Hi Roger,
On 22 Nov 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
You say
" OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like
Penrose and Lucas did."
So basically, whether you believe the Lucas-Penrose theory
It is not a theory.
It is an informal argument according to which Gödel's theorem would
show that we are not machine. The argument has never convinced any
logicians and can be shown wrong in many different ways.
On the contrary, incompleteness protects the consistency of Church
thesis, and thus comp.
depends
on whether you believe in comp or no.
Not at all. The argument show that Gödel's theorem (incompleteness)
==> non-comp. This would imply that comp ===> Gödel's theorem is
wrong, which is absurd.
The most basic error is that Lucas/Penrose believe that a human can
know that they are sound.
Like Watson can play jeopardy, Gödel already knew that the Löbian
machine can detect the error made in Penrose and Lucas type of
argument. This is developed in my long text: "Conscience & Mécanisme".
Judson Webb wrote a book on this.
In his second book, Penrose correct his mistake, but does not really
take the correction into account, and thus miss the formal first
person indeterminacy.
I have serious problems
with comp because the 1ps and hence the 3ps of various
people and various computer programs will vary.
I don't
see how they can all be the same.
I don't understand your point.
Meanwhile, I'll look at the counter-arguments to Lucas and Penrose.
You need to study Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Most popular account
of it are non valid. An nice exception is Hofstadter "Gödel, Escher
Bach".
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/22/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-21, 12:23:40
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in great
scholarly detail on
http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/
To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it
fails to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on
Lucas, Benacerraf and the Penrose argument).
I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are
uninteresting, and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas
and Penrose are typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it
leads to the proposition according to whioch:
If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this
plays some role in the formal part of the study of the first person
indeterminacy.
Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know
that they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the
soundness is restricted to arithmetic.
In Conscience & Mechanism, I show how all Löbian machines can refute
Lucas and Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p
& p (1p knowledge)..
It seems to me to be self-evident that
1p cannot be part of 3p
But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be
proved, as the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p
and []p & p, as they don't know that they are correct.
[]p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p
and p cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the
Löbian one can prove that for simpler machine than themselves, and
they can bet on their correctness and lift that idea at their own
level, with the usual theological risk of this (forgetting the "bet"
in the process).
Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm.
OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like
Godel and Lucas did.
Or the observer can't be part of what is observed.
Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof.
Well, both the observer (3p) and the prover (3p) can do that,
without necessarily knwoing that they do that.
But the knower (1p) cannot.
To explain the details of this would need more familiarity in logic,
and notably Solovay's theorems, which I might explain someday.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-20, 10:05:13
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Sorry, where are the steps of UD ?
You can find them here:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram
for each step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8,
the best version is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph
Argument). The seven first steps already explains the reversal
physics---/---number's bio-psycho-theo-logy though.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/20/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation
[Audio]
On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.
Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind,
and not consciousness per se).
What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is
not completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is.
Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the
place of the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the
consciousness. It means only that the consciousness can only be
made manifestable through relative bodies, but it exists only in
Platonia. But then matter too, and it relies statistically on all
computations going through my current comp states, and the math
shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable.
I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal
understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/19/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20
Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation
[Audio]
On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
>
>>
>> More In This Article
>> * Overview
>> _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_
>>
(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
>> )
>>
>>
>>
>> Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of
>> discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks.
>> It stands to reason
>> that computersÿÿwhich process information in discrete
>> chunksÿÿshould be able
>> to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns
out
>> that
>> certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized;
>> they are
>> irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of
>> "_Is Quantum
>> Reality Analog after All?_
>>
(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
>> ) " in the December 2012 issue of
>> Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a
>> computer.
That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted
digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated)
violated
the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non
computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra.
Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp
implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp,
digital physics is contradictory.
Bruno
>
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