On 22 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Rusell,
> How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is
the Great Programmer has finite (or perhaps bounded resources), which
gives an additional boost to algorithms that run efficiently.
that´s the problem that I insist, has a natural solution
considering the computational needs of living beings under natural
selection, without resorting to a everithing-theory of reality
based of a UD algorithm, like the Schmidhuber one.
My suspicion is that there does not exist a single global
computation of the behavior of living (or other) beings and that
"natural selection" is a local computation between each being and
its environment. We end up with a model where there are many
computations occurring concurrently and there is no single
computation that can dovetail all of them together such that a
picture of the universe can be considered as a single simulation
running on a single computer except for a very trivial case (where
the total universe is in a bound state and at maximum equilibrium).
I agree. But a UD, or just arithmetic define a superstructure
containing this, and consciousness, or first person, is what will
select it. This explains why the world will look computational, and
still never be entirely computational. And indeed, we cannot simulate
with a computer even just a quantum bit observation, without
simulating the observer looking at that qubit.
Note that this does NOT make QM, nor the comp-physics violating Church
thesis, at least assuming comp, as we can simulate exactly a qubit
behavior coupled to an observer (but we have to include the observer
in the simulation).
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