If in your theory sense is fundamental, a hence explains everything, how could your theory explain concepts like:

Quantum mechanics
Fine tuning

It seems you need some formal laws and definitions concerning sense in order to build from it as a basis of understanding.

What might those laws of sense be?


On Dec 13, 2012, at 7:51 AM, Craig Weinberg <> wrote:

On Thursday, December 13, 2012 5:22:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
> On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
> >
> > On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Your servitor:
> > >
> > > 1) Arithmetic (comp)
> > >
> > > :)
> > >
> > > Bruno
> > >
> > > To which I add:
> > >
> > > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise
> > > to comp.
> >
> >
> > OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.
> >
> > No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for
> > granted.
> Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence,
> are theorem in the tiny arithmetic.
> Tiny compared to what though?

Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described.

But if the universe contains no K to begin with, then it is insurmountably un-tiny, no?

> As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from
> nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory-
> motor primitive, which has no possible explanation.

First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or
Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them,

That's what I keep telling you though, I have already done this. Numbers cannot be assumed and they can be explained as epiphenomenal protocols within sense.

if only to make sense
of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor.

Now sensory-motor really cannot be explained with less than sensory- motor. That's because it is the legitimate universal primitive. That's why 'seeing is believing' and 'there is no substitute for experience' and 'you had to be there' and 'it's lost in translation'. Experience is trans-rational. Logic arises from experience, not the other way around. It isn't numbers who dream, it is dreams who count. See? You are experiencing sensory-motor now - it is all that anything has ever experienced. All 'explanations' arise through it, from it, and to it as isomorphisms of sense- making. Juxtapostion of like experiences on different levels, from the concrete and personal to the abstract and generic.

Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation.

That's what I'm saying. In sense, everything has lots of explanations. New explanations all the time. Explanations are made of sense.

> Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences

Keep in mind that "experiences" is what I want explain.

That's circular. Explanation is already an experience. You are trying to put the shoebox into the shoe.

> which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in
> arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of
> frustration.

In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness.

Any machine that physically exists must be executed through some material which, on some level of description, has some level of awareness - molecules if nothing else. That doesn't mean though, if you make a walking machine out of PVC pipes (which are fantastic btw) that the walker as a whole hosts a unified awareness. Whatever awareness we project onto it is ultimately a reflection of our own sensory expectations and the sensory-motive intentions of the engineer(s) who created it. We watch TV, but the TV doesn't watch TV. We use a computer, but the computer doesn't use it's own computations to make sense. It reminds us very much of consciousness, but ultimately that reminder is a sculpture made of collections of metal pins and glassy films rather than living cells divided from a mammalian sexual syzygy event.

> It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all
> it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete
> sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the
> Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure
> capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers?
> > Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't
> > necessary in the first place.
> By postulating what we want to explain.
> There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain
> arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of
> arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense
> which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value.

If you say so ...

I don't see any reason not to?

> >
> > You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back.
> >
> > It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If
> > you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non-
> > ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other
> > beings in public space.
> You take the problem, and then say it is the solution.
> The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and
> solutions.

Well, the cosmos is a problem with comp, and which makes comp

Interesting is good, but the truth of the cosmos doesn't have to be that interesting.

> That's the god-
> of-the-gap mistake.
> No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos -
> beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is
> sense itself.

We don't even know if there is one.

We don't need to know that there is a cosmos because we already are the cosmos.

> We have of course already discuss this. You are
> just saying "don't search".
> You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the
> only answer that can ever be universally true.


> It looks *you* are talking everything for
> granted at the start, in the theory.
> I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down
> into any more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down
> to sense.

The CTM + classical theory of knowledge can explain that feeling.

Then it should break itself down in the same way.

> >
> > With the CTM ( a
> > better name for comp), that which perceives, understands,
> participates
> > and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its
> > consciousness) by the only two laws:
> >
> > Kxy = x
> > Sxyz = xz(yz)
> >
> > Laws? What are those? How do they govern?
> Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first
> equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x.
> So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in
> eleimnainating the left parentheses):
> KKK = K.
> For the same reason
> KSK = S
> KSS = S
> K(S K) K = (S K)
> etc.
> For example SKK is an identity operator:
> SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation,  = x, by the first equation.
> S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a
> Turing universal language/system/machine.
> Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems
> don't appear without some capacity to generate and participate in
> them which exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a
> Law, but when I ask what you mean by that, you give more details on
> this specific proposition. I'm asking about the proposition itself
> though? What Turing universal language allows S and K to 'behave',
> or to exist or to relate to each other?

Any one, if you don't like combinators. But we have to start from one
universal system. The simplest one, conceptually, is arithmetic.

The impulse to start from one universal system is already consciousness - it's already sense. Stop there. What is start? What is universal? What is system? These three are the primitives - participation, perception, and order = sense.

Computers all need to be turned on. That's the start. Initialization is motive. Doing. Going. Computers need storage and memory - that's your universality: read/ write = being, perception. Access to the public by the private. Computers need programming - that's logic. Input from one sense modality, integration with other sense modalities, and output in some descriptive experiential modality (motive-motor participation). These are the agents of realism. The arithmetic patterns which arise echo and reflect the complexity of experience, but they do not in themselves generate experience. They aren't selves. They are de- selves. Di-versions. They help us understand selves, certainly. They empower and extend our motor capacities, undoubtedly, but they are not 'us'. They are beautiful Platonic shadows of intelligence.

> It's consistent within a particular frame of generalized truth but
> it has no proprietary traction. It doesn't move eyeballs and cross
> streets, it just equals or increments.

Again, you make assertion which can all be sump up by "comp is false".
It is your philosophical opinion, not a fact on which we can agree to
start with.

If everyone is lost in the neo-scholastacism of comp, then the first order of business is to explain why comp is false and why facts are not the only epistemological sources when explaining consciousness. Experience itself is the most relevant fact.

Of course I am a scientist who asks for a scientific theory, I might
be too much demanding.

I think it's me who might be too demanding of science to make theories about reality instead of theories about theory.

> > How do these formulas become perception, understanding,
> > participation, and discovery?
> By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception,
> understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion,
> self-
> reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps
> by the fact that combinators, or numbers, machines, programs, when
> looking inward, get unjustifiable bunch of information, including
> unexpressible one.
> But this is what we are trying to explain.

This is already explained.

Then why do you say 'Perhaps'?

> It seems like after all of the mathematics we are no closer to
> answering Why qualia than Plato was.

On the contrary, we have a precise and testable theory of qualia. It
is testable as it contains a theory of quanta and we can compare with
the empiric quantum.

But your perhaps theory of qualia assumes the qualia of numbers and arithmetic.

> If you accept that qualia is fundamental and irreducible, then
> everything else makes perfect sense, including mathematical figures
> as reflections of sense-making rather than agents of subjectivity.

I just don't have to take qualia as fundamental,

That's why you are seeing the universe from an inverted perspective...which is great, but it being inverted is a problem when you get to qualia itself, which is the 'verted' principle. Orientation cannot be understood from a disoriented assumption.

and this in a theory
which postulate only that my consciousness supervene on my brain
computational activity.

I'm saying that computational activity already supervenes on simple consciousness. Initialization - memory - programming. These cannot be substituted or simulated at the bottom level by comp.

> Today the number 12 will be undoubtedly be referenced by more people
> and computers than at any other time in history. Will 12 care? If it
> doesn't, then how could any number care about anything?

12 is too little to care of everything.

Ahh, now your racism shows through. Some numbers are more equal than others, eh Bruno ;)

But relatively to a universal
numbers, many numbers will care (in CTM). Of course when I say that a
number cares, I mean the person associated to the coupling of that
numbers with its most probable universal numbers "running" it.

Why not just say 'the person' and let the computations be sub- personal?

> > I know what sense is, because everything that I can experience makes
> > some kind of sense with in some sensory experience or is itself a
> > sensory experience.
> OK. But if we can use the directly obvious at the metalevel, does not
> mean we can't explain that very use from a simpler level.
> Except the explanations from the simpler level supervenes on an even
> simpler level, which ultimately can only begin with some capacity to
> be and do - sense and motive.

Locally, yes. But again this can be explained without assuming sense
in the ontology.

All explanations assume sense (by definition), whether they acknowledge it or not.

> A universal machine needs to be made of parts which have sensory-
> motor characteristics: stability, succession, detection, multiple
> interpretations, reading and writing, lots of things.

I don't think so. You assume the two things that  comp explains as
illusory: primitive experience (sense) and primitive matter. I have
already explained that you need actual infinities to attach the
primitive experience to the primitive matter (and this follows from
UDA if you assume comp).

If comp requires the existence of illusions, then it isn't a theory about the cosmos. Illusions are the places where we fall short in our understanding. Illusions reveal much more reality than what we presume are not illusions. Sense explains absolutely everything and everything is absolutely explained by sense.

> > 'Two Laws' is an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no
> > presence or effect without a participant who is in some way subject
> > to that presence or effect. Being present and subject to an effect
> > is sense.
> I can't agree more. I appreciate your intuition on the first person.
> What you say here is the base of defining knowledge of p by a belief
> in p in case p is true. Kp = Bp & p, with p arithmetical, and B too.
> So any particular knowlegde will be arithmetical, despite Kp is not
> definable in one strike, in arithmetic. This entails that no machine
> can know who she "really" is. She can only give a 3p description of
> herself or a summary of it (like an identity card).
> I can agree with that I think, although I'm not so much focused on
> knowledge and belief, because those are more experiences of
> verification and representation rather than initial presentation.
> >
> >
> > or if you prefer:
> >
> > x + 0 = x
> > x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
> >
> >   x *0 = 0
> >   x*(y + 1) = x*y + x
> >
> > By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an
> > unnecessary magic.
> >
> > The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove.
> Keep is mind that I am a scientist, or if you prefer, I am simple
> minded. I expect a theory to be given by what we assume. The theorems
> will show what is emerging from what we have assumed. If you do not
> add the perceiver, then tell me precisely what you assume, and how you
> derive the perceiver from it.
> I assume only a single experiential capacity which subdivides itself
> and does not subdivide itself. The individual perceiver is what
> remains through isolation - the presence of absence. This isolation
> is what we call space and time (or alienation, Tsimtsum, etc), which
> is really about scale modulation, the enfolding of sense within
> sense. Computation are the rules for establishing this isolation, so
> in a real sense it is just as primary as experience itself, however
> the natural orientation should always foreground the head end - the
> perceiver, and background information/arithemtic/spacetime, if we
> are talking about realism and not abstraction. In abstraction, we
> can talk about turning the universe upside down and making energy or
> communications, semiotics, arithmetic, mana, prana, or whatever
> primary and learn all kinds of interesting things, but ultimately we
> won't ever be able to find consciousness there. Consciousness is
> always beneath all of it - functions and substances are only kinds
> of experiences, but experience has no substance and serves no
> function.

? Experience has no function? With comp consciousness has a function,
like self-speeding up oneself relatively to possible universal numbers
in the neighborhood (with consciousness modeled by bet in self-

But I have explained that speeding up is meaningless in an arithmetic universe. Computation can stop and start, go fast or slow, go backward and edit the past...all without any sort of experience or realism. If you want a part of a program to go faster, put a bunch of while loops everywhere else except in that subroutine - voila! relative acceleration without experience.

> In such complex subject, it is very useful to put ALL the cards on the
> table. That is why I assume a bit of logic, the natural numbers,
> addition and multiplication, and then, using comp at the metalevel, I
> show that we need nothing more, and that adding anything more is a
> sort of treachery, which can deprive the natural quanta/qualia
> distinction to get derived from self-reference.
> Self-reference is a Red Herring to me. If I say "I" does that mean
> the author of the words or the sentence is talking about itself?
> There is nothing in the letter "I" which can answer that, but our
> intuition should tell us that the sentence is not really talking
> about itself, and that in fact sentences themselves can't really
> talk about anything.

They can, by the use of the Dx = "xx" trick.

You think they can, but the trick is in the eye of the beholder.

> > You are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a > > doorway to a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of
> > counting. Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers.
> > Computers require sense.
> >
> > I continue to be,
> > Craig
> You continue to be a good phenomenologist and a bad metaphysician,
> imo.
> Hehe. I don't want to be a metaphysician though, I want to
> physicalize meta.
> I would not care so much if you didn't become a consciousness-
> eliminativist with respect to material and immaterial machines.
> I'm ok with machines opening up new experiences for us, but I don't
> think that we are opening up new experiences for them.

We differ on this.


> If we were, they wouldn't care anyhow, and that is part of what
> makes 'them' machines. It's not discrimination to expose the truth
> about awareness. I'm very happy to have silicon sisters working with
> me or above me, but I have a solid understanding of why they can
> only work and never play. It's not a deficiency on their part, it's
> an over-simplification on our part about the qualitative nature of
> consciousness and its roots in totality and the single history of
> (our) universe.

Of course we differ on this. I try hard to make people listening to
the machines, but today it asks for a non trivial,investment in
computer science. I can't force you to study the math, but I can't
help if you don't. All this can be understood even by a disbeliever in

I agree that machines are worth listening to, but not as oracles of universal truth. Oracles of default facts, maybe.



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