Hi Bruno Marchal It is known that I think Hilbert and other great mathematicians thought at least initially in terms of images or pictures. That is more evidence in support of Lucas and Penrose.

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[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-23, 14:41:13 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 23 Nov 2012, at 16:43, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal, I find this statement on http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmk/papers/05-KI.html : "....the Lucas-Penrose argument, which can be summarized as follows: Since G?el proved that in each sound formal system - which is strong enough to formulate arithmetic - there exists a formula which cannot be proved by the system (assumed the system is consistent), and since we (human beings) can see that such a formula must be true, human and machine reasoning must inevitably be different in nature, even in the restricted area of mathematical logic. This attributes to human mathematical reasoning a very particular role, which seems to go beyond rational thought. " I can't think of an arithmetic example that LP could use, which they should have provided. So as the question is posed, LP seem to be mistaken or at least incomplete themselves. G?el talk about axiomatic logical theories, or machine, theorem prover. It shows that for such theories or machine, we can find true statement that the machine or theory cannot prove. But the reason why Penrose and Lucas is based on the fact that G?el provide an algorithm for finding that true but non provable proposition. So machines excel in finding the true proposition about other little machine, that the little machine cannot find. L?ian machine can prove theorem own G?el's theorem, and develop transfinite autonomous self-extension in provability matter. G and G* remains correct at each state, and Becklemishev has found extension of G and G* formalizing the multimodal logic captureing the [] = [0] and the [alpha] transfinite provability level. (But you need to study logic for making sense of this). At any rate, many factual statements can obviously be true but unproveable by a computer alone. That the sky is blue would be such a statement. OK. We are not "obviously" more gifted than the computer. Or any piece of data not in its data bank. No, the computer can assert much more than what is in the data bank. Much much more. What it deduces from it, what it induces from it, and all the hazardous theories, if not the lie and delusion etc. Look at the difference between the string "z_n := (z_(n-1))^2 +1", which is the data bank content, and what the universal machine says from that : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0nmVUU_7IQ So I conclude that LP are correct at least for most factual statements and they only needed one example. ? No LP are not correct. They can do what they pretend on simpler machine than themselves, and machines can do that too. But they cannot do that for themselves without changing themselves, and the machine can do that too. The machine already knows that it is a bit risky. If the truth is possible, the lies and errors are possible too. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/23/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-21, 12:23:40 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in great scholarly detail on http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/ To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it fails to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on Lucas, Benacerraf and the Penrose argument). I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are uninteresting, and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas and Penrose are typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it leads to the proposition according to whioch: If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this plays some role in the formal part of the study of the first person indeterminacy. Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know that they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the soundness is restricted to arithmetic. In Conscience & Mechanism, I show how all L?ian machines can refute Lucas and Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p & p (1p knowledge).. It seems to me to be self-evident that 1p cannot be part of 3p But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be proved, as the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p and []p & p, as they don't know that they are correct. []p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p and p cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the L?ian one can prove that for simpler machine than themselves, and they can bet on their correctness and lift that idea at their own level, with the usual theological risk of this (forgetting the "bet" in the process). Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm. OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like Godel and Lucas did. Or the observer can't be part of what is observed. Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof. Well, both the observer (3p) and the prover (3p) can do that, without necessarily knwoing that they do that. But the knower (1p) cannot. To explain the details of this would need more familiarity in logic, and notably Solovay's theorems, which I might explain someday. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/21/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-20, 10:05:13 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, where are the steps of UD ? You can find them here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram for each step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8, the best version is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument). The seven first steps already explains the reversal physics---/---number's bio-psycho-theo-logy though. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/20/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say, that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable. Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and not consciousness per se). What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is. Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place of the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the consciousness. It means only that the consciousness can only be made manifestable through relative bodies, but it exists only in Platonia. But then matter too, and it relies statistically on all computations going through my current comp states, and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable. I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/19/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote: > > > -------- Original Message -------- > >> >> More In This Article >> * Overview >> _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_ >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all >> >> ) >> >> >> >> Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of >> discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks. >> It stands to reason >> that computers??which process information in discrete >> chunks??should be able >> to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out >> that >> certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized; >> they are >> irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of >> "_Is Quantum >> Reality Analog after All?_ >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all >> >> ) " in the December 2012 issue of >> Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a >> computer. That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra. Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp, digital physics is contradictory. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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