Hi Evgenii Rudnyi Brent has a pragmatic view of consciousness in that the meaning of things is what they do, not what they are. This is Peirce's view of reality. I tend to lean that way myself.
Roger Clough, [email protected] 9/18/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-17, 14:27:02 Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge On 16.09.2012 21:55 meekerdb said the following: > On 9/16/2012 12:44 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >> On 15.09.2012 21:56 meekerdb said the following: >>> On 9/15/2012 9:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: >>>> On 9/15/2012 4:11 AM, Russell Standish wrote: >> >> ... >> >>>> Hi Russell, >>>> >>>>> That is far too inclusive a definition of computation. >>>> >>>> Not really, it only requires some way of representing the >>>> information such that it can be transformed. The integers are >>>> not the only kind of number that we can represent numbers (or >>>> any other mathematical object) with. IMHO, we are naive to >>>> think that Nature is hobbled to only use integers to perform >>>> her Computations. We must never project our deficiencies on >>>> Nature. >>> >>> I would go even farther than Russell implies. A lot of the >>> muddle about computation and consciousness comes about because >>> they are abstracted out of the world. That's why I like to think >>> in terms of robots or Mars rovers. Consciousness and computation >>> are given their meaning by their effecting actions in the world. >>> To find out what a string of 1s and 0s means a Mars rovers memory >>> you need to see what effect they have on its actions. You know >>> that "1+1=10" means 1+1=2 when 10 in a register causes it to pick >>> up two rocks. >>> >>> So to further abstract computation to mean "transformation of >>> information" will lead to even more of a muddle. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> So this is some kind of enactive model of consciousness, similar to >> what Alva No? writes in Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your >> Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness. >> >> One question in this respect. Let me start with a quote from Max >> Velmans, Understanding Consciousness >> >> Section Can qualia be reduced to the exercise of sensory-motor >> skills? >> >> p. 102 ?iloting a 747 no doubt feels like something to a human >> pilot, and the way that it feels is likely to have something to do >> with human biology. But why should it feel the same way to an >> electronic autopilot that replaces the skills exercised by a human >> being? Or why should it feel like anything to be the control system >> of a guided missile system? Anyone versed in the construction of >> electronic control systems knows that if one builds a system in the >> right way, it will function just as it is intended to do, whether >> it feels like anything to be that system or not. If so, functioning >> in an electronic (or any other) system is logically tangential to >> whether it is like anything to be that system, leaving the hard >> problem of why it happens to feel a certain way in humans >> untouched.? >> >> Do you mean that the meaning in a guided missile system happens as >> by-product of its development by engineers? >> >> To me, it seems that meaning that you have defined in Mars Rovers >> is yet another theory of epiphenomenalism. > > And your quote and question are yet another example of "nothing > buttery" and argument by incredulity. > > Brent > I am not sure if I understand you. I am not saying that I am right but I really do not understand you point. You say "Consciousness and computation are given their meaning by their effecting actions in the world." and it seems that you imply that this could be applied for a robot as well. My thought were that engineers who have design a robot know everything how it is working. You comment suggests however that in the robot there is something else that has emerged independently from the will of engineers. I would be just interested to learn what it is. If you know the answer, I would appreciate it. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
