Materialism fails to account for the first person Sentience or sentient experience or experience or consciousness all require a subject who is conscious. The first person in grammatical language. I.
This is missing in materialistic accounts of consciousness, but present in Leibniz's monads. Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/26/2013 See my Leibniz site at http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
