# Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge

```On 9/14/2012 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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`Hi Brian,`
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On 13 Sep 2012, at 22:04, Brian Tenneson wrote:

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```Bruno,

You use B as a predicate symbol for "belief" I think.
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I use for the modal unspecified box, in some context (in place of the more common "[]"). Then I use it mainly for the box corresponding to GĂ¶del's beweisbar (provability) arithmetical predicate (definable with the symbols E, A, &, ->, ~, s, 0 and parentheses. Thanks to the fact that Bp -> p is not a theorem, it can plays the role of believability for the ideally correct machines.
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What are some properties of B and is there a predicate for knowing/being aware of that might lead to a definition for self-awareness?
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Yes, B and its variants:
B_1 p == Bp & p
B_2 p = Bp & Dt
B_3 p = Bp & Dt & t,
and others.

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btw, what is a machine and what types of machines are there?
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With comp we bet that we are, at some level, digital machine. The theory is one studied by logicians (Post, Church, Turing, etc.).
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Dear Bruno,

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Could you elaborate on what your definition of "a digital machine" is? Is it something that can be faithfully represented by a Boolean Algebra of some sort?
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Is there a generic description for a structure (in the math logic sense) to have a belief or to be aware; something like
```A |= "I am the structure A"
?
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Yes, by using the Dx = xx method, you can define a machine having its integral 3p plan available.
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This "3p plan" would be like my internal model of my body that I have as part of my conscious awareness?
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But the 1p-self, given by Bp & p, does not admit any name. It is the difference between "I have two legs" and "I have a pain in a leg, even if a phantom one". G* proves them equivalent (for correct machines), but G cannot identify them, and they obeys different logic (G and S4Grz).
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This implies, to me, that the 1p-self cannot be defined by an equivalence class with a fixed equivalence relation. This is problematic if assumed to be true for all possible 1p-selfs. AFAIK, your definition would only apply to an machine that is unnameable infinite such as the totality of all that could exist, aka "God" or "cosmic intelligence". It reminds me more of theAzathoth of H.P. Lovecraft's mythos <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azathoth>.
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Finally, on a different note, if there is a structure for which all structures can be 1-1 injected into it, does that in itself imply a sort of ultimate structure perhaps what Max Tegmark views as the level IV multiverse?
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A 1-1 map is too cheap for that, and the set structure is a too much structural flattening.
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I agree, it is just a tautology.

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Comp used the simulation, notion, at a non specifiable level substitution.
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But does not address the computational resource requirement. :_(

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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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