Hi Bruno Marchal I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say, that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.
[Roger Clough], [[email protected]] 11/19/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote: > > > -------- Original Message -------- > >> >> More In This Article >> * Overview >> _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_ >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all >> >> ) >> >> >> >> Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of >> discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks. >> It stands to reason >> that computers??which process information in discrete >> chunks??should be able >> to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out >> that >> certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized; >> they are >> irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of >> "_Is Quantum >> Reality Analog after All?_ >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all >> >> ) " in the December 2012 issue of >> Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a >> computer. That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra. Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp, digital physics is contradictory. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
