On Thursday, October 25, 2012 2:01:44 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote: > > On 10/24/2012 10:48 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 1:29:24 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote: >> >> On 10/24/2012 10:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, October 25, 2012 1:10:24 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote: >>> >>> On 10/24/2012 9:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> Or what if we don't care? We don't care about slaughtering cattle, >>>> which are pretty smart >>>> as computers go. We manage not to think about starving children in >>>> Africa, and they *are* >>>> humans. And we ignore the looming disasters of oil depletion, water >>>> pollution, and global >>>> warming which will beset humans who are our children. >>>> >>> >>> Sure, yeah I wouldn't expect mainstream society to care, except maybe >>> for some people, I am mainly focused on what seems to be like an >>> astronomically unlikely prospect that we will someday find it possible to >>> make a person out of a program, but won't be able to just make the program >>> itself and no person attached. >>> >>> >>> Right. John McCarthy (inventor of LISP) worried and wrote about that >>> problem decades ago. He cautioned that we should not make robots conscious >>> with emotions like humans because then it would be unethical use them like >>> robots. >>> >> >> It's arbitrary to think of robots though. It can be anything that >> represents computation to something. An abacus, a card game, anything. >> Otherwise it's prejudice based on form. >> >>> >>> Especially given that we have never made a computer program that can >>> do anything whatsoever other than reconfigure whatever materials are able >>> to execute the program, I find it implausible that there will be a magical >>> line of code which cannot be executed without an experience happening to >>> someone. >>> >>> >>> So it's a non-problem for you. You think that only man-born-of-woman or >>> wetware can be conscious and have qualia. Or are you concerned that we are >>> inadvertently offending atoms all the time? >>> >> >> Everything has qualia, but only humans have human qualia. Animals have >> animal qualia, organisms have biological qualia, etc. >> >> >> So computers have computer qualia. >> > > I would say that computer parts have silicon qualia. > > > Is it good or bad? Do they hurt when they loose and electron hole? >
It's only speculation until we can connect up our brain to a chip. I suspect that good or bad, pain or pleasure is more of an animal level of qualitative significance. I imagine more of a holding or releasing of a monotonous tension. I don't think the computer parts cohere into a computer except in our minds. Racist! Not at all, it's just that I understand what it actually is. Is it racist to think that Bugs Bunny isn't really an objectively real entity? > Do their qualia depend on whether they are sold-state or vacuum-tube? > germanium or silicon? PNP or NPN? Do they feel different when they run > LISP or C++? > Nah, its all inorganic low level qualia is my guess. Temperature, density, electronic tension and release. They feel good when they beat you at chess. > If I change a line of code, then they will try to lose at chess. They feel nothing either way. There is no 'they' there. > Do you have Craig qualia? > Sure. All the time. Probably just low energy water soluble chemistry. > I would agree if I could, but since I experience sensory reality first hand, I know that is not the case. I also know, through my sensory reality, that there is a difference between being alive and dead, between animals and minerals, willful human beings and mechanical automatons. If any computer ever built gave me any reason to doubt this, then I would have to consider it, but unless and until that happens, I don't need to pretend that it is a possibility. > > >> >> No matter how hard we try, we can never just make a drawing of these >> functions just to check our math without invoking the power of life and >> death. It's really silly. It's not even good Sci-Fi, it's just too lame. >> >> >> I think we can, because although I like Bruno's theory I think the MGA is >> wrong, or at least incomplete. I think the simulated intelligence needs a >> simulated environment, essentially another world, in which to *be* >> intelligent. And that's where your chalk board consciousness fails. It >> needs to be able to interact within a chalkboard world. So it's not just a >> question of going to a low enough level, it's also a question of going to a >> high enough level. >> > > A chalkboard world just involves a larger chalkboard. > > > Right. And it involves great chalkboard sex - but none we need worry > about. > To me, there is no chalkboard world. It's all dusty and flat. Not much sexy going on, except maybe for beaten erasers. To you maybe, but what about the chalk-people's qualia. > There aren't any chalk people, only particles of chalk and slate. They may not feel anything except every few thousand of our years when they are broken down. Craig Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/-pE8FtXYhCcJ. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
