On 04 Oct 2013, at 23:30, John Mikes wrote:

Richard:I grew into denying probability in cases where not - ALL -circumstances are known.

`I agree with this. That is why there are many other attempt to study`

`ignorance and beliefs (like believability theories, which is like`

`probability, except they can sum and go above "1").`

`Now I am not sure Dizadji-Bahmani is successful on his critics on`

`branching indifference, which of ourse can be seen as part of the`

`first person indeterminacy in the (more general) comp or arithmetical`

`duplication situations.`

Bruno

Since we know only part of the infinite complexity of the WORLD, webuy in for a mistake if fixing anything like 'probability'.The same goes for "statistical": push the borderlines abit furtheraway and the COUNT of the studied item (= statistical value) willchange. Also the above argument for probability is valid for resultsas 'statistical' values.JMOn Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>wrote:Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettianquantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science INPRESS.ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]).The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantummechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics,Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense ofprobabilities, and recover the Born Rule. To solve the probabilityproblem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantumrepresentation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to theprobability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examineone of the axioms of rationality used to derive the theorem,Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successfulin showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to putthe burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom ofrationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI isnot rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternativestrategy for setting one’s credences in the face of branching whichis rational, and which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC).Wallace is aware of BC, and has proffered various arguments againstit. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s arguments against BC areunpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM persists.http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdfPublications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May2012)‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum MechanicsPersists’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science,2011 78(5): 976-988‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73:393-412, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)‘Conﬁrmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011179(2): 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Alsoavailable in:‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas(eds): Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives andFoundational Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy ofScience Association Proceedings), Dordrecht: SpringerI think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWIprobability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhereby members of this list. Previous discussions have not beenpersonally convincing.Richard --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.