Hey all on the list,

Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this 
teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish 
to simply conclude from the entire argument that the correct substitution 
level is, in principle, not only not knowable, but not achievable, which 
means:

congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof that 
teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so 
(give me a margin of error of about plus/minus 100) ... this is very 
reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use some of godel's 
closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's relativity to argue 
that time travel to the past is possible. The problem is, the furthest back 
you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to make the CTC, the 
formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a time 
machine. This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in 
the time machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to 
use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. 

In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the 
conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the 
computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less appealing 
conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in your entire thought 
experiment is simply impossible, for much of the same reasons as time 
travel is impossible. 

It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you think if 
we admit that the teleportation required in your thought experiment is 
simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and therefore not 
computational, or mechanistic) reasons. 

Looking forward to your response,

Dan

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