychology 
> follows whatever the level is proposed. The consequences follows only from 
> the existence of the level, and it is nice as the substitution level cannot 
> be know for sure.
>
>
>
>
>
> It might be a very low level like if we needed to simulate the entire solar 
> system at the level of string theory,
> or very high, like if we were the result of the information processing done 
> by the neurons in our skull. Comp entails
> that NO machine can ever be sure about its substitution level (the level 
> where we survive through the digital
> emulation), and so comp cannot be used normatively: if we are machine, we 
> cannot know which machine we are,
> and thus "saying yes" to the digitalist doctor for an artificial brain 
> demands some act of faith.
> It is a theological sort of belief in reincarnation, even if technological. 
> It is theotechnology, if you want.
> No one can imposes this to some other.
>
> Then I show that comp leads to Plato, and refute Aristotle metaphysics.
> There are no ontological physical universe.
>
> the physical universe emerges from a gluing property of machines or number's 
> dream.
> The physical universe appears to be a tiny facet of reality. The proof is 
> constructive and show how to derive physics from machine's dream theory 
> (itself belonging to arithmetic); but of course this leads to open problems 
> in arithmetic. What has been solved so far explains already most of the 
> quantum aspect of reality, qualitatively and quantitatively. The approach 
> explains also why from the number's points of view, quanta and qualia 
> differentiate. The work is mainly a complete translation of a part of the 
> 'mind-body problem' into a 'belief in matter problem' in pure arithmetic.
>
> ROGER: I will pass on most of this for now as for one thing I do not 
> understand what normalization is.
>
>
> I don't use the term "normalization". I use "normatively" above, and it is 
> used to describes theories which can be used to prescribe behavior. But comp 
> protect the souls against all such prescription. Universal numbers are 
> universal dissident, they reject all theories prescribing behavior. They 
> don't reject practical laws, but they reject general judgement on behaviors, 
> or recipe in everyday life.
>
>
>
>
> The only issue that sticks out is Aristotle. My point of view
> is that when in Leibnizland one whould think and do as Leibniz did.
>
> And when in Aristotleland one should do as Aristotle said and did.
>
>
> ?
>
> Well, if comp is correct, Aristotleland does not exist.
>
>
>
> ROGER: I obviously need to peruse your main idea .
> Do you have a link ?
> BRUNO: The more simple to read in english is probably the sane04:
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
> Abstract: I will first present a non constructive argument showing that the 
> mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough
> constraints to decide what a "physical reality" can possibly consist in. Then 
> I will explain how computer science, together with logic,
> makes it possible to extract a constructive version of the argument by 
> interviewing a Modest or L?ian Universal Machine.
>
> Reversing von Neumann probabilistic interpretation of quantum logic on those 
> provided by the L?ian Machine gives a testable
> explanation of how both communicable physical laws and incommunicable 
> physical knowledge, i.e. sensations, arise from number theoretical relations.
>
>
>
>
> Oh, I see there is a sequel. I comment a sentence here:
>
> In either case, the entire universe might be envisioned as a gigantic
> digital golem,
>
>
> There is something that some people can take some time to get it right: if 
> comp is correct (meaning that my brain is Turing emulable), then there is no 
> universe per se, but there is an appearance of a universe, and that 
> appearance is not definable in terms of a digital structure. Nor is 
> consciousness, truth, feeling, intuition. Except for my brain description, 
> comp confronts the machine with a ladder of non computational realities, 
> climbing beyond the constructive ordinals. Arithmetic seen from inside is far 
> bigger than even the already quite non computational arithmetic truth.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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