On 22 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2012/10/22 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Rusell,
>
>     How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen

No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is that
the Great Programmer has finite (or perhaps bounded resources), which
gives an additional boost to algorithms that run efficiently.

that´s the problem that I insist, has a natural solution considering the computational needs of living beings under natural selection, without resorting to a everithing-theory of reality based of a UD algorithm, like the Schmidhuber one.
--
Dear Alberto,

My suspicion is that there does not exist a single global computation of the behavior of living (or other) beings and that "natural selection" is a local computation between each being and its environment. We end up with a model where there are many computations occurring concurrently and there is no single computation that can dovetail all of them together such that a picture of the universe can be considered as a single simulation running on a single computer except for a very trivial case (where the total universe is in a bound state and at maximum equilibrium).


I agree. But a UD, or just arithmetic define a superstructure containing this, and consciousness, or first person, is what will select it. This explains why the world will look computational, and still never be entirely computational. And indeed, we cannot simulate with a computer even just a quantum bit observation, without simulating the observer looking at that qubit. Note that this does NOT make QM, nor the comp-physics violating Church thesis, at least assuming comp, as we can simulate exactly a qubit behavior coupled to an observer (but we have to include the observer in the simulation).

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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