On 10/24/2012 11:58 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:



2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


    On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:



    2012/10/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net 
<mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

        On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


        2012/10/22 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au 
<mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>>

            On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
            > Hi Rusell,
            >
            >     How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
            >
            > --
            > Onward!
            >
            > Stephen

            No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is 
that
            the Great Programmer has finite (or perhaps bounded resources), 
which
            gives an additional boost to algorithms that run efficiently.

        that´s the problem that I insist, has  a natural solution considering 
the
        computational needs of living beings under natural selection, without
        resorting to a everithing-theory of reality based of a UD algorithm, 
like
        the Schmidhuber one.

            --

        Dear Alberto,

            My suspicion is that there does *not* exist a single global 
computation of
        the behavior of living (or other) beings and that "natural selection" 
is a
        local computation between each being and its environment. We end up 
with a
        model where there are many computations occurring concurrently and 
there is no
        single computation that can dovetail all of them together such that a 
picture
        of the universe can be considered as a single simulation running on a 
single
        computer except for a very trivial case (where the total universe is in 
a bound
        state and at maximum equilibrium).

    Yes, that'`s also what I think. These computations are material, in the 
sense that
    they are subject to limitation of resources (nervous signal speeds, chemical
    equilibrion, diffusion of hormones etc. So the bias toward a low kolmogorov
    complexity of an habitable universe can be naturally deduced from that.

    Natural selection is the mechanism for making discoveries, individual life
    incorporate these discoveries, called adaptations. A cat that jump to catch 
a fish
    has not discovered the laws of newton, Instead, the evolution has found a 
way to
    modulate the force exerted by the muscles according with how long the jump 
must be,
    and depending on the weight of the cat (that is calibrated by playing at at 
the
    early age).

    But this technique depends on the lineality and continuity of the law of 
newton for
    short distances. If the law of newton were more complicated, that would not 
be
    possible. So a low complexity of the macroscopical laws permit a low 
complexity and
    a low use of resources of the living computers that deal with them, and a 
faster
    dsicovery of adaptations by natural selection. But that complexity has a 
upper
    limit; Lineality seems to be a requirement for the operation of natural 
selection
    in the search for adaptations.

    
http://ilevolucionista.blogspot.com.es/2008/06/ockham-razor-and-genetic-algoritms-life.html



    I kind of agree with all what you say here, and on the basic philosophy. 
But I think
    that what you describe admits a more general description, in which the laws 
of
    physics are themselves selected by a process similar but more general than
    evolution. It makes me think that life (and brains at some different level) 
is what
    happen when a universal system mirrors itself. A universal machine is a 
dynamical
    mirror, and life can develop once you put the dynamical mirror in front of 
itself
    (again a case of diagonalization). I think I follow your philosophy, but 
apply it in
    arithmetic and/or computer science.


I envision also a kind of selection of the mind over the matter , since the most basic notion of existence implies and observer, that is,a mind and a mind, in a universe where history has a meaning (that discard boltzmann brains) , and hold a kind of intelligence (since intelligence permits to make use of experience) impose very strong antropic restrictions not only in the nature of the phisical laws, as I said, but in the matematicity of them. With matematicity i mean a reuse of the same simple structures at different levels of reality. I mean that the most simple mathematical structures are more represented in the structure of reality than complicated ones, to minimize the complexity.

But aren't those all the same conclusions that would arise from assuming that mathematics and physical laws are our inventions for describing and reasoning about the world and they are simple because that makes them understandable; they reflect our limited cognitive ability to think about only a few things at a time. Notice that physics, as it has become more mathematical and abstract, has left more and more to contingency and the randomness of QM. So physicists no longer propose to answer, "Why are there just eight planets?" or "Why is there a Moon?"


    Now I am just afraid, to talk frankly, that it looks like you have a 
reductionist
    conception of numbers and machines, which does not take into account the 
discovery
    of the universal machine (by the Post-Church-Kleene-Turing thesis) which 
makes you
    miss that your philosophy might be the natural philosophy of all universal 
numbers.
    (I probably exaggerate my point for attempt to be short).

I do not discard your point of view. the difference is that I go the easy path, from inside to outside, in a cartesian process, may call it, So my interest is centered not in a simple production principle, and explain the human experience from it, but to go from consciousness (with some leaps of faith) out to ascertain the nature of what is known with the aid of some hopefully testable hypotheses. To go in the opposite direction i need a kind of understanding and inspiration that I don´t have. I perhaps need a kind of leap in imagination to see the big picture, but my natural selectionist bias force me to think that there would be no intellgence without purpose, and no purpose without environmnetal pressure, that is impossible without an environment, and a environment impossible without a preexistent matter, with preexistent laws. So a universal machine seems to me the inmaterial equivalent of a boltzman brain, made with no purpose, for no purpose and this devoid of meaning, with little to understand about it...

If you're going to explain purpose, meaning, qualia, thoughts,...you need to start from something simpler that does not assume those things. Bruno proposes to explain matter as well, so he has to start without matter.

Brent
The web of this world is woven of Necessity and Chance.  Woe to
him who has accustomed himself from his youth up to find
something necessary in what is capricious, and who would ascribe
something like reason to Chance and make a religion of
surrendering to it.
   -- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

Unless some restrictions of resources, pruposes etc are aplied, that is a selection process.....

    We can already talk with the "Löbian numbers". I already recognize myself. 
I already
    don't take them as zombie. It does not matter that the talk admits a local 
atemporal
    description. Arithmetic is full of life and dreams


    And if we limit ourselves, non constructively (it is the price) to the
    *arithmetically sound* Löbian numbers, we get an arithmetical 
interpretation of a
    platonist conception of reality. Decidable on its propositional parts.

    In that conception physics is the border of the universal mind, which by 
assuming
    comp, might be the mind of the universal machine.

    Can that philosophy helps to solve the 1p measure problems, or guide us in 
the
    "human" interpretation of the arithmetical interpretation? Hard to say. 
Plausible.
    There will be different methods, and insight.


    Bruno

    http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>



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