How can monads store information without any internal parts?

On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 11:01 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Richard Ruquist
>
> My claim was a bit over simplified.
> Although numbers do not  have parts,
> my thinking was of monads as numbers not
> numbers as monads. So they have history, context,
> desires, etc.  Monads have
> all kinds of accessories. Power steering
> anti-skid brakes, you name it.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 9/3/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
> so that everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Richard Ruquist
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-09-03, 10:07:37
> Subject: Re: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
>
> Roger,
>
> Every natural number is distinct from all others.
> So your characterization of them as simple
> with no internal parts has to be incorrect.
> Leibniz himself says that every monad is distinct:
> "In a confused way they all strive after [vont a] the infinite, the whole;
> but they are limited and differentiated
> through the degrees of their distinct perceptions."
> http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/leibniz/monad.htm
>
> Also nowhere in the Monadology do the words
> extend, inextended, unextended or nonextended appear.
> So could you give us a link to where he says they are inextended.
> Richard
>
> On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 9:36 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> Natural numbers are monads because
>>
>> 1) the are inextended substances, which is redundant to say.
>> 2) they have no parts.
>>
>> That's a definition of a monad. Except to add that monads are alive,
>> except that numbers are not very alive. I imagine one could write
>> an entire scholarly paper on this issue.
>>
>> OK-- thanks-- there is a level of description that is comp
>>
>> Yes, there are a number of differences between Aristotle's substances
>> and Leibniz's. I would go so far as tpo say that they have
>> little in common:
>>
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei
>>
>> "Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv))
>> in a very different way from Aristotle's individual substances. An
>> Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some
>> accidentally. The accidental properties of an object are ones that can be
>> gained and lost over time, and which it might never have possessed at all:
>> its essential properties are the only ones it had to possess and which it
>> possesses throughout its existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's
>> monads—which is the name he gives to individual substances, created or
>> uncreated (so God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that
>> an object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its
>> existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for Leibniz,
>> even the properties that an object possesses only for a part of its
>> existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of its properties as
>> part of its nature, so if it were to have been different in any respect, it
>> would have been a different entity.
>>
>> Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly similar to
>> each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They each do so, however,
>> from a different perspective.
>>
>> For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways the
>> general system of phenomena which he has found it good to produce…And he
>> considers all the faces of the world in all possible ways…the result of each
>> view of the universe, as looked at from a certain position, is…a substance
>> which expresses the universe in conformity with that view. (1998: 66)
>>
>> So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own perspective
>> emphasised. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will contain all the
>> features of the universe at all times, but with those relating to its own
>> time and place most vividly, and others fading out roughly in accordance
>> with temporal and spatial distance. Because there is a continuum of
>> perspectives on reality, there is an infinite number of these substances.
>> Nevertheless, there is internal change in the monads, because the respect in
>> which its content is vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the
>> passage of time just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most
>> vivid.
>>
>> It is not possible to investigate here Leibniz's reasons for these
>> apparently very strange views. Our present concern is with whether, and in
>> what sense, Leibniz's substances are subjects of change. One can say that,
>> in so far as, at all times, they reflect the whole of reality, then they do
>> not change. But in so far as they reflect some parts of that reality more
>> vividly than others, depending on their position in space and time, they can
>> be said to change. "
>>
>> There are whole talks on monadic change on Youtube.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 9/3/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
>> so that everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-09-02, 08:37:43
>> Subject: Re: A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
>>
>> Hi Roger,
>>
>>
>> On 01 Sep 2012, at 15:59, Roger Clough wrote:
>>
>>
>> A Dialog comparing Comp with Leibniz's metaphysics
>>
>>
>> Abstract
>>
>> The principal conclusion of this discussion is that there is a striking
>> similarity between comp and the metaphysics of Leibniz,
>>
>>
>> I agree. that is why two years ago I have followed different courses on
>> Leibniz. But it is quite a work to make the relationship precise. It is far
>> more simple with Plato, neoplatonists, and mystics.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> for example that the natural numbers of comp are indeed monads,
>>
>>
>> I am glad you dare to say so, but that could be confusing. You might
>> define monad, and define precisley the relationship.
>>
>>
>>
>> but a critical difference is that not all monads are natural numbers.
>> And not all substances are monads. For students of comp,
>> this should be of no practical importance as long as the
>> computational field is confined to natural numbers.
>>
>>
>> It is, by definition.
>>
>>
>>
>> Which is the basic method of comp. However, if one goes
>> outside of that field, a reassessment of the
>> additional mathematical forms in terms of substances
>> would have to be made.
>>
>> ROGER (a Leibnizian): Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> Perhaps I am misguided, but I thought that comp was moreorless
>> a mechanical model of brain and man activity.
>>
>> BRUNO (a comp advocate):...
>>
>>
>> I am not a comp advocate. I use comp because it gives the opportunity to
>> apply the scientific method to biology, philosophy and theology.
>> I search the key under the lamp, as I know I will not find it in the dark,
>> even if the key is in the dark.
>>
>> I am just a technician in applied logic. I inform people that IF comp is
>> correct, then physics arise from elementary arithmetic, which includes a
>> theology of number. The fundamental science, with comp, is the thology of
>> numbers (that is: the study about the truth on numbers: this includes many
>> form of truth: provable, feelable, observable, knowable, etc. With the usual
>> classical definition. It masp closely with the theology of the
>> neoplantonists and of the mystics, and certainly some aspect of Leibniz.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ... Not really. Comp is the hypothesis that there is a level of
>> description of my brain or body such that I can be
>> emulated by a computer simulating my brain (or body) at that level of
>> description.
>>
>> ROGER: Very good. "At that level of description" is exactly the point of
>> view I have adopted regarding Leibniz's metaphysics,
>> discussed below.
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>
>> This is wholly my own version, since a possible problem arises in
>> understanding what a Leibnizian substance is.
>> The reason is that Leibniz describes a substance as potentially any
>> "whole" entity, that being either extended body
>> or inextended mind. But because extended bodies (despite L's familiarty
>> with atomism)* can always be divided into
>> smaller inextended bodies, extended bodies cannot be substances in L's
>> metaphysics. Hence L substances are
>> the inextended representations of extended bodies.
>>
>>
>> OK. (Of course here 'substances' are not the Aristotelian primary matter).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *[In my view, the issue that fundamental particles cannot be subdivided,
>> can be replaced
>> by the the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle, which in effect allows one to
>> consider corporeal
>> bodies as inifinitely divisible in the sense that one cannot arrive at
>> final separate pieces without
>> uncertainty. So one cannot come to a final state, holding up L's argument
>> that corporeal bodies
>> cannot be sustances. There's nothing left that one can point to. ]
>>
>>
>> I can agree, but Heisenberg uncertainties are an open problem in the comp
>> theory, as the existence of particles, space, physical time, etc.
>>
>>
>>
>> Natural numbers qualify as Leibnizian substances, since they are
>> inextended
>> and not divisible.
>>
>>
>> Well, 24 is divisible by 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 and 24.
>>
>> OK, you can take it as a joke. But I fear you put too much importance in
>> the particular notion of numbers, ad we can use LISP programs instead of
>> numbers. This plays some role in the derivation of physics from the comp
>> first person indeterminacy.
>>
>> I do see your point that numbers "are not divisible", though. But Fortran
>> program, machines, neither, in such a similar sense.
>>
>>
>>
>> They also do not have parts, so in L's terms, they are simple substances,
>> which is another name for monads. Natural numbers are thus (Platonic)
>> monads, although
>> not all monads are natural numbers. A man-- me, for example-- is not a
>> natural number
>> even in the Platonic realm, but yet is a monad, separates comp from L's
>> metaphysics.
>>
>>
>> I'm afarid that your notion of monad becomes to general, as with comp, a
>> term like a man is ambiguous. Either we refer to his body, and that is a
>> (relative) number, or to its soul, in which case, comp prevents us to take
>> it as a number. It is nothing third person describable. Todays machines
>> already know that, if you listen carefully (which asks for work -la G鰀el-L鯾,
>> but terrribly simplified by the use of Solovay theorem on G and G*.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In addition, not all substances are monads. Those with more than one part,
>> for example. This critical difference also separates comp from L
>> metaphysics.
>> At the same time, I am only looking at the difference
>>
>> Since time and space are in extended form, they are similarly infinitely
>> divisible and hence
>> are not substance and cannot be monads. The monadic world must then be
>> entirely Platonic.
>>
>>
>>
>> In comp, space and time are, like in Kant, in the understanding of a
>> machine. It is not ontologically real.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> We now turn to the "at that level of description" issue, since although
>> corporeal
>> bodies are not substances, they can have physical parts.
>> But a simple substance or monad is a mental substance without parts, so
>> that we can only speak of a man as a whole thus as a monad.
>> And that is precisely how Leibniz treats a man-- as a monad which is also
>> a
>> homunculus. With the traditional tripartite division into intellect,
>> feeling, and body.
>> With no barriers between, since they are all mental representations.
>>
>>
>>
>> ? There can be barrier in mental representations, no?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Thus
>> there is no logical problem with having body act on intellect and feeling,
>> vice versa, or in any combination.
>> Leibniz goes further to treat all monads as homunculi-- but with levels
>> of intellect, feeling and body both appropriate to the substance
>> and individual. Thus men have all three divisions, some with greater
>> intellect than others, and so forth.
>> Animals do not have (any significant) intellect, only feeling and body.
>>
>>
>> I don't think so. But it is out of topic. They do have feeling, body, and
>> intuition. Right, they have more limited intellect, but that might be an
>> advantage.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Rocks only have body as a suignificant component.
>> He does not rank vegetables but I personally would assign them
>> to the animal category.
>>
>>
>> Me too.
>>
>>
>>
>> BRUNO:-- either the idealistic or mental or inextended form of an extended
>> corporeal body as a whole -- or the extended
>> body itself (which may at the same time have some variations in
>> composition and many types of substance).
>>
>> ROGER: No problem.
>>
>>
>> I have no written the sentence above. Extended bodies are mental images.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> BRUNO: Comp is neutral on this level [of the properties of an extended
>> body].
>>
>>
>> I said only that the reversal between physics and machine's psychology
>> follows whatever the level is proposed. The consequences follows only from
>> the existence of the level, and it is nice as the substitution level cannot
>> be know for sure.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It might be a very low level like if we needed to simulate the entire
>> solar system at the level of string theory,
>> or very high, like if we were the result of the information processing
>> done by the neurons in our skull. Comp entails
>> that NO machine can ever be sure about its substitution level (the level
>> where we survive through the digital
>> emulation), and so comp cannot be used normatively: if we are machine, we
>> cannot know which machine we are,
>> and thus "saying yes" to the digitalist doctor for an artificial brain
>> demands some act of faith.
>> It is a theological sort of belief in reincarnation, even if
>> technological. It is theotechnology, if you want.
>> No one can imposes this to some other.
>>
>> Then I show that comp leads to Plato, and refute Aristotle metaphysics.
>> There are no ontological physical universe.
>>
>> the physical universe emerges from a gluing property of machines or
>> number's dream.
>> The physical universe appears to be a tiny facet of reality. The proof is
>> constructive and show how to derive physics from machine's dream theory
>> (itself belonging to arithmetic); but of course this leads to open problems
>> in arithmetic. What has been solved so far explains already most of the
>> quantum aspect of reality, qualitatively and quantitatively. The approach
>> explains also why from the number's points of view, quanta and qualia
>> differentiate. The work is mainly a complete translation of a part of the
>> 'mind-body problem' into a 'belief in matter problem' in pure arithmetic.
>>
>> ROGER: I will pass on most of this for now as for one thing I do not
>> understand what normalization is.
>>
>>
>> I don't use the term "normalization". I use "normatively" above, and it is
>> used to describes theories which can be used to prescribe behavior. But comp
>> protect the souls against all such prescription. Universal numbers are
>> universal dissident, they reject all theories prescribing behavior. They
>> don't reject practical laws, but they reject general judgement on behaviors,
>> or recipe in everyday life.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The only issue that sticks out is Aristotle. My point of view
>> is that when in Leibnizland one whould think and do as Leibniz did.
>>
>> And when in Aristotleland one should do as Aristotle said and did.
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>> Well, if comp is correct, Aristotleland does not exist.
>>
>>
>>
>> ROGER: I obviously need to peruse your main idea .
>> Do you have a link ?
>> BRUNO: The more simple to read in english is probably the sane04:
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>> Abstract: I will first present a non constructive argument showing that
>> the mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough
>> constraints to decide what a "physical reality" can possibly consist in.
>> Then I will explain how computer science, together with logic,
>> makes it possible to extract a constructive version of the argument by
>> interviewing a Modest or L?ian Universal Machine.
>>
>> Reversing von Neumann probabilistic interpretation of quantum logic on
>> those provided by the L?ian Machine gives a testable
>> explanation of how both communicable physical laws and incommunicable
>> physical knowledge, i.e. sensations, arise from number theoretical
>> relations.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Oh, I see there is a sequel. I comment a sentence here:
>>
>> In either case, the entire universe might be envisioned as a gigantic
>> digital golem,
>>
>>
>> There is something that some people can take some time to get it right: if
>> comp is correct (meaning that my brain is Turing emulable), then there is no
>> universe per se, but there is an appearance of a universe, and that
>> appearance is not definable in terms of a digital structure. Nor is
>> consciousness, truth, feeling, intuition. Except for my brain description,
>> comp confronts the machine with a ladder of non computational realities,
>> climbing beyond the constructive ordinals. Arithmetic seen from inside is
>> far bigger than even the already quite non computational arithmetic truth.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
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