On 20 Dec 2013, at 18:48, Richard Ruquist wrote:

## Advertising

Bruno: In that case a multiverse could contain another multiverse,a bit like a black hole could be a door to another universe.Richard: I like that idea because Smolin hypothized and Poplawskiconfirmed using GR + spin that black holes yield at least aninternal universe.

Interesting. Wish I could follow this more closely. Bruno

On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 12:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:Richard, On 20 Dec 2013, at 12:40, Richard Ruquist wrote:What surprises me is that apparently comp predicts a singlemultiverse rather than than multiple multiverses.Interesting problem.Comp predicts only a single multi-dreams, which is the "universal"computation made by the UD, or the Sigma_1 complete part ofarithmetic.I am still not sure if the "material points of view" will give 0, 1,2, ... aleph_0, ... or more multiverses.A difficulty relies also in the fact that a "multiverse", or even a"physical universe" is still not really well defined by thephysicists themselves. In fact in Everett theory, we might also notbe entirely sure if there is a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse,and such question might need the resolution of the quantum gravityquestion.With comp, we can say things like that: IF there are n multiverses,THEN they cannot interfere statistically and so "you" are in onlyone of them (if not they will comp-interfere), and thus they must beall "small" (= not emulating a UD). So, only one multiverse mightcontain a "physical" universal dovetailing.Is the quantum vacuum a physical universal dovetailer? Is the Everett universal wave a physical universal dovetailer?Is the solution of the comp measure problem a physical universaldovetailer? Should "nature" compete with the universal dovetailingto win the measure competition?Ah! You make me thinking ... What is really a multiverse? Can wedefine this in ZF, or in ZF+kappa? Would it makes sense to talk ofalpha-multi-verse for alpha an arbitrary cardinal, or an On-multiverse, with On being the class of all cardinals?What if the ultimate structure of the physical reality is non wellfounded? That is plausible with comp (despite arithmetic is wellfounded). In that case a multiverse could contain anothermultiverse, a bit like a black hole could be a door to anotheruniverse.Keep in mind that for a computationalist (who is aware of the UDA"reversal") (assuming there is no flaw of course) the physicalreality is the border of the "real" reality where "real" is what theFPI gives for the "average" universal (and Löbian) numbers.You can visualized the UD by a cone of length omega (aleph_zero).Just take a program for a UD implemented in a universal game of lifepattern. Then pile up the planes representing the successiveevolving life pattern. This gives a digital cone (due to the neverending growing of the life pattern emulating the UD), and you can"see" the UD* as an infinite tridimensional digital cone. OK?Now, you can compactify that structure. You identify the planes at0, 1, 2, 3, ... n, places in the infinite piling with 0, 1/2,1/2+1/4, 1/2+1/4+1/8, ..., so that the entire infinite UD* is kepton a finite board of lenght 1: just a cone, or its projection: atriangle. OK?Where is the "physical reality" in that picture? Nowhere, as UD* ispurely 3p, and physics is purely 1p. Hopefully: 1p-plural (andEverett confirms this: our computations are contagious, we cannot*not* share them when interacting. But that 1p collective structuremust (in comp) emerge at the union of all sets of all computations(containing our actual states), and this can be described in 3p, andis in the border which appears when we do the compactification.That border, the topside of the cone, or the right side of thetriangle of length 1, is an hologram, as each sub-branch infinitelyoften generates the UD, and the broder contains the infinite one. Itis a bit like the border (but on dimension 1) of the Mandelbrot set.The physical realities are dense everywhere "there" and they aremultiplied in hard to conceive magnitude, on that 2-dimensional top(in that representation of UD*).Unlike the little mandelbrot sets, they might be non enumerable.And then you have that things which I tended to hide a little bit,which is that the hypostases gives three quantizations, like ifthere where three type of physical realities (would that mean threemultiverses? In *some* sense to make precise: perhaps).Not just sensible matter and intelligible matter (Bp & Dt & p, andBp & Dt, respectively) provides quantization, on the p sigma_1, thesoul (Bp & p) does too, on the p sigma_1. Apparently Plotinus isright on this: the soul seems to be born with a foot already inmatter.I should say more on modal logic and enunciate the theorem ofSolovay. All what I say comes from the fact that meta-arithmetic canbe arithmetized, the main discovery of Gödel. It is the technicwhich embeds the "mathematician" in the mathematical reality (indeedin a tiny arithmetical part), like Everett embeds the physicist inthe physical reality (defined by a solution of the SWE).It is the technic which makes able to interview, and sum up infiniteinterviews with the machine talking about itself.Monistic theories cannot not embed the observer in the observed, thespectator in the spectacle, the audience in the show.Best, BrunoRichardOn Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 20 Dec 2013, at 02:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:If it's all just math, what is the unexpected surprise that makesit funny? Is math surprised that its math?It is of course only surprising for those deluded (assuming comp)into thinking that there is some primitive non mathematicalreality, like the aristotelian theologian, who believe in a nonmathematical primitively physical universe.The real surprise, in the arithmetic internal views, is theexistence of the universe (not the fact that it is not a primitive).The absence of X, if proved, would surprise the believers in X, ina same way."Surprised" is prejudice dependent. BrunoOn Wednesday, December 18, 2013 2:07:47 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: http://abstrusegoose.com/544 Brent --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.