Richard: I grew into denying probability in cases where not - ALL - circumstances are known. Since we know only part of the infinite complexity of the WORLD, we buy in for a mistake if fixing anything like 'probability'. The same goes for "statistical": push the borderlines abit further away and the COUNT of the studied item (= statistical value) will change. Also the above argument for probability is valid for results as 'statistical' values. JM
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote: > Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum > mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science IN PRESS. > > ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, > emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The > possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, > in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the > ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the > Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch > ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that > Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. > First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the > theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not > successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to > put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of > rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not > rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for > setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and > which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC, > and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue > that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the > probability problem in EQM persists. > > http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf > Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May 2012) > ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’, > British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming > ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011 > 78(5): 976-988 > ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412, > (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) > ‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2): > 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) > > His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available in: > ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): Recent > Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems, > 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings), > Dordrecht: Springer > > I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI probability > problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by members of this > list. Previous discussions have not been personally convincing. > > Richard > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
