On 11 Dec 2012, at 18:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born
rule." a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better
explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating
an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities "deterministic"
in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.
It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not
well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the
collapse needed to get one physical reality).
That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.
Only against theories which postulate "objective" indeterminacy
(and what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory.
The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.
The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't
need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have
calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some
state is actualized and others aren't.
That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as
first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely,
It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an
ignorance of ensemble samples form,
It is only realist on what our best theories describe. Both QM-Everett
and CTM cannot avoid those "ensembles". And they are not just
ensemble. In QM Everett its is a universal wave, a solution of the SWE
(or Dirac, or deWitt-Wheeler, ...), and in CTM it is a tiny part of
the arithmetical reality (which after Gödels appears as something
*very* big, and structured in many-ways, with many different inside
views.
but with not possible way of resolving the ignorance, so that the
two 'explanations' are strictly equivalent
CTM illustrates the contrary. It is made testable, and up to now the
two quantum logic resemble enough. of course it might be a
coïncidence, but it is a strong point, imo, that where the UDA tells a
quantum probability should appear, we get indeed an arithmetical
quantization making something quite quantum like, formally, where we
expected it to be, by UDA.
in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.
Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.
I disagree on this, despite most would agree with you. But perhaps not
Everett itself who talks only about a formulation. And indeed
Everett's main contribution in QM is the formulation of a new QM which
is just the old QM without the collapse postulate. Everett explains
why the observers, in any base in which they can have memories, will
believe in probabilities, until they explain this by the wave itself,
and a notion of first person (called Subjective by Everett).
Then my point is just that if CTM is correct, we have to pursue that
move in the whole arithmetic, not just the wave, which is itself
selected through a similar self-selection process. I show that it
works, thanks to incompleteness, which both makes equivalent all the
points of view, p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & Dt & p, yet prevent the
machines to ever know that, which makes the logics behaving very
differently, and giving different views on arithmetical truth, from
arithmetical truth.
Look at the progress in conceptual elegance of those different
theories of reality:
Old QM:
1) Wave
2) collapse
3) Unintelligible theory of mind
Everett:
1) Wave
2) Arithmetic (comp)
Your servitor:
1) Arithmetic (comp)
:)
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.2221 / Virus Database: 2634/5450 - Release Date:
12/10/12
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
