On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012
Dear Roger,

I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an infinite regress. That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something "different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties?

The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem.

--
Onward!

Stephen


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