On 04 Oct 2013, at 23:30, John Mikes wrote:
Richard:
I grew into denying probability in cases where not - ALL -
circumstances are known.
I agree with this. That is why there are many other attempt to study
ignorance and beliefs (like believability theories, which is like
probability, except they can sum and go above "1").
Now I am not sure Dizadji-Bahmani is successful on his critics on
branching indifference, which of ourse can be seen as part of the
first person indeterminacy in the (more general) comp or arithmetical
duplication situations.
Bruno
Since we know only part of the infinite complexity of the WORLD, we
buy in for a mistake if fixing anything like 'probability'.
The same goes for "statistical": push the borderlines abit further
away and the COUNT of the studied item (= statistical value) will
change. Also the above argument for probability is valid for results
as 'statistical' values.
JM
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>
wrote:
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian
quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science IN
PRESS.
ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,
emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]).
The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum
mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics,
Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of
probabilities, and recover the Born Rule. To solve the probability
problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum
representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to the
probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examine
one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the theorem,
Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successful
in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to put
the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of
rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is
not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative
strategy for setting one’s credences in the face of branching which
is rational, and which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC).
Wallace is aware of BC, and has proffered various arguments against
it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s arguments against BC are
unpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM persists.
http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf
Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May
2012)
‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics
Persists’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science,
2011 78(5): 976-988
‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73:
393-412, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011
179(2): 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also
available in:
‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas
(eds): Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and
Foundational Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of
Science Association Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer
I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI
probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere
by members of this list. Previous discussions have not been
personally convincing.
Richard
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
