Richard: *".Bruno: In that case a multiverse could contain another multiverse, a bit like a black hole could be a door to another universe...." - and:* *"...What surprises me is that apparently comp predicts a single multiverse rather than than multiple multiverses..."* feeling free to fantasize - maybe congruent to the "physical" ways of thinking. Bruno, however, seems to stick to the "practical" worldview using the base of the 'arithmetical' to facilitate 'reasonable' conclusions. If I feel free to meander into fantasieland I would not restrict the features I meet. They may be way out of the 'thinkable'.
Bruno's: *"...It is the technic which makes able to interview, and sum up infinite interviews with the machine talking about itself...."* still restricts his 'infinite' topics WITHIN the human imagination. We have no reception to the 'machine's' beyond-the-human-mind variations. The same applies (in my view) to an anticipation of the "noch nie dagewesen" (=~the absolute NEW?) still imaginable. We are absolutely 'closed-in' into Robert Rosen's "model' of the knowable world. (the reason why I fancy the 'infinite complexity' as the "Everything" ((God?)) of which we only have portions to access - and that, too, in adjusted ways to the capabilities of our present mental development-levels. This is the main reason why I have limited appreciation for past 'wise' opinions coming from similarly limited minds (even if maybe more advanced thinkers than myself). John M On Sat, Dec 21, 2013 at 4:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 20 Dec 2013, at 18:48, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno: In that case a multiverse could contain another multiverse, a bit > like a black hole could be a door to another universe. > > Richard: I like that idea because Smolin hypothized and Poplawski > confirmed using GR + spin that black holes yield at least an internal > universe. > > > > Interesting. Wish I could follow this more closely. > > Bruno > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 12:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Richard, >> >> >> On 20 Dec 2013, at 12:40, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> What surprises me is that apparently comp predicts a single multiverse >> rather than than multiple multiverses. >> >> >> Interesting problem. >> >> Comp predicts only a single multi-dreams, which is the "universal" >> computation made by the UD, or the Sigma_1 complete part of arithmetic. >> I am still not sure if the "material points of view" will give 0, 1, 2, >> ... aleph_0, ... or more multiverses. >> >> A difficulty relies also in the fact that a "multiverse", or even a >> "physical universe" is still not really well defined by the physicists >> themselves. In fact in Everett theory, we might also not be entirely sure >> if there is a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, and such question might >> need the resolution of the quantum gravity question. >> >> With comp, we can say things like that: IF there are n multiverses, THEN >> they cannot interfere statistically and so "you" are in only one of them >> (if not they will comp-interfere), and thus they must be all "small" (= >> not emulating a UD). So, only one multiverse might contain a "physical" >> universal dovetailing. >> Is the quantum vacuum a physical universal dovetailer? >> Is the Everett universal wave a physical universal dovetailer? >> Is the solution of the comp measure problem a physical universal >> dovetailer? Should "nature" compete with the universal dovetailing to win >> the measure competition? >> >> Ah! You make me thinking ... What is really a multiverse? Can we define >> this in ZF, or in ZF+kappa? Would it makes sense to talk of >> alpha-multi-verse for alpha an arbitrary cardinal, or an On-multiverse, >> with On being the class of all cardinals? >> What if the ultimate structure of the physical reality is non well >> founded? That is plausible with comp (despite arithmetic is well founded). >> In that case a multiverse could contain another multiverse, a bit like a >> black hole could be a door to another universe. >> >> Keep in mind that for a computationalist (who is aware of the UDA >> "reversal") (assuming there is no flaw of course) the physical reality is >> the border of the "real" reality where "real" is what the FPI gives for the >> "average" universal (and Löbian) numbers. >> >> You can visualized the UD by a cone of length omega (aleph_zero). Just >> take a program for a UD implemented in a universal game of life pattern. >> Then pile up the planes representing the successive evolving life pattern. >> This gives a digital cone (due to the never ending growing of the life >> pattern emulating the UD), and you can "see" the UD* as an infinite >> tridimensional digital cone. OK? >> >> Now, you can compactify that structure. You identify the planes at 0, 1, >> 2, 3, ... n, places in the infinite piling with 0, 1/2, >> 1/2+1/4, 1/2+1/4+1/8, ..., so that the entire infinite UD* is kept on a >> finite board of lenght 1: just a cone, or its projection: a triangle. OK? >> >> Where is the "physical reality" in that picture? Nowhere, as UD* is >> purely 3p, and physics is purely 1p. Hopefully: 1p-plural (and Everett >> confirms this: our computations are contagious, we cannot *not* share them >> when interacting. But that 1p collective structure must (in comp) emerge at >> the union of all sets of all computations (containing our actual states), >> and this can be described in 3p, and is in the border which appears when we >> do the compactification. >> >> That border, the topside of the cone, or the right side of the triangle >> of length 1, is an hologram, as each sub-branch infinitely often generates >> the UD, and the broder contains the infinite one. It is a bit like the >> border (but on dimension 1) of the Mandelbrot set. The physical realities >> are dense everywhere "there" and they are multiplied in hard to conceive >> magnitude, on that 2-dimensional top (in that representation of UD*). >> Unlike the little mandelbrot sets, they might be non enumerable. >> >> And then you have that things which I tended to hide a little bit, which >> is that the hypostases gives three quantizations, like if there where three >> type of physical realities (would that mean three multiverses? In *some* >> sense to make precise: perhaps). >> Not just sensible matter and intelligible matter (Bp & Dt & p, and Bp & >> Dt, respectively) provides quantization, on the p sigma_1, the soul (Bp & >> p) does too, on the p sigma_1. Apparently Plotinus is right on this: the >> soul seems to be born with a foot already in matter. >> >> I should say more on modal logic and enunciate the theorem of Solovay. >> All what I say comes from the fact that meta-arithmetic can be >> arithmetized, the main discovery of Gödel. It is the technic which embeds >> the "mathematician" in the mathematical reality (indeed in a tiny >> arithmetical part), like Everett embeds the physicist in the physical >> reality (defined by a solution of the SWE). >> It is the technic which makes able to interview, and sum up infinite >> interviews with the machine talking about itself. >> >> Monistic theories cannot not embed the observer in the observed, the >> spectator in the spectacle, the audience in the show. >> >> >> Best, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Richard >> >> >> On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 20 Dec 2013, at 02:15, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> If it's all just math, what is the unexpected surprise that makes it >>> funny? Is math surprised that its math? >>> >>> >>> It is of course only surprising for those deluded (assuming comp) into >>> thinking that there is some primitive non mathematical reality, like the >>> aristotelian theologian, who believe in a non mathematical primitively >>> physical universe. >>> >>> The real surprise, in the arithmetic internal views, is the existence >>> of the universe (not the fact that it is not a primitive). >>> >>> The absence of X, if proved, would surprise the believers in X, in a >>> same way. >>> >>> "Surprised" is prejudice dependent. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, December 18, 2013 2:07:47 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> http://abstrusegoose.com/544 >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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