On 31 Oct 2012, at 14:39, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

`The ONE is much more than the universal mind, as it is where the`

`universal minds compete, perhaps before eventually recognizing`

`themselves and reuniting, or fusing, and coming back to the ONE`

`(Plotinus' conversion).`

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse theories ?

`Not really because the "multiverse illusion" emerges from the`

`statistical interference in all realities/dreams. But what you say`

`might be locally true, if our substitution level is very low, like if`

`a difference in the 10^(10^1000) decimal of h-bar would prevents`

`consciousness to occur, or make it completely different (no need of`

`zombies here). That would be astonishing, given the evidence, but comp`

`certainly does not exclude, yet, such weird possibility. This would`

`give a multi-multi-verse, at the least, as we already have evidence`

`that our branches in the quantum multiverse can, and mostly, do`

`interfere.`

Bruno

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-30, 12:38:34 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 30 Oct 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treatedmathematically as always.I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to theexistence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise isequivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or falseeven in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.Dear Bruno I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind ofconscious beings.This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts compimmediately, as comp needs the understanding of what a computer cando, even in absence of any conscious observer.Dear Bruno,It contradicts your version of comp, yes, but not mine, as I seeminds and numbers as co-existing simultaneously, there is noontological priority between them in my version.Comp is only the assumption that the brain is a machine, to beshort. Then it is proved that the TOE is arithmetic (or recursivelyequivalent). Matter and mind arise from the numbers (and + and *).If you reintroduce a mind assumption, mind will be epiphenomenal. Ityou reintroduce matter, it will be epinomenal.If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers areconcepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in suchworlds.But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by numberrelations. We explain the concept of numbers, and of humanunderstanding of numbers, by number relations (computations).Sure, but we should be able to 'go the other way' as well! Youseem to insist on a well founded relation where as I do not!I derive proposition. I suggest nothing, nor do I insist on nothing,except on reasoning validly. I am not a philosopher. you mustunderstand the technical result before philosophising on it. It issubtle as comp makes a part of philosophy of mind into a branch ofscience (indeed, arithmetic/computer science).My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theoremsapply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, notto numbers themselves.Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them forsome machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.Your version, yes.Not my version. "My" version is just a technically more precise thatthe version used in some literature. Comp is the same for everybody."My" Version implies all other one, as it is a very weaker version(because it does not depend on which level of substitution we use).And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle isthat we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result indefining some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0,s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, thateverybody understands (unless philosophers?).I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the'miracle' is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have aconcept of numbers and can ascertain the truth of arithmeticstatements. My claim is that truth valuations supervene on theability of consciousness to form concepts of numbers.That is idealism, if not solipsism. In comp plotinus term, youconfuse the outer God (the objective ultimate truth) and the innerGod, or the sould of the individual inquirer.No, Idealism is that only the mind exists, i.e. idealism takesthe mind as ontologically primitive. Solipsism is the condition of amind such that it can only interact with some version of itself.Given that matter comes from the numbers, if the number comes fromthe human mind, everything comes from the human mind. This is aversion of (collective) solipsism.I question the entire idea of numbers existing as separate Platonicentities. In the absence of consciousness, there is no such thing asa concept!Again, we need only the relation between the numbers, not theconcept of numbers, which with comp will be explained by computationoccurring in the brain of some machine/number.Let me ask you: Do numbers have "concepts" of each other" YES!Godel numbers are a way for one number to have a concept of another.You can't be serious. A Godel number is a coding of something, whichcan indeed be a number. For a concept you need a thinking universalnumber; not just a faithful coding. Some numbers can be said havingconcept of other number, but just because some numbers implementsophisticated person relatively to their most probable computations.No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, how canthey dream?Yes, the universal numbers can have concept.This is just to show that your idea implicitly considers thatconcepts are 'mental' and that if numbers can be coherently said tohave minds then their concepts supervene on their minds. But whatare numbers as themselves - as objects?We don't ever know that. But we don't need to know that, as we agreeon the axioms, and reason from that. It is not philosophy.What can know the 'in-it-self-ness' of a number such that that'in-it-self-ness' is not a concept??PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP neversucceed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I amafraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamentaland has many interesting feature, but it concerns a localtractability issue, and is a priori, unless justification, notrelevant for the arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology(including physics) issue, etc.It is the argument is sound and is the same kind of argument aswhat Kripke used to discuss the idea of possible worlds. In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_worldwe read:"There is a close relation between propositions and possibleworlds. We note that every proposition is either true or false atany given possible world; then the modal status of a proposition isunderstood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds inwhich it is false."All this presuppose numbers at the outset. World in Kripke are onlyelements of any set having a binary relation. You must study themath, not use the naive interpretation based on the use of commonterms.Please, you are not addressing my critique, but some straw man.You are smarter than to do that!Rephrase your critics. You lost me, as I don't even see the critics.Solutions to equations or computations are not available untilafter they are actually solved.That is constructive thinking, again incompatible with comp,although retrieved and explain for the subject. This is akin to yoursolipsism above.Where am I claiming that only my thoughts exist? Could you definewhat solipsism is and how I am being such above?Because you seem to think that a solution of an equation exists onlyif we have found the solution. I think that arithmetic is boolean,and so a solution exist or does not exist independently of me and you.Of course it is hard to guess what you think as long as you don'tpropose a theory.Oh, so its OK that you do not think that you propose a theory,but it is a crime is someone else does that. You are being ahypocrite with that claim! How childish! Stop trying to evade mycritique.I am trying hard to get it, and don't succeed, and point that thisfact might come by my unability to see what are your assumption.My solution to this is to not go so far as you do in Step 8.You can't make the conclusion of a reasoning false by stopping thereasoning. This will only make you ignorant of a conclusion.blah blah blah... ? Let me try to be more explicit:From your paper http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf:"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [amachine state] at space-time(x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf ofcomputations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platoniawhich is accepted as existingindependently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "Yes. That is already true in a concrete robust physical universe(robust = own a non stopping UD).OK, so how does it remain true when there is no physicaluniverse? How can actions be defined on entities that are, bydefinition, static and eternally fixed? You result is self-stultifying here - not self-contradictory. If we take step 8 to becorrect then there is no possibility of a means to communicate themeaningfulness of comp to anything other than the mind of BrunoMarchal, since his chalkboard can be, do be consistent not a"physical object" and thus is at best a "dream".? The chalk seems to be obviously a physical object. But compexplains where it comes from.Whose dream? Dreams of Numbers. What makes how are the dreams ofnumbers more "special' than the dreams of Pink Unicorns or PurplePonys?If you have a theory of Pink Unicorns precise enough to be provedTuring universal, it is OK.The laws of both mind and matter are totally independent of theinitial objects you assume, be them numbers or combinators, or PinkUnicorn. Just give me the axioms you assume on Pink Unicorns.We have discussed how concepts and objects are not the samething, so what is the object aspect of a number?We don't need to know that. We need only to agree on the axioms: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x together with some axioms on equality.How does a number demonstrate its nature other than throughconcepts? It cannot!It can. Read any textbook in mathematical logic, or theoreticalcomputer science. Or G?el original papers. It is coneptually not sodifficult, just long and tedious, as it it an implementation of highlevel notion (concept of number) in low level notion numbers,addition and multiplication.I am pointing out that the idea of computations "existingindependently of our selves" is wrong in that it conflates themeaning and truth valuation of numbers with the existence of numbersas Platonic objects.You seem to ignore that this conflation is not us, but the doing ofthe (universal) numbers themselves, and this independently of me,you, or universes.OK, then this very independents prevents any meaning from beingassociated with its existence and thus the ability for "thissentence is true" to refer to itself vanishes (as it would for anyGodel Numbering that does exactly the same thing or any derivativething).Why would meaning disappear? I guess you are again violating comp.The meaning and consciousness is preserved in the digital(arithmetical) emulation.Independence isolates and cuts off connections, so do not claim thatthe results of those connections remain once independence is claimed.Then you say no to the doctor.There is no such thing as "running" or "implementing" or "meaning"or anything that is anything derivative of an action if step 8 iscorrect as you state it therefore AUDA is steaming rubbish if youinsist on it. Why? Because AUDA (and all the argument about G and G*and Z and Z*, etc) is "independent' of physical implementation andthat independence goes both ways - it independence is appliedcoherently.? All statements referred to in AUDA are theorems in PA. (the theoryabove + the induction axioms). And the theory above proves thatalready, as it emulates (but is different from) PA.If A and B are independent then they have nothing to do with eachother at all, unless their is some C that is prior to A and B. If Aand B are independent of the physical and timeless, there is nothingprior to them therefore no relation or prior to them can be used toinfer any relation what so ever between them.You might be correct here, and that is why it is a good thing thatthe *primitive* physical universe does not exist, as it would beindeed totally independent of any mind, and would be an epinomenon.Even the common naming conversion, A and B, is treachery as ittacitly assumes that there are two objects that can besimultaneously known and distinguished both between each other andsome common background vanishes is they are independent andtimeless. Your concept of Platonism is deeply flawed.But here you lost me again.You should spend some time studying philosophy if you aregoing to pretend to make philosophical arguments.I do not. That's the point.It is absurd to refer to the claim that the truth of "17 is prime"depends on any one person or entity, but the claim that the truth of"17 is prime" is knowable by any person is not absurd.It is absurd with comp, as knowing, despite NON arithmetical in thelogical sense, is still defined in purely arithmetical terms. Ifnot, you will not surive with an artificial brain, even concrete.No, it is not absurd, except for you that allows concepts ofactions, such as "implements" and "runs", to exist when they cannotbe coherently defined.But they can. I already define them once (or twice). read anytextbook in theoretical computer science. running, implementation,etc. are purely mathematical notion. It just happens that we canapproximate them through a physical reality, and that is what makecomp possible. But the the physical reality appears to benecessarily emerging from the numbers and their mind (or the mindassociated to person associated to the arithmetical relations, to bemore precise).If we stipulate that the content of knowledge exists somehow priorto that which knowledge supervenes upon, we are being absurd.This is just realism. The semantical content of knowledge as toexist independently of you if you don't want to fall into solipsism.How is it related to the word "real" at all? You are only showingus the mathematical theory of a consistent solipsistNot at all. On the contrary I ascribe mind to numbers (in relationwith opther numbers). It is the contrary of solipsism.and, as a consistent solipsist you are unable to conceptualize thatyou are wrong, after all "it is absurd that anything contradict thesolipsist as only it exists and its existence is only possible if itis consistent".Some thing is "real" only is that reality is common for many,thus solipsism and realism are mutually exclusive.Of course.The content of knowledge and the ability of knowledge occursimultaneously or not at all.With comp they "occur" as consequence of + and * laws. No. There is no "occurance" in your comp.The machine 678 on argument 456 stop after less than 456789 steps.That is a statement which if true can be proved in arithmetic, andyou can defined many notion of occurrence from it.Nothing can possibly "occur".An infinity of emulation of the collision of the Milky way andAndromeda occurs in arithmetic.In your result these is only "is".In GR too. In physics you can always replace a dynamical phenomenonby a higher dimensional statical structure. With comp we get thehigher structure at the start. Dynamics arise in the internal insideviews.X is Y, not any X occurs iff Y. There are no coherent concept ofactions in your comp.There are many.You really seems to lack even just the computer science intuition.Please study the book by Mendelson, or ask precise question, butmost of it have already been explained.Absent the "concept" of numbers there is no such thing asvaluations of numbersThen 17 is prime only since humans exist on the planet? or sinceinsects use this to regulate mating?This is solipsism/idealism.You fail to read temporarily or is it OK to attack straw men?Read further of my post.The fact is that your current posts makes me doubt about yourposition on "17 is prime independently of us".because the notion of Platonic objects considers objects as existingindependently as some singular "perfect" version that is thenplurally projected somehow into the physical realm, as we see in theAllegory of the Cave. This is a one-to-many mapping, not a one-to-one mapping.? (so you postulate conscious observer *and* physical universes?).Your theory looks more and more like Craig's non comp theory.They are very similar, I admit that. You have no idea whatCraig's idea is as demonstrated by your inability to describe itaccurately as anything other than rubbish or noise.I have great respect for Craig's attempt to defend a non comptheory. But you seem to want both comp and a Craig-like theory, andthen that is what I have shown inconsistent. Craig's theory isconsistent, as it assumes non-comp. But your "theory", as far as Iunderstand it, is not. Now Craig is not consistent in most of hisargument against comp, as his conversation with Stathis illustrates,but that is another point.How exactly is a "type" or "sheaf" a singular and "perfect"version of each and every computation and yet be something that hasindividuated valuations? Individual valuations of computations areonly those that occur as physical instantiations of computations"physical instantiation of computations" is something in needed tobe explaiend, not assumed, if we want to understand something (notjust comp). Computation evaluation is a too fuzzy terming for me.A physical instance of a computation is the existence of aphysical system that can "run" a universal turing machine.Trivially true. The whole point is that such a physical existencewill no more be primary.It can do so, among other things, because it uses resources of timeand/or memory to transform through some set of states such that itreproduces the functions of the UTM.Agains that is true for the physical universal machine. But not forall universal machine, and the physical emerges from the work of alluniversal machines.Straight forward idea that we see in texts on computers. Nothing newor magical...because computers are thought as physical, since we build them. butthe mathematical notion preceded it, and does not rely on physicalnotion of resource, but on mathematical notion of "enough memory".and thus they do not "exist" in Platonia. Then Church thesis has no more meaning. To you, perhaps. What a pity!To everyone. If arithmetical realism is excluded, you can no moreexplain the consistency of Church thesis by the diagonalization. Youneed to believe that for all i and j, either phi_i(j) stops orphi_i(j) does not stop, independently of you.The Many exist in the physical worlds, no? Primitive one?No. Not primitive, derivative. No different from how numbers arederivative in my thinking and that of most natural philosophers.? Your mistake is in assuming strict ontological well foundedness; ? Comp makes this possible.the idea that there has to be a irreducible ontological primitivethat has innate properties. If you would read Bertrand Russell'sdiscussions of neutral monism then you might see his explanation ofwhat I am proposing and not have the straw man of my terriblewriting to use as a shield of your unwillingness to try tounderstand what I am trying to communicate to you.You are quite unfair as I try hard.Irreducible objects, in the ontological sense, cannot have aparticular set of properties as such is to exclude all otherpossible properties without justification. To claim that numbers canbe ontologically primitive and yet have valuations and abilities isto deny their irreducibility, as values and abilities arederivative, not fundamental or innate.Give me the entire quote of Russell. keep in mind that Russellphilosophy has been refuted by G?el, also. But the very existence ofprincipia mathematica makes me doubt that Russell ever defended anontology with object who irreducibility prevents them to haveproperties; such an ontology would be by construction not amenableto scientific analysis.I propose a rephrasing of your statement above: We identify the1p qualia to a sheaf of computations (as bisimilar Boolean Algebras)that is dual to physical machine states at diffeomorphicallyequivalent space-time coordinates (x, y, z, t). This is arestatement of the Stone duality into COMP-like terms. ;-)That does not make sense to me. Sorry.Read some more books on philosophy, such as The Problems ofPhilosophyI read it, and it does not say one word related to the paragraphabove.it might make sense in some non comp analogical theory of mind, withmind and matter explicitly defined in term of non computablediffeomorphism. But this looks to me like making the mind-bodyproblem more complex just for fun.No, I am trying to show you how to solve the 'arithmetic body'problem.You have just to see if the arithemtical quantization defines themeasure, as it seems to promise up to now. If not, then comp +(theatetus definition) is refuted.All what I have done is a translation of the arithmetic body problemin arithpmetic. The solution can only be technical, although somevariability exists due to the use of the classical theory ofknowledge. It is already a mircale that the Theaetus definition ofknowledge gives rise to the classical theory of knowledge. Without G?el and L?, that would be impossible.(The idea of diffeomorphic equivalence is discussed in detail here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Leibniz_Equivalence.html)When you say: <<Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have arguedbefore this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim thatthe solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possibleworld) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God)prior to the availability of resources with which to actuallyperform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the contentof a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient!I don't find any sense.How is this so difficult for you to comprehend? The PlatonicRealm is defined as timeless, everything in it just 'exists', no?Only in the sense that if some proposition P(n) is trueindependently of me, then ExP(x) is true independently of me.But you are not the only entity involved in the truth of P(n)! ? I am not involved at all.You pretend that it is possible for something to be so absurd! P(n)is true only because it is possible to implement some version ofP(n) and verify that indeed P(n) is true.Then arithmetic is no more boolean, and both "yes doctor" and"church's thesis" have no more meaning.The mere Platonic existence of P(n) P(n) does not exist. n exist, and P is true or false about it. is insufficient for truth as truth is a derivative evaluation. Not at all. truth is a matter of fact. It cannot be ontologically irreducible.Truth is is the easiest notion to conceive as irreducible, for aplatonist.Therefore any argument that shows that "if A does not exist thenneither does B if B requires A to exist" is true in Platonia aswell, (we stipulate the existence of Platonia as defined for thesake of this statement). If a solution to a computation cannot existuntil the computation is run then if the resources required to runthe computation do not exist then there does not exist a solution tothe computation!So you cannot compute 10^1000 + 10^1000, and your theory isultrafinitist (and so non-comp).False. Straw man argument.Then why do you say that a computation has to be run to assert theexistence of its solution. And run by who, and where?I propose that we can easily resolve this conundrum by statingComputational universality as: "A computation is universal if andonly if it is independent of any particular physical implementation."Universal applies to finite entity (numbers, humans, machines,language). Not to computations, although the running of a universaldovetailer can be said universal in some context, but only by abuseof language.So? How does that contradict my definition of universality?The computation of 2+2 will not depend on any particularimplementation, yet it is not universal.This allows for the existence of physical implementations, Comp allows this too; without the need of assuming physical realities.Rubbish. You must assume the a priori possibility of physicalreality to even have a coherent notion of comp or else it is, atleast, not communicable.I have already explain why this is a confusion of level.even those that are themselves defined by correlations betweensheaves for computations. This sets up a relation betweencomputations - as abstract or immaterial objects - and physicalsystems that seems consistent with "COMP minus Step 8". We canrecover the picture of step 8,Step 8 is a consequence of comp, like all steps in the UDA. 'Compminus step 8' implies that 0 = 1.LOL, no. It only means "'Comp minus step 8' implies that 0 =1." for a consistent solipsist.Then you have to find a flaw.in a way that is truly neutral ontologically, by changing its singledirected arrow to a pair of oppositely directed arrows, but this onethat occurs only in the ultimate sense of the elaboration of allpossible physical worlds consistent with Pratt's idea.1004. Straw Man. Then you have to elaborate.This idea, BTW, is consistent with the concept of Indra's Net, asan inversion of the idea that every Jewel reflects all others: Everyjewel is a physical world that is defined by all computations of it.Note also that this naturally includes self-computation as jewelsalso reflect themselves. ;-)I have no more any understanding by what you mean by "physicalworld". It seems like a God-of-the-Gap.I define a physical world as the set of mutually non-contradictory 1p for some set of non-solipsistic entities that havecertain properties that at least allow for some coherent notion ofcommunication between those entities.Then the physical reality emerges from the 1p. Like in comp. why doyou take so much time to criticize comp for not assuming a physicalreality. And how do you define 1p, without using physics or notionsof resources.I hope you don't mind my frankness. I wouldn't say this if I did notrespect some intuition of yours. But math and formalism can't be apretext for not doing the elementary reasoning in the philosophy ofmind. If you use math, you have to be clearer on the link withphilosophy or theology. To be understandable by others.I am trying to be clear. I will correct and rephrase my verbiageuntil you understand it.It would help to tell us what you assume at the start. from what Iunderstand it is just contradictory. Pratt assumes more thanarithmetic. All paper you refer too assumes more than arithmetic.Your notion of consciousness and of physical universe seems to bevery fuzzy and clearly not comp-compatible.My point is that you are not "just assuming" arithmetic. Youassume, additionally, at least that there is qualia.In UDA. No more in AUDA. They are defined and explain in arithmetic,as UDA eventually forces us to do.I reject the idea of an entity, 'God', whose total purpose is to"observe" the Reality of the Universe!Comp too. Comp rejects also the primitive reality of a physicaluniverse.So do I. I reject as ontologically primitive anything that is notproperty neutral.This makes no sense. It must be nuetral with respect to mind andbody. Not neutral to any properties, as your theory will be unableto derive anything.If we accept the idea that numbers exist in our complete absence,then it follows that an entity like us cannot exist just to observethe existence of numbers (or anything else).? ? ?Why postulate the existence of a special entity that does what wecollectively are already doing?Why postulate physical computations, and comp, when comp explainshow physical computations emerges in our mind through the existenceof the computations in arithmetic?No, it does not do so alone. Comp requires the implementation ofa physical symbolic representation of the idea for it to be evenevaluated and thus implicitly requires something physical even ifthat "physicality" is derivative and not ontologically primitive.Then I don't see why you critics the consequence of comp, as itshows exactly this.Read Russell's book ad stop using straw amn arguments about mypitiful attempt to help you solve a problem that you ackowledgeexists in comp.The existence of that problem is the main result (UDA) Then I transform it into a problem in arithmetic (AUDA).It is our collective consciousness that Constitutes the PlatonicRealm, IMHO. A theory that there is some independently existingrealm is a gross violation of Occam.But you do it for the physical computations, like in this post,despite you often pretend the contrary in other posts.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Stop using logical fallacious statements.Which one. How is it fallacious? I might have been wrong, but youhave to elaborate on the clarity of your statements.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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