A few remarks.
On Monday, June 24, 2013 9:03:26 PM UTC-4, chris peck wrote:
> Hi Roger
> So long as Im not a hapless monad subjected to an influx of incomplete and
> distorted 'percepts' via a supreme monad, I'm more than happy to be a
> Zombie. I might be dead but at least I'm not deluded and neither one of us
> has much of a claim on having free will. Moreover, being a zombie is just
> an extrapolation of what a materialist is bound to according to his
> critics, something he can argue against, being a monad on the other hand is
> a positive theory offered up by idealists as the actual truth. I mean they
> really believe that stuff!
What difference is there between "a hapless monad subjected to an influx of
incomplete and distorted 'percepts' via a supreme monad" and a mindless
Zombie? I would argue that there is no difference! This is why I violently
disagree with ROger's idea of a supreme monad. Leibniz himself was wrong in
this portion of monadology and he compounded the error by implying that a
'pre-ordained harmony' exists. Such a mechanism can be easily seem to be
equivalent to the solution to an infinite NP-Hard problem that is, somehow,
computed in zero steps. For a supreme monad to 'determine' the moment by
moment state of any of its "submonads' it is required to perform all of its
possible actions and extract from those those that are "the best possible
How is it possible to perform that computation in fewer than the number
of steps that the submonads can use to carry out the actions themselves?
Why not just dispense with the untenable idea of a ultimate monad and think
of the monads as existing in a non-hierarchical relation, where any one
monad is defined by its relations to some other monads and the computation
of the "best possible world" is one that is individual for each.
There is no preferred observer or point of view or observable basis.
Nature treats all points of view equally and judges them only by
their consistency with each other.
> I doubt you will reply but it seems to me that by the id of inds and his
> conviction that what is real must be simple and indivisible that monads can
> not be minds. Afterall, the mind is clearly divisible. Ask any blind person
> whether they can see, or any deaf person whether they can hear. Far from
> being unified the mind is a divisible conglomerate of interacting parts and
> thats apparent when you just consider qualia. When you consider thinking
> itself, and the manner we employ fast and loose heuristics to make
> judgements rather than logically think issues through, again it is
> abundantly clear that the mind is a pandemonium of competing routines
> rather than a unified 'one'. This is all clearly and distinctly apparent
> subjectively to anyone who cares to look.
Could you explain how the mind is divisible?
> Identifying minds with monads then contravenes the identity of
> indiscernibles because whilst we can say the mind is divisible a monad by
> definition is not.
No, monads, if used according to a sound definition, can be identifies
with minds in the sense that for every mind there exists a monad that has
identical 1p content.
> all the best
> Subject: How to tell whether you are a zombie or have a materialist mind
> Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2013 21:26:44 -0400
> How to tell whether you are a zombie or have a materialist mind
> If you can have subjective experiences, then you can neither
> be a zombie nor have a materialist mind.
> Most of us should be relieved to know that.
> Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
> See my Leibniz site at
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