On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Your servitor: 
> > > 
> > > 1) Arithmetic (comp) 
> > > 
> > > :) 
> > > 
> > > Bruno 
> > > 
> > > To which I add: 
> > > 
> > > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise 
> > > to comp. 
> > 
> > 
> > OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. 
> > 
> > No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for   
> > granted. 
>
> Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence,   
> are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. 
>

Tiny compared to what though? As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of 
arithmetic truth from nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of 
a sensory-motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. Arithmetic is 
easily explained as one of the many types of experiences which allow us to 
refer to other experiences, but nothing in arithmetic will ever point to 
the taste of a carrot or a feeling of frustration. It may leave room for 
undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all it is: room. Nothing points 
positively to realism and concrete sensory participation, only 
simulations...but what simulates the Turing machine itself? What props up 
the stability and erasure capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to 
detect numbers?


>
>
>
> > Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't   
> > necessary in the first place. 
>
> By postulating what we want to explain. 
>

There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain 
arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of 
arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense which 
persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. 

>
>
> > 
> > You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. 
> > 
> > It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If   
> > you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- 
> > ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other   
> > beings in public space. 
>
> You take the problem, and then say it is the solution.


The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and solutions. 
 

> That's the god- 
> of-the-gap mistake. 


No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos - beneath all 
gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is sense itself.
 

> We have of course already discuss this. You are   
> just saying "don't search".


You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the only 
answer that can ever be universally true.
 

> It looks *you* are talking everything for   
> granted at the start, in the theory. 
>

I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down into any 
more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down to sense.
 

>
>
>
>
> > 
> > With the CTM ( a 
> > better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates 
> > and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its 
> > consciousness) by the only two laws: 
> > 
> > Kxy = x 
> > Sxyz = xz(yz) 
> > 
> > Laws? What are those? How do they govern? 
>
> Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first   
> equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x. 
>
> So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in   
> eleimnainating the left parentheses): 
> KKK = K. 
>
> For the same reason 
>
> KSK = S 
> KSS = S 
> K(S K) K = (S K) 
> etc. 
>
> For example SKK is an identity operator: 
>
> SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation,  = x, by the first equation. 
>
> S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a   
> Turing universal language/system/machine. 
>

Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems don't 
appear without some capacity to generate and participate in them which 
exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a Law, but when I ask 
what you mean by that, you give more details on this specific proposition. 
I'm asking about the proposition itself though? What Turing universal 
language allows S and K to 'behave', or to exist or to relate to each 
other? It's consistent within a particular frame of generalized truth but 
it has no proprietary traction. It doesn't move eyeballs and cross streets, 
it just equals or increments.


>
>
> > How do these formulas become perception, understanding,   
> > participation, and discovery? 
>
> By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception,   
> understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion, self- 
> reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps   
> by the fact that combinators, or numbers, machines, programs, when   
> looking inward, get unjustifiable bunch of information, including   
> unexpressible one. 
>

But this is what we are trying to explain. It seems like after all of the 
mathematics we are no closer to answering Why qualia than Plato was. If you 
accept that qualia is fundamental and irreducible, then everything else 
makes perfect sense, including mathematical figures as reflections of 
sense-making rather than agents of subjectivity.

Today the number 12 will be undoubtedly be referenced by more people and 
computers than at any other time in history. Will 12 care? If it doesn't, 
then how could any number care about anything?
 

>
>
>
> > I know what sense is, because everything that I can experience makes   
> > some kind of sense with in some sensory experience or is itself a   
> > sensory experience. 
>
> OK. But if we can use the directly obvious at the metalevel, does not   
> mean we can't explain that very use from a simpler level. 
>
> Except the explanations from the simpler level supervenes on an even 
simpler level, which ultimately can only begin with some capacity to be and 
do - sense and motive. A universal machine needs to be made of parts which 
have sensory-motor characteristics: stability, succession, detection, 
multiple interpretations, reading and writing, lots of things.
 

>
>
> > 'Two Laws' is an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no   
> > presence or effect without a participant who is in some way subject   
> > to that presence or effect. Being present and subject to an effect   
> > is sense. 
>
> I can't agree more. I appreciate your intuition on the first person.   
> What you say here is the base of defining knowledge of p by a belief   
> in p in case p is true.  Kp = Bp & p, with p arithmetical, and B too.   
> So any particular knowlegde will be arithmetical, despite Kp is not   
> definable in one strike, in arithmetic. This entails that no machine   
> can know who she "really" is. She can only give a 3p description of   
> herself or a summary of it (like an identity card). 
>
> I can agree with that I think, although I'm not so much focused on 
knowledge and belief, because those are more experiences of verification 
and representation rather than initial presentation. 

>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > or if you prefer: 
> > 
> > x + 0 = x 
> > x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 
> > 
> >   x *0 = 0 
> >   x*(y + 1) = x*y + x 
> > 
> > By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an 
> > unnecessary magic. 
> > 
> > The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove. 
>
>
> Keep is mind that I am a scientist, or if you prefer, I am simple   
> minded. I expect a theory to be given by what we assume. The theorems   
> will show what is emerging from what we have assumed. If you do not   
> add the perceiver, then tell me precisely what you assume, and how you   
> derive the perceiver from it. 
>

I assume only a single experiential capacity which subdivides itself and 
does not subdivide itself. The individual perceiver is what remains through 
isolation - the presence of absence. This isolation is what we call space 
and time (or alienation, Tsimtsum, etc), which is really about scale 
modulation, the enfolding of sense within sense. Computation are the rules 
for establishing this isolation, so in a real sense it is just as primary 
as experience itself, however the natural orientation should always 
foreground the head end - the perceiver, and background 
information/arithemtic/spacetime, if we are talking about realism and not 
abstraction. In abstraction, we can talk about turning the universe upside 
down and making energy or communications, semiotics, arithmetic, mana, 
prana, or whatever primary and learn all kinds of interesting things, but 
ultimately we won't ever be able to find consciousness there. Consciousness 
is always beneath all of it - functions and substances are only kinds of 
experiences, but experience has no substance and serves no function.
 

>
> In such complex subject, it is very useful to put ALL the cards on the   
> table. That is why I assume a bit of logic, the natural numbers,   
> addition and multiplication, and then, using comp at the metalevel, I   
> show that we need nothing more, and that adding anything more is a   
> sort of treachery, which can deprive the natural quanta/qualia   
> distinction to get derived from self-reference. 
>

Self-reference is a Red Herring to me. If I say "I" does that mean the 
author of the words or the sentence is talking about itself? There is 
nothing in the letter "I" which can answer that, but our intuition should 
tell us that the sentence is not really talking about itself, and that in 
fact sentences themselves can't really talk about anything.
 

>
>
>
> > You are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a   
> > doorway to a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of   
> > counting. Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers.   
> > Computers require sense. 
> > 
> > I continue to be, 
> > Craig 
>
> You continue to be a good phenomenologist and a bad metaphysician, imo. 
>

Hehe. I don't want to be a metaphysician though, I want to physicalize 
meta. 

>
> I would not care so much if you didn't become a consciousness- 
> eliminativist with respect to material and immaterial machines. 
>

I'm ok with machines opening up new experiences for us, but I don't think 
that we are opening up new experiences for them. If we were, they wouldn't 
care anyhow, and that is part of what makes 'them' machines. It's not 
discrimination to expose the truth about awareness. I'm very happy to have 
silicon sisters working with me or above me, but I have a solid 
understanding of why they can only work and never play. It's not a 
deficiency on their part, it's an over-simplification on our part about the 
qualitative nature of consciousness and its roots in totality and the 
single history of (our) universe.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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