On Saturday, February 1, 2014 11:32:03 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 1 February 2014 15:44, Craig Weinberg <[email protected] <javascript:>
> > wrote
>
> Neither comp nor any other TOE can consistently make reference to input or
>>> output extrinsic to itself,
>>>
>>
>> Unless, like mine, your TOE makes I/O (unified as a sensory-motive dipole
>> 'sense') the foundation of Everything.
>>
>
> So are you saying, as it would appear above, that your "TOE" refers to
> explanatory entities outside of its own domain? If so it would be
> incoherent in its own terms.
>
It refers to explanatory entities which would be identical to its own
domain, but the domain is greater than all 'entity' or 'domain'.
>
> I'm sorry Craig, but I can't really make head or tail of your arguments or
> even most of your vocabulary. I responded to you in this case because you
> appeared to be making a criticism of comp based on its lack of input and
> output. I attempted to make the point that no TOE, in general, can do this
> and remain consistent. In your reply to me you indicate agreement ("right")
> at various junctures but without apparently grasping the significance to
> your argument of the actual points I'm making.
>
I'm saying that you are right in your reasoning based on your assumptions,
but I'm proposing that the hypothesis I'm using is a completely new kind of
assumption which breaks from previous expectations. Your account is right
because it matches the consensus, but the hypothesis I'm using goes beyond
the consensus.
> The same comment applies to the discussion I've been attempting to have
> with you about the POPJ, which you have not, as yet, replied to. If you do
> decide to reply,
>
I must have lost the thread. This Google Groups format is always burying
threads for me. If I can find it, I'll definitely reply.
> I would appreciate it if you would do so in a manner that directly
> addresses the points I'm making, rather than changing the subject or
> talking as though your theory somehow automatically trumps any logical
> objection without actually addressing it.
>
I would appreciate it if you would stick with the subject that I'm trying
to communicate also. If you don't see how my 'theory' automatically trumps
any logical objection then you don't understand my theory fully. Primordial
Identity Pansensitivity means that logic is derived as a second order
phenomenon within sense.
>
> I don't mean to sound patronising (although I suspect it's unavoidable
> that I will) but your ideas strike me as very similar to many others in
> Theory of Mind, of the general flavour of panpsychism or
> panexperientialism, going back to Berkeley and indeed much farther than
> that.
>
Berkeley was on the right track, but you need to also add in Leibniz,
Einstein, maybe Deleuze, and Lao Tzu. I don't mean to sound patronizing,
but your objections strike me as very similar to many others who I have had
conversations with before.
> For a number of years I entertained similar ideas as the only way to
> reconcile the indubitability of consciousness with an apparently physical
> world. In fact, I developed a whole vocabulary for this not dissimilar to
> your own, with which I proceeded to confuse anyone who would listen to me,
> including some of those on this list a few years ago.
>
> However, eventually I came to see that this approach isn't in fact capable
> of solving the problems it sets out to tackle, though I appreciate this
> isn't necessarily widely recognised. The problem with panpsychist
> approaches isn't that it's "obvious" that everything isn't "conscious"
> (because we shouldn't expect that to be obvious) but rather that everything
> we perceive as "extrinsic" (and most particularly including our own
> apparently physical selves) specifically *behaves* according to a rigorous
> set of rules that vitiate and make redundant any notion of consciousness
> and block any access to it. This is, in effect, the POPJ. It bites
> panpsychism as it bites physicalsim and - forgive me - I think it would
> behove you to give the matter some more serious thought.
>
I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it
doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because
their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point
amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating
frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each other's
presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what is
perceived appears mechanical. There is more to it than that, but the new
principle I'm introducing I call eigenmorphism.
http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/
>
> As to comp, my reading of your criticisms lead me to the conclusion that
> you have never yet properly understood it (independent of whether it turns
> out to be true of our reality). Like you, I have spent much time with
> computers and had independently reached the conclusion that thinking and
> experiencing could not in any way be the same as what computers do. Indeed
> this was my frame of mind when in 1984 I encountered John Searle's Chinese
> Room argument which he presented very convincingly in his BBC Reith
> Lectures of that year. So when I came across Bruno's ideas on this list
> about seven years ago I had plenty of arguments, as I thought, to demolish
> them. However, I gradually came to realise, through Bruno's patience and
> expertise, that computer science is no more the study of computers (the
> study of which is a branch of engineering) than astronomy is the study of
> telescopes. Hence your criticisms of comp on the basis of your observations
> of the current state of computer engineering are simply beside the point.
> You need to up your game here if you really seek to defeat Bruno's
> arguments rather than simply misunderstand them.
>
I'm not trying to defeat Bruno's arguments, I'm showing how they can be
transcended altogether. Separating computation from engineering is the same
mistake as separating physics from sensation, and it is what makes it
possible to overlook the failure of both physics and information science to
adequately consider awareness.
>
> Anyway, back to the POPJ, if you have the stomach for it!
>
Sure, let me see if I can find it.
Thanks,
Craig
>
> Cordially
>
> David
>
>>
>>
>
>
>
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