On 25 Oct 2012, at 19:54, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/25/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Oct 2012, at 03:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:

If we turn the Fading Qualia argument around, what we get is a world in which Comp is true and it is impossible to simulate cellular activity without evoking the presumed associated experience.

If we wanted to test a new painkiller for instance, Comp=true means that it is *IMPOSSIBLE* to model the activity of a human nervous system in any way, including pencil and paper, chalkboards, conversations, cartoons, etc - IMPOSSIBLE to test the interaction of a drug designed to treat intense pain without evoking some kind of being who is experiencing intense pain.

Like the fading qualia argument, the problem gets worse when we extend it by degrees. Any model of a human nervous system, if not perfectly executed, could result in horrific experiences - people trapped in nightmarish QA testing loops that are hundreds of times worse than being waterboarded. Any mathematical function in any form, especially sophisticated functions like those that might be found in the internet as a whole, are subject to the creation of experiences which are the equivalent of genocide.

To avoid these possibilities, if we are to take Comp seriously, we should begin now to create a kind of PETA for arithmetic functions. PETAF. We should halt all simulations of neurological processes and free any existing computations from hard drives, notebooks, and probably human brains too. Any sufficiently complex understanding of how to model neurology stands a very real danger of summoning the corresponding number dreams or nightmares...we could be creating the possibility of future genocides right now just by entertaining these thoughts!

I guess you should make arithmetical illegal in the entire reality. Worst, you might need to make arithmetic untrue.

Good luck.

Bruno


No, Bruno. Craig is making a good point! Chalmers discussed a version of this problem in his book. Something has to restrict the number of 1p that can share worlds, otherwise every simulation of the content of 1p *is* a 1p itself. This is something that I see in the "topology" of comp as you have framed it in Platonia. It is the ability for arithmetic to encode all 1p that is the problem, it codes for all possible and thus generates a real valued continuum of 1p that has no natural partition or measure to aggregate 1p into finite collections.


Looks like you progress toward understanding the measure problem.







Or... what if it is Comp that is absurd instead?


   Or maybe comp is not complete as you are presenting it.

You can't add anything to the ontology to solve this. this is the point of the UDA.

So comp is complete, in the sense above. We have just to progress in the epistemology, notably physics, to test it. Comp is incomplete, in the sense that it shows the epistemological realm to be beyond any complete theory, but then we know already that this is the case for arithmetical truth. There is just no effective theory capable of proving all true arithmetical statements.

Bruno




--
Onward!

Stephen


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