# Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person

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On 28 May 2013, at 17:52, John Clark wrote:```
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```On Mon, May 27, 2013  Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

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> John - you are being disingenuous here. Bruno has explained this [Bp&p] at
```considerable length.

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If even mighty Google doesn't know what Bp&p is then I'm not embarrassed in not knowing either.
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You might search on "Theatetus" instead, as Russell suggested.

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It is the older theory of knowledge. It is the idea that knowledge is subjectively the same as belief, except that, *by definition* the belief is correct.
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The very old Wittgenstein, the one who wrote "On Certainty", eventually got it, and realize implicitly somehow he was wrong until there.
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The greek used it to develop the dream argument. You can find similar argument in chinese and indian philosophies.
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Now, by Gödel's theorem, provability (Gödel's beweisbar arithmetic predicate Bew, which is sigma_1 complete and thus represent a provability predicate enough rich to emulate all Turing machines, i.e. to be universal in the Church-Turing-Post sense) does NOT obey Bew('p') -> p, with p an arbitrary arithmetical sentence. I write Bp - > p for the longer expression (and later this is amde precise by theorem on the modal logics G and G*)
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If PA, or any correct Löbian machine, would prove all Bp -> p, this would entail they would prove Bf -> f, with f the constant propositional 'false'), and so they would prove ~Bf, and they would contradict Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
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But this means that the logical expressions Bew('p'), and Bew('p') & p will obeys different logics, and it can be shown that for the Löbian machines (and even more general class of entities) such logic obeys the classical theory of knowledge, axiomatized by the modal logic S4. Indeed they are entirely formalized by S4 + K(K(p->Kp)->p)->p. K for "I know".
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So, incompleteness makes the definition of Theatetus working well for the case study of a simple notion of knowledge for the ideally correct machines. There are many interesting theorem, like the fact that the knower cannot attribute a name to itself, that it feels like not being a machine, and is somehow right on that, that he is a fixed point in a relation between believe and truth, etc.
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John,
and
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AUDA is supposed to explain that physics (and much more) is in the head of *all* universal machine/number.
```(the Lôbian one are just more chatty about all this).

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It makes sense for people who, in this list, try to get a theory of everything, explaining, without begging the question, from where matter and consciousness comes from, and how they are related.
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What I argue is that if we assume we can survive with a physical digital brain, then physics get reduced to a relative measure problem on all computations, or Turing emulable processes, as defined in arithmetic. I use arithmetic but any first order logical specification of a universal system would work.
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This will be translated by a refinement of Bp & p, in fact by Bp & p & Dt. With p restricted to the sigma_1 proposition (UD-accessible). Dt = ~Bf = self-consistency. This will again give the same extensional view of arithmetic, but a quite different intensional, or modal, one. This is too long to justify here. But this works, and give an arithmetical quantization from which you can see the shadow of the "quantum linear symmetrical core of physical reality". Linearity should ensure the existence of the first person plural deep histories.
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Actually, arithmetical quantization appear with the Bp & p, Bp & Dt, and Bp & p & Dt, (all p sigma_1) making possible many nuances.
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Bruno

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John K Clark

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