Hi Richard Ruquist Good question. My response is that the monads only refer as a whole

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to physical entities. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/4/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-03, 11:48:22 Subject: Re: Monads with power steering How can monads store information without any internal parts? On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 11:01 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > My claim was a bit over simplified. > Although numbers do not have parts, > my thinking was of monads as numbers not > numbers as monads. So they have history, context, > desires, etc. Monads have > all kinds of accessories. Power steering > anti-skid brakes, you name it. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 9/3/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him > so that everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-09-03, 10:07:37 > Subject: Re: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics > > Roger, > > Every natural number is distinct from all others. > So your characterization of them as simple > with no internal parts has to be incorrect. > Leibniz himself says that every monad is distinct: > "In a confused way they all strive after [vont a] the infinite, the whole; > but they are limited and differentiated > through the degrees of their distinct perceptions." > http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/leibniz/monad.htm > > Also nowhere in the Monadology do the words > extend, inextended, unextended or nonextended appear. > So could you give us a link to where he says they are inextended. > Richard > > On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 9:36 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> Natural numbers are monads because >> >> 1) the are inextended substances, which is redundant to say. >> 2) they have no parts. >> >> That's a definition of a monad. Except to add that monads are alive, >> except that numbers are not very alive. I imagine one could write >> an entire scholarly paper on this issue. >> >> OK-- thanks-- there is a level of description that is comp >> >> Yes, there are a number of differences between Aristotle's substances >> and Leibniz's. I would go so far as tpo say that they have >> little in common: >> >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei >> >> "Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) >> in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An >> Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some >> accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be >> gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all: >> its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it >> possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's >> monads梬hich is the name he gives to individual substances, created or >> uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that >> an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its >> existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz, >> even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its >> existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as >> part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it >> would have been a different entity. >> >> Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to >> each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however, >> from a different perspective. >> >> For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the >> general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce匒nd he >> considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways卼he result of each >> view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is卆 substance >> which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66) >> >> So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective >> emphasised. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the >> features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own >> time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance >> with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of >> perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances. >> Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in >> which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the >> passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most >> vivid. >> >> It is not possible to investigate here Leibniz's reasons for these >> apparently very strange views. Our present concern is with whether, and in >> what sense, Leibniz's substances are subjects of change. One can say that, >> in so far as, at all times, they reflect the whole of reality, then they do >> not change. But in so far as they reflect some parts of that reality more >> vividly than others, depending on their position in space and time, they can >> be said to change. " >> >> There are whole talks on monadic change on Youtube. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 9/3/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him >> so that everything could function." >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-09-02, 08:37:43 >> Subject: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics >> >> Hi Roger, >> >> >> On 01 Sep 2012, at 15:59, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> >> A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics >> >> >> Abstract >> >> The principal conclusion of this discussion is that there is a striking >> similarity between comp and the metaphysics of Leibniz, >> >> >> I agree. that is why two years ago I have followed different courses on >> Leibniz. But it is quite a work to make the relationship precise. It is far >> more simple with Plato, neoplatonists, and mystics. >> >> >> >> >> >> for example that the natural numbers of comp are indeed monads, >> >> >> I am glad you dare to say so, but that could be confusing. You might >> define monad, and define precisley the relationship. >> >> >> >> but a critical difference is that not all monads are natural numbers. >> And not all substances are monads. For students of comp, >> this should be of no practical importance as long as the >> computational field is confined to natural numbers. >> >> >> It is, by definition. >> >> >> >> Which is the basic method of comp. However, if one goes >> outside of that field, a reassessment of the >> additional mathematical forms in terms of substances >> would have to be made. >> >> ROGER (a Leibnizian): Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> Perhaps I am misguided, but I thought that comp was moreorless >> a mechanical model of brain and man activity. >> >> BRUNO (a comp advocate):... >> >> >> I am not a comp advocate. I use comp because it gives the opportunity to >> apply the scientific method to biology, philosophy and theology. >> I search the key under the lamp, as I know I will not find it in the dark, >> even if the key is in the dark. >> >> I am just a technician in applied logic. I inform people that IF comp is >> correct, then physics arise from elementary arithmetic, which includes a >> theology of number. The fundamental science, with comp, is the thology of >> numbers (that is: the study about the truth on numbers: this includes many >> form of truth: provable, feelable, observable, knowable, etc. With the usual >> classical definition. It masp closely with the theology of the >> neoplantonists and of the mystics, and certainly some aspect of Leibniz. >> >> >> >> >> ... Not really. Comp is the hypothesis that there is a level of >> description of my brain or body such that I can be >> emulated by a computer simulating my brain (or body) at that level of >> description. >> >> ROGER: Very good. "At that level of description" is exactly the point of >> view I have adopted regarding Leibniz's metaphysics, >> discussed below. >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> This is wholly my own version, since a possible problem arises in >> understanding what a Leibnizian substance is. >> The reason is that Leibniz describes a substance as potentially any >> "whole" entity, that being either extended body >> or inextended mind. But because extended bodies (despite L's familiarty >> with atomism)* can always be divided into >> smaller inextended bodies, extended bodies cannot be substances in L's >> metaphysics. Hence L substances are >> the inextended representations of extended bodies. >> >> >> OK. (Of course here 'substances' are not the Aristotelian primary matter). >> >> >> >> >> *[In my view, the issue that fundamental particles cannot be subdivided, >> can be replaced >> by the the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle, which in effect allows one to >> consider corporeal >> bodies as inifinitely divisible in the sense that one cannot arrive at >> final separate pieces without >> uncertainty. So one cannot come to a final state, holding up L's argument >> that corporeal bodies >> cannot be sustances. There's nothing left that one can point to. ] >> >> >> I can agree, but Heisenberg uncertainties are an open problem in the comp >> theory, as the existence of particles, space, physical time, etc. >> >> >> >> Natural numbers qualify as Leibnizian substances, since they are >> inextended >> and not divisible. >> >> >> Well, 24 is divisible by 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 and 24. >> >> OK, you can take it as a joke. But I fear you put too much importance in >> the particular notion of numbers, ad we can use LISP programs instead of >> numbers. This plays some role in the derivation of physics from the comp >> first person indeterminacy. >> >> I do see your point that numbers "are not divisible", though. But Fortran >> program, machines, neither, in such a similar sense. >> >> >> >> They also do not have parts, so in L's terms, they are simple substances, >> which is another name for monads. Natural numbers are thus (Platonic) >> monads, although >> not all monads are natural numbers. A man-- me, for example-- is not a >> natural number >> even in the Platonic realm, but yet is a monad, separates comp from L's >> metaphysics. >> >> >> I'm afarid that your notion of monad becomes to general, as with comp, a >> term like a man is ambiguous. Either we refer to his body, and that is a >> (relative) number, or to its soul, in which case, comp prevents us to take >> it as a number. It is nothing third person describable. Todays machines >> already know that, if you listen carefully (which asks for work -la G?el-L?, >> but terrribly simplified by the use of Solovay theorem on G and G*. >> >> >> >> >> In addition, not all substances are monads. Those with more than one part, >> for example. This critical difference also separates comp from L >> metaphysics. >> At the same time, I am only looking at the difference >> >> Since time and space are in extended form, they are similarly infinitely >> divisible and hence >> are not substance and cannot be monads. The monadic world must then be >> entirely Platonic. >> >> >> >> In comp, space and time are, like in Kant, in the understanding of a >> machine. It is not ontologically real. >> >> >> >> >> We now turn to the "at that level of description" issue, since although >> corporeal >> bodies are not substances, they can have physical parts. >> But a simple substance or monad is a mental substance without parts, so >> that we can only speak of a man as a whole thus as a monad. >> And that is precisely how Leibniz treats a man-- as a monad which is also >> a >> homunculus. With the traditional tripartite division into intellect, >> feeling, and body. >> With no barriers between, since they are all mental representations. >> >> >> >> ? There can be barrier in mental representations, no? >> >> >> >> >> Thus >> there is no logical problem with having body act on intellect and feeling, >> vice versa, or in any combination. >> Leibniz goes further to treat all monads as homunculi-- but with levels >> of intellect, feeling and body both appropriate to the substance >> and individual. Thus men have all three divisions, some with greater >> intellect than others, and so forth. >> Animals do not have (any significant) intellect, only feeling and body. >> >> >> I don't think so. But it is out of topic. They do have feeling, body, and >> intuition. Right, they have more limited intellect, but that might be an >> advantage. >> >> >> >> >> Rocks only have body as a suignificant component. >> He does not rank vegetables but I personally would assign them >> to the animal category. >> >> >> Me too. >> >> >> >> BRUNO:-- either the idealistic or mental or inextended form of an extended >> corporeal body as a whole -- or the extended >> body itself (which may at the same time have some variations in >> composition and many types of substance). >> >> ROGER: No problem. >> >> >> I have no written the sentence above. Extended bodies are mental images. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> BRUNO: Comp is neutral on this level [of the properties of an extended >> body]. >> >> >> I said only that the reversal between physics and machine's psychology >> follows whatever the level is proposed. The consequences follows only from >> the existence of the level, and it is nice as the substitution level cannot >> be know for sure. >> >> >> >> >> >> It might be a very low level like if we needed to simulate the entire >> solar system at the level of string theory, >> or very high, like if we were the result of the information processing >> done by the neurons in our skull. Comp entails >> that NO machine can ever be sure about its substitution level (the level >> where we survive through the digital >> emulation), and so comp cannot be used normatively: if we are machine, we >> cannot know which machine we are, >> and thus "saying yes" to the digitalist doctor for an artificial brain >> demands some act of faith. >> It is a theological sort of belief in reincarnation, even if >> technological. It is theotechnology, if you want. >> No one can imposes this to some other. >> >> Then I show that comp leads to Plato, and refute Aristotle metaphysics. >> There are no ontological physical universe. >> >> the physical universe emerges from a gluing property of machines or >> number's dream. >> The physical universe appears to be a tiny facet of reality. The proof is >> constructive and show how to derive physics from machine's dream theory >> (itself belonging to arithmetic); but of course this leads to open problems >> in arithmetic. What has been solved so far explains already most of the >> quantum aspect of reality, qualitatively and quantitatively. The approach >> explains also why from the number's points of view, quanta and qualia >> differentiate. The work is mainly a complete translation of a part of the >> 'mind-body problem' into a 'belief in matter problem' in pure arithmetic. >> >> ROGER: I will pass on most of this for now as for one thing I do not >> understand what normalization is. >> >> >> I don't use the term "normalization". I use "normatively" above, and it is >> used to describes theories which can be used to prescribe behavior. But comp >> protect the souls against all such prescription. Universal numbers are >> universal dissident, they reject all theories prescribing behavior. They >> don't reject practical laws, but they reject general judgement on behaviors, >> or recipe in everyday life. >> >> >> >> >> The only issue that sticks out is Aristotle. My point of view >> is that when in Leibnizland one whould think and do as Leibniz did. >> >> And when in Aristotleland one should do as Aristotle said and did. >> >> >> ? >> >> Well, if comp is correct, Aristotleland does not exist. >> >> >> >> ROGER: I obviously need to peruse your main idea . >> Do you have a link ? >> BRUNO: The more simple to read in english is probably the sane04: >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >> Abstract: I will first present a non constructive argument showing that >> the mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough >> constraints to decide what a "physical reality" can possibly consist in. >> Then I will explain how computer science, together with logic, >> makes it possible to extract a constructive version of the argument by >> interviewing a Modest or L?ian Universal Machine. >> >> Reversing von Neumann probabilistic interpretation of quantum logic on >> those provided by the L?ian Machine gives a testable >> explanation of how both communicable physical laws and incommunicable >> physical knowledge, i.e. sensations, arise from number theoretical >> relations. >> >> >> >> >> Oh, I see there is a sequel. I comment a sentence here: >> >> In either case, the entire universe might be envisioned as a gigantic >> digital golem, >> >> >> There is something that some people can take some time to get it right: if >> comp is correct (meaning that my brain is Turing emulable), then there is no >> universe per se, but there is an appearance of a universe, and that >> appearance is not definable in terms of a digital structure. Nor is >> consciousness, truth, feeling, intuition. Except for my brain description, >> comp confronts the machine with a ladder of non computational realities, >> climbing beyond the constructive ordinals. Arithmetic seen from inside is >> far bigger than even the already quite non computational arithmetic truth. >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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