On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
>> >> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
>> >> > wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Hi Craig (and all),
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like
>> >> >> to
>> >> >> confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say
>> >> >> looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are three
>> >> >> possibilities: either you are significantly more intelligent than me
>> >> >> or you're a bit crazy, or both. I'm not joking, I don't know.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> But I would like to focus on sensory participation as the
>> >> >> fundamental
>> >> >> stuff of reality and your claim that strong AI is impossible because
>> >> >> the machines we build are just Frankensteins, in a sense. If I
>> >> >> understand correctly, you still believe these machines have sensory
>> >> >> participation just because they exist, but not in the sense that
>> >> >> they
>> >> >> could emulate our human experiences. They have the sensory
>> >> >> participation level of the stuff they're made of and nothing else.
>> >> >> Right?
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Not exactly. My view is that there is only sensory participation on
>> >> > the
>> >> > level of what has naturally evolved.
>> >>
>> >> This sounds a bit like vitalism. What's so special about natural
>> >> evolution that can't be captured otherwise?
>> >
>> >
>> > It's not about life or nature being special, it's about recognizing that
>> > nature is an expression of experience, and that experience can't be
>> > substituted.
>>
>> Ok. How did you arrive at this belief? How can you believe this
>> without proposing some mechanism by which it happens? Or do you
>> propose such a thing?
>
>
> Mechanisms are functions of time, but experience would be more primitive
> than time in this view. To have a mechanism, there must already be some
> experience of events, memory, expectation, etc.

But we know that universal machines can be built with very little:
simple cellular automata, arithmetics, balls colliding and so on. You
can then argue that some substrate is necessary for this computation,
but it is quite clear that what is necessary to have the possibility
of a full blown human zombie is theoretically very little. This does
not refute your main thesis, of course, but I think it does refute
that experience of events, memory and expectations are necessary for
mechanism.

>Think of the mechanism by
> which you change your attention or open your eyes. Sure, there are
> mechanisms that we can point to in the body, but what mechanism do *you* use
> to control yourself?

Ok, I know what you mean. Yes, I find this mysterious.

> I submit that there is no button to push or crank to
> turn. If there were, then you would already be controlling yourself to use
> them. No, at some point something has to directly control something by
> feeling and doing.

What if the thing that controls is being generated by the act of controlling?

> Whether we push it down to the microcosm or out to
> statistical laws makes no difference - somewhere something has to sense
> something directly or we cannot have experience.
>
> I wouldn't call it a belief, it's a hypothesis. I arrived at it by having a
> lot of conversations in my head about it over several years - writing things
> down, remembering them, dreaming about them, etc.

Ok. I have nothings against this but I would say you have to be very
cautious when relying on this type of approach. My position is that
there is a lot of value in doing this, but you cannot ever claim a
communicable discovery just by doing this. You can only find private
truth. When you try to communicate private truth, you risk sounding
like a lunatic. This is, in my view, what's so compelling about art.
Under the banner of "art", you are allowed to try to communicate
private truth and get a free pass from being considered a nutjob.

>>
>> > A player piano can be made to play the notes of a song, but no
>> > matter how many notes it plays, it will never know the significance of
>> > what
>> > notes or music is.
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> > Since the machine did not organize
>> >> > itself, there is no 'machine' any more than a book of Shakespeare's
>> >> > quotes
>> >> > is a machine that is gradually turning into Shakespeare.
>> >>
>> >> But the books are not machines. Shakespeare possibly was. If he was,
>> >> why can't he be emulated by another machine?
>> >
>> >
>> > I was using the example of a book to show how different a symbol is from
>> > that which we imagine the symbol represents. If we want a more
>> > machine-like
>> > example, we can use a copy machine. The copier can reproduce the works
>> > of
>> > any author mechanically, but does it appreciate or participate in the
>> > content of what it is copying?
>>
>> Ok. Yes, of course. But consider this: when you read a book, your
>> brain triggers in super-complex ways that constantly find patterns,
>> correlate with previous informations, trigger emotions and so on. This
>> clearly isn't happening with the copying machine. This would also not
>> happen if I was forced to copy a book in Japanese by hand. So I don't
>> think the comparison is fair. I'm not trying to argue that brain
>> complexity generates consciousness, but I am inclined to believe that
>> his complexity creates the necessary space for a human-like 1p. I
>> don't see why this couldn't be equally done in a computer.
>
>
> I that there is a correlation between the complexity of form+function and
> the richness of subjective experience but I don't think that it's the
> form+function aspect which is head end.The more words you have in your
> vocabulary, the more of an interesting story you can tell, but you still
> need a reader to appreciate the meaning of the story. Without a reader, it
> makes no difference how complex the arrangement of words is. A computer is
> about breaking down patterns that it cannot read into even more meaningless
> bits and processing them from the bottom up. Consciousness benefits from
> that kind of computation through the brain, but it also does the opposite.
> Consciousness is top down as well as bottom up.

So one aspect generates the other. I can live with that.

>>
>> >>
>> >> > What we see as
>> >> > machines are assemblies of parts which we use to automate functions
>> >> > according to our own human sense and motives - like a puppet.
>> >> > There is sensation going on two levels: 1) the very local level, and
>> >> > 2)
>> >> > at
>> >> > the absolute level. On the 1) local level, all machines depend on
>> >> > local
>> >> > physical events. Whether they are driven by springs and gears,
>> >> > boiling
>> >> > water
>> >> > in pipes, or subatomic collisions, Turing emulation rides on the back
>> >> > of
>> >> > specific conditions which lock and unlock small parts of the machine.
>> >> > Those
>> >> > smallest of those parts would be associated with some sensory-motive
>> >> > interaction - the coherence of molecular surfaces, thermodynamics,
>> >> > electrodynamics, etc, have a very local, instantaneous, and
>> >> > presumably
>> >> > primitive sensory involvement. That could be very alien to us, as it
>> >> > is
>> >> > both
>> >> > very short term and very long term - maybe there is only a flash of
>> >> > feeling
>> >> > at the moment of change, who knows?
>> >>
>> >> This part I can somewhat agree with. I do tend to believe that 1p
>> >> experience is possibly not limited to living organisms. I think about
>> >> it like you describe: "flashes of feeling" and "who knows" :)
>> >>
>> >> > On the 2) absolute level, there is the logical sensibility which all
>> >> > 1)
>> >> > local events share - the least common denominator of body
>> >> > interactions.
>> >> > This
>> >> > is the universal machine that Bruno champions. It's not sense which
>> >> > is
>> >> > necessarily experienced directly, rather all local sense touches on
>> >> > this
>> >> > universal measuring system *when it measures* something else.
>> >> >
>> >> > The problem with machines is that there is no sense in between the
>> >> > momentary, memoryless, sensation of lock/unlock and the timeless,
>> >> > placeless
>> >> > sensibility of read/write or +/*. In a human experience, the 1) has
>> >> > evolved
>> >> > over billions of years to occupy the continuum in between 1) and 2),
>> >> > with
>> >> > implicit memories of feelings and experiences anchored in unique
>> >> > local
>> >> > contexts. Machines have no geography or ethnicity, no aesthetic
>> >> > presence.
>> >>
>> >> Why do you believe we have evolved like that? What's the evolutionary
>> >> pressure for that? Whatever evolution did, why can't we recreate it?
>> >> Or do you. by evolution, mean something else/more than conventional
>> >> neo-Darwinism?
>> >
>> >
>> > By evolution I mean that the history of individual experiences plays a
>> > role
>> > in accessing possibilities. Experience takes place in a spacetime
>> > context
>> > that may only occur one time.
>>
>> Ok. Why do you argue this is the case (that it may only occur one time)?
>
>
> I'm not sure, but there are a number of clues that relate to a theme in
> nature of superlative uniqueness. Everything from the Cambrian Explosion to
> the Industrial Revolution to 'stars' (celebrities) points to a connection
> between singularity and significance. For a universe which is so vast and
> based on so many generic repeating patterns, it seems suspicious that there
> would be so many instances where being 'first' is possible.

Evolution + combinatorial explosion?

> The nature of QM
> measurements also carry this theme of unitarity and wavefunction collapse
> into thermodynamic irreversibility. The 'eventness' of the now seems rooted
> not in probability and inevitability but in the polar opposite - an
> improbable, unreproducible, singling out.
>
>>
>> > If we want to be billionaires, we might ask 'why can't we recreate John
>> > D.
>> > Rockefeller?", as if there were some particular recipe which can be
>> > extracted and applied to anyone. It's not like that though. There were
>> > real
>> > events with a nation full of real people who did not yet have electric
>> > lights or cars for which Rockefeller was able to make money by supplying
>> > kerosene. Nobody needs much kerosene now, so that wouldn't work.
>>
>> Sure, but you could argue that if you abstract away the specificities
>> of Rockefeller's environment, you could propose some general
>> strategies for becoming a millionaire. E.g. identify a need, figure
>> out a way to meet it better than what currently exists, become a
>> sociopath, etc etc. Even if this doesn't work, you can write a
>> self-help book about it and become rich anyway :)
>>
>> I think this example is actually quite revealing of how we think
>> differently. You resist a certain type of abstractions that many
>> people are willing to accept. I think.
>
>
> Right, I resist them intentionally because I don't think they match reality.
> Any formula for becoming a millionaire based on general strategies would be
> likely to cancel each other out statistically by failure and by
> self-competition.

Yes, but that doesn't invalidate the abstraction. If you buy a "get
rich" book that actually contains ideas extracted from people who got
rich, you are too late. But if you get to learn from the person before
the book is published, maybe not. The point being that the abstraction
does not become irrelevant, it's just no longer enough because
information propagation made a large number of agents less naif. It's
a red queen scenario.

> I think that every attempt at imitating nature or reverse
> engineering it to a formula ultimately run into the same kinds of problems -
> aesthetic problems where they seem canned or dull.

I tend to think that this stems from the fact that a lot of people are
doing science and technology for the wrong reasons. They want the
money and prestige and don't care about the sense of wonder. In fact,
many bastards actively try to remove wonder from the process. Fuck
them. We've all endured enough of this already through basic
education. When pursuing a dream, a new apparently dry technicality
can fill one with excitement. When studying for an exam, the same
thing is dull and lifeless.

> Technologies like search
> engines and predictive text seem to hit a wall beyond which they cannot
> really deliver detailed understanding.

I agree. My view is that this is because they are using statistical
approaches instead of deep parsing. There was a recent discussion
about this between Chomsky and Peter Norivg. I side with Chomsky. Now
Google is right to rely on statistical approaches, because it's the
low-hanging fruit. It gave us something incredibly useful very fast.
But this approach won't give us the Enterprise computer or Data (a
likeable philosophical zombie, or is he?). This becomes obvious with
Siri:

http://weknowmemes.com/2011/12/siri-im-bleeding-really-bad-can-you-call-me-an-ambulance/

(I'm sure they fixed this already, but it's just plugging holes in a
sinking ship)

I am convinced that it is possible to program a computer to achieve
detailed understanding, but this will require a completely different
paradigm, namely looking at natural language itself as a Turing
complete language running on a gigantic context of human knowledge.

> I have never found an automatic
> system, even within IT, which really 'work' to a satisfying degree.

I wouldn't phrase it like that but I know what you mean.

> The
> generic has no capacity to relate to the specific.
>
>>
>> > In a similar way, the stories of living organisms may not be able to be
>> > told
>> > except for through the particular vocabulary that it has reserved for
>> > itself. We have not successfully built any living organisms from scratch
>> > yet, which is something worth noting, given that we have been trying for
>> > decades.
>>
>> This might suffer from the same problem as AI. It's not that we
>> haven't been making progress, but every time something is achieved
>> people will say, "oh, but that's not what I meant by
>> intelligence/life".
>>
>> But I agree with you that results so far are disappointing. My belief
>> is that there is a class of very complex algorithms that we are not
>> smart enough to grasp.
>
>
> I think that there may or may not be some breakthroughs waiting to happen,
> but I don't think they will help for long. Just as synthetic fabrics were
> popular when they first came out, people soon grew intolerant of their
> aesthetics. New versions of fabrics came out later with improved aesthetics,
> and they have found a niche for certain functions, but they remain different
> from natural textiles, particularly where fine clothing is desired.

But that's a different issue. That is the human desire for status.
Once something becomes easily obtainable, it's no longer desirable.
But if you are homeless in the cold, you would kill for a synthetic
blanket and some microwave food. I predict the same thing will happen
at some point with sex robots. They will do the trick, but nobody will
be satisfied with them not matter how realistic.

> Because I think that awareness might be 'the opposite of the universe', no
> material form, energetic function, or informational model can represent it
> fully. An algorithm can only work if there is already some sense experience
> there which has the power to compare.

I understand this position and am willing to entertain it. What I
still don't understand -- and this was the original challenge in a way
-- is why can't this awareness be accessed by a synthetic entity. I've
read your claims that experience cannot be replaced, but that's where
your ideas become hard to swallow for me.

>>
>> > We have also not found any sign of alternate biologies that exist
>> > without water or hydrocarbons.
>>
>> I would propose that a plausible explanation for this is that the
>> emergence of the initial building blocks of life is a very unlikely
>> event, but the progression from these building blocks to more
>> complexity is almost trivial by comparison. One of the reasons I have
>> for this intuition is direct experience with playing with artificial
>> evolution.
>
>
> Sure, and that's the standard assumption I would say. I think that because
> the universe is a continuum between anthropomorphic and mechanemorphic
> aesthetics, there will always be nearly-plausible explanations for the big
> picture. I don't think this is an accident. There is a balance, or law of
> conservation of mystery in which final certainty will always be elusive.

Agreed, but again it's hard to swallow that the reason for this is aesthetics.

> Even the interpretation of that balance, as coincidence which is meaningless
> or meaningful is part of the balance. Ultimately though, I don't think that
> such a continuum of perspectives would be possible under the strict
> mechanemorphic read. The likelihood of life existing at all is not
> necessarily greater than zero. Life, order, and awareness may not be a
> matter of probability, it may be probability itself which is a projection of
> that which is infinitely improbable.
>
>>
>> > The finality of death is another feature that
>> > suggests a difference between organisms and machines. The whole idea
>> > that
>> > any particular experience or object can exist in isolation from the
>> > totality
>> > is just an assumption.
>>
>> Ok.
>>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> So let's talk about seeds.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> We now know how a human being grows from a seed that we pretty much
>> >> >> understand. We might not be able to model all the complexity
>> >> >> involved
>> >> >> in networks of gene expression, protein folding and so on, but we
>> >> >> understand the building blocks. We understand them to a point where
>> >> >> we
>> >> >> can actually engineer the outcome to a degree. It is now 2013 and we
>> >> >> are, in a sense, living in the future.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> So we can now take a fertilised egg and tweak it somehow. When done
>> >> >> successfully, a human being will grow out of it. Doing this with
>> >> >> human
>> >> >> eggs is considered unethical, but I believe it is technically
>> >> >> possible. So a human being grows out of this egg. Is he/she normal?
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > I don't know that there is normal. All that we can do is see whether
>> >> > people
>> >> > who have had various procedures done to their cell-bodies seem
>> >> > healthy
>> >> > to
>> >> > themselves and others.
>> >>
>> >> So it appears you're open to the possibility that this is fine, and
>> >> that a human being like you and me was produced.
>> >
>> >
>> > Sure, humans can be cloned, incubated in a test tube, etc. It's
>> > interesting
>> > to not though that every person, even a clone, is an individual. Unlike
>> > machines, you can't replace one with another, even if they look very
>> > similar
>> > to each other.
>>
>> How do you know that? We don't have the technology to do that experiment
>> yet.
>
>
> Just going by identical twins. Even brain-conjoined identical twins who
> share the same body and DNA are different individuals.

This is a very interesting case to study, but still not a copy.

>>
>>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> What if someone actually designs the entire DNA string and grows a
>> >> >> human being out of it? Still normal?
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Same thing. Probably, but it depends on how the mother's body
>> >> > responds
>> >> > to it
>> >> > as it develops.
>> >>
>> >> So you don't believe this is possible:
>> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus ?
>> >
>> >
>> > It seems possible, but I don't think anyone will know for sure until we
>> > try
>> > it.
>>
>> Ok.
>>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> If not, why?
>> >
>> >
>> > Different organisms have different requirements. Even if we can get all
>> > of
>> > the chemical requirements right, we don't know what sensitivities might
>> > be
>> > involved. As we see, baby monkeys will choose the wireframe mother with
>> > the
>> > fur attached to it rather than the bare wire. Can we be sure that being
>> > enveloped by another organism is not in intrinsic requirement for
>> > mammals to
>> > be healthy?
>>
>> It's more than likely that this is the case, but a very plausible
>> model for why this is the case is epigenetics.
>
>
> Yes, epigenetics is another clue, as is ephaptic
> coupling.http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v14/n2/abs/nn.2727.html

Nice! Thank you for the link.

> The more we look at the microbiology, the more we will find what can only be
> sensitivity on cellular and molecular levels.

Can you give a specific example?

>>
>>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >> What if we simulate the growth of the organism from a string of
>> >> >> virtual DNA and then just assemble the outcome at some stage? Still
>> >> >> normal?
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Virtual DNA is a cartoon, with a recording of our expectations
>> >> > attached
>> >> > to
>> >> > it. Is a digital picture of a person 'normal'? If we photoshop it a
>> >> > little
>> >> > bit, is it still normal? The problem is the expectation that virtual
>> >> > anything is the same as real simply because it reminds us of
>> >> > something
>> >> > real.
>> >> > Of course it reminds us of what is real, we have designed it
>> >> > specifically to
>> >> > fool us in every way that we care about.
>> >>
>> >> Wait a moment. What I suggest here is that we simulate DNA and then
>> >> morphogenesis as precisely as we can. Then, through some sci-fi-ish
>> >> device we actually 3D print the resulting organism with the normal
>> >> molecules that a human being is made of. The cartoon generated the
>> >> real thing. No?
>> >
>> >
>> > Not necessarily. It may not work like that. If you 3D printed additional
>> > brain cells from a person who is already alive, then sure, they would be
>> > able to integrate the transplant. If you tried to 3D print an adult
>> > body, my
>> > guess is that it would not live very long or gain consciousness. That's
>> > because I think that it is the experience that is actually the
>> > absolutely
>> > real physical entity, and the body is only a thin cross-section
>> > (although
>> > it's a really wide cross-section in that it touches on the common level
>> > of
>> > every other experience).
>>
>> Alright. So ok, there's no way to falsify that claim. As I asked
>> before, why do you believe in this though?
>
>
> I don't know that I 'believe' in it, but it makes more sense to me than
> other explanations, all of which seem to have pretty large holes in them.
>
>>
>>
>> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> What if now we do away with DNA altogether and use some other Turing
>> >> >> complete self-modifying system?
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Then we have a cool cartoon that reminds us of biology. That's if we
>> >> > have it
>> >> > rendered to a graphic display. If not then we have a warm box full of
>> >> > tiny
>> >> > switches that we can imagine are doing something other than switching
>> >> > on
>> >> > and
>> >> > off.
>> >>
>> >> Alright, so what is the property that DNA has that other mediums can't
>> >> capture?
>> >
>> >
>> > For one thing, it allows Ribosomes to make protein. DNA is an actual
>> > thing
>> > that exists independently as a molecular body with a history that goes
>> > back
>> > to the beginning of time, and may possibly extend indefinitely. A model
>> > of
>> > DNA can be nothing but a picture or a program. It's not real. It has no
>> > history beyond it's initial rendering.
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Do you accept that DNA describes a Turing emulable program?
>> >
>> >
>> > No. DNA is not a description, it is an actual presence. Turing
>> > emulations
>> > are descriptions which can be used to program something which is
>> > actually
>> > present. If you copied the transcription pattern of DNA onto ping pong
>> > balls
>> > instead of organic molecules, there wouldn't be any proteins or cells
>> > being
>> > generated.
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Or do you believe there is something inherently non-computational in
>> >> DNA?
>> >
>> >
>> > I think that everything that is actually present (experiences or bodies)
>> > if
>> > fundamentally non-computable. It is only the measurement which is
>> > computable. There is no computation that can produce a single particle
>> > or
>> > experience by itself.
>> >
>> >> If you agree that DNA is Turing emulable, I don't see how you
>> >> cannot be prepared to accept the equivalent phenomena happening on
>> >> some other medium.
>> >
>> >
>> > Nothing real is Turing emulable. If it were, we wouldn't need 3D
>> > printers,
>> > we would simply find the code to will objects into being.
>>
>> Once we create a sufficiently good neural-machine interface we might
>> be able to move to a reality were Turing emulable is enough. This is
>> just an interface problem, in my view.
>
>
> I hope so. I'm not down on porting our brain to give us access to each
> other's worlds and designer experience, I just don't think that we will be
> able to completely replace the wetware. It seems better that way anyhow,
> otherwise AI scientists would be guilty of atrocities in their labs as they
> develop and abandon experimental versions of a human-like brain.

I always feel a bit weird when I look at a computer I no longer use.

Best,
Telmo.

> Thanks,
> Craig
>
>>
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Telmo.
>>
>> > Emulation itself
>> > is really a figurative term. It's useful for folk engineering, but each
>> > moment or event is, from an absolute perspective, unrepeatable.
>> > Emulation is
>> > always an approximation to a certain substitution level, and with
>> > awareness,
>> > there can be no substitution level because I think that awareness is
>> > authenticity itself.
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> What if we never build the outcome but just let it live inside a
>> >> >> simulation? We can even visit this simulation with appropriate
>> >> >> hardware: http://www.oculusvr.com/. What now?
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >> > We're entertaining ourselves is all.
>> >>
>> >> Ok, the bump was before this one so let's leave it aside for now.
>> >>
>> >> > We'll know when we have created
>> >> > artificial biology when it tries to escape and exterminate us.
>> >>
>> >> I actually am inclined to agree here, but possibly for different
>> >> reasons.
>> >
>> >
>> > Ok
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> In your view, at what point does this break? And why?
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > It's broken from the start.
>> >>
>> >> No, you're contradicting yourself. Read what you wrote. I believe you
>> >> were ok with DNA manipulation and possibly ok with DNA synthesis. Our
>> >> divergence appears to really start with virtual DNA.
>> >
>> >
>> > I mean it's broken from the start in the sense of considering real
>> > phenomena
>> > to substituted for disembodied information. DNA manipulation and
>> > synthesis
>> > is only making some changes to actual DNA. There's nothing
>> > non-biological or
>> > non-physical going on. When it comes to using other materials you would
>> > have
>> > to see how the physical and biological environment accepted it. Even
>> > ordinary transplants of human to human organs often suffer rejection.
>> > When
>> > it comes to immaterial, 'virtual DNA', I don't think that there is any
>> > intersection with reality until we use physical and biological systems
>> > to
>> > realize it.
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> > The trash can that says THANK YOU on the lid
>> >> > whenever you put the tray in doesn't get smarter if you had a second
>> >> > lid
>> >> > that said NO THANK YOU if a sensor detected too large of an object.
>> >> > There is
>> >> > nothing there which is present on the human level to share our
>> >> > awareness
>> >> > of
>> >> > the situation. Adding billions of tiny lids doesn't improve the
>> >> > capacity
>> >> > of
>> >> > them to feel or experience. We are mistaking the effect of what we
>> >> > are
>> >> > (the
>> >> > brain) for the cause of what we are (nested experiences, some of
>> >> > which
>> >> > seem
>> >> > like the brain). By taking the public end of the thing (forms and
>> >> > functions)
>> >> > and assuming that Santa Claus will provide the private end of the
>> >> > thing
>> >> > (aesthetic appreciation and participation...sense and motive), we are
>> >> > approaching it the wrong way around. It is like trying to build
>> >> > Shakespeare
>> >> > out of rules for grammar and spelling. You might be able to give
>> >> > yourself a
>> >> > feeling of Shakespeare, but there is no 16th century playwright
>> >> > there.
>> >>
>> >> Ok, ok. One step at a time :) Please explain to me what's wrong with
>> >> virtual DNA first.
>> >
>> >
>> > As soon as you want to touch a ribosome, you need something that is not
>> > virtual anymore. At that point, it depends on how different the product
>> > you
>> > are using is from natural DNA and how well the particular cell it is
>> > being
>> > inserted into tolerates it.
>> >
>> > Thanks!
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Thanks Craig!
>> >> Telmo.
>> >>
>> >> > Thanks,
>> >> > Craig
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Best,
>> >> >> Telmo.
>> >> >
>> >> > --
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>> >> > Groups
>> >> > "Everything List" group.
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>> >> > send
>> >> > an
>> >> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>> >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>> >> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>> >
>> > --
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
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>> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
> --
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