;) >From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases:
1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means nothing) 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single alternative: comp) 6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like. Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread) finally a three alternative multiverse appears: 7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and smoke a pipe of marihuana or 7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line of a modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas. or 7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level. 2014-02-14 21:39 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore > everithing can be made isomorphic or "emergent" from 0 and 1's. > > > ? > > > So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. > > > ? > > > > > -Why people make apparently weird distincitions? > it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on FPI > - Why they believe in God? > God is the universal machine. > > > the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the inner > God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God. > > I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it? > > - Yes but why people distinguish between.... > god is the universal machine and blah blah blah. > > > That is akin to a comp blaspheme! > > > > > -Yes, but why people... . > that is FPI as i said before > - Yes but... > I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are > very nice ideas > > and so on > > > You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first. > > Bruno > > > > > > > 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > >> Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal >> logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be >> justified later, as it is not obvious at all). >> >> >> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: >>> > >>> > You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! >>> :-) >>> > >>> > (Sorry!) >>> > >>> > I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's >>> > likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string >>> theory >>> > retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a >>> positive >>> > result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... >>> > >>> >>> I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable >>> facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. >>> >> >> I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it. >> >> >> I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to >> simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be >> simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes >> of one's brain. This is the bet of "saying yes to the doctor". >> >> >> With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We >> can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is >> preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in >> the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. >> >> >> >> >> But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather >> system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are >> simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will >> be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; >> we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must >> be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; >> >> >> It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. >> >> >> So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I >> think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can >> still build a conscious Mars rover. >> >> >> >> With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover >> is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to >> distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to us, >> notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness of Mars >> Rover is a 1-view, and it is more "a product" of the infinity of >> computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with >> a "single" machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own entanglement with mars, >> we can indeed bet that little Mars Rover share some history with us. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths. This explains >> why aspects of consciousness are ineffable. It's because conscious >> processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that some truths are >> unprovable. Bruno takes "qualia are ineffable" and "some arithmetical >> truths are unprovable" and postulates "ineffable=unprovable". >> >> >> Not really. >> I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but >> some logician did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are >> related to non communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens >> through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1), >> >> >> Don't understand that. >> >> >> Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency modal >> logic G into two parts: the provable statements, and the true statements, >> it also makes the logic of the differents modalities: >> >> p >> []p >> []p & p >> []p & <>t >> []p & <>t & p >> >> obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent >> extensionnally (they "proves" the same true arithmetical propositions, but >> they see them differently. >> >> Among them, three logics splits into provable and non provable parts: >> >> []p (gives G and G*, by Solovay theorem) >> []p & <>p (gives Z and Z*- >> []p & <>t & p (gives X and X*) >> >> That remains true when we restrict p on the sigma_1 arithmetical reality >> (the arithmetical UD, which is a UD, provably). >> >> That changes G into a modal logic G1 (G + p->[]p) and all hypostases get >> changed by this. I change their names by adding a 1. And qualia and quanta >> appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the >> UD measure, due to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p & p, or >> []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p. >> >> >> >> Brent, do you see this? >> >> Are you OK that in a cul-de-sac world we have []A for all A? >> >> I repeat two arguments. >> >> I recall first Kripke semantics: >> >> All the worlds obeys CPL. And there is some fixed binary relation R on >> that set of worlds (called "accessibility"). >> >> Then, >> >> []p is true in a world alpha if p is true in all worlds beta such that >> alpha R beta >> >> Or equivalently, (and dually): >> >> <>p is true in a world alpha if it exists a world beta with p true in >> beta and alpha R beta. >> >> (re-verify that this entails well >> >> <>p = ~[]~p >> []p = ~<>~p >> ~[]p = <>~p (jump law 1) >> ~<>p = []~p (jump law 2) >> >> OK?) >> >> >> Now consider some multiverse with zeta being a cul-de-sac world, like >> >> {alpha, beta, gamma, zeta} with >> >> alpha R beta, beta R gamma, gamma R zeta. >> >> And nothing else. In that multiverse zeta is a cul-de-sac world. >> >> OK? >> >> Proposition. For any proposition A, []A is true in zeta. >> >> Proof. >> >> Imagine that []A is not true in Zeta. Zeta obeys CPL, so if []A is not >> true, []A is false. OK? And if []A is false, then >> ~[]A is true, by classical logic. OK? >> >> But if ~[]A is true, then <>~A is true, by the jump law 1 above. OK? >> >> Then by Kripke semantics above, if <>~A is true in Zeta, it means that >> there is a world accessible from Zeta, and in which ~A is true. >> >> But that is impossible, given that Zeta is a culd-de-sac world. >> >> Conclusion: []A cannot be false in Zeta. >> >> Summary: []A is true, for any A, in any cul-de-sac world, of any Kripke >> multiverse. This is a direct consequence of the jump law: as []A can only >> be false if <>~A is true, and all proposition beginning by a diamond "<>" >> are false in a cul-de-sac world. >> >> In particular []f is true in the cul-de-sac worlds. And in fact []f is >> false in any non cul-de-sac world. So []f characterizes the cul-de-sac >> worlds in Kripke semantics. OK? >> >> definition: I will say that a world is transitory iff it is not >> cul-de-sac world. >> >> Now, the G modal logic has curious Kripke multiverse. No worlds can ever >> access to itself, but worse, all worlds access to some cul-de-sac world. >> (cf the image "you die at each instant in comp or in the little buddhist >> theory). >> >> G proves <>t -> <>[]f. This says, in Kripke semantics, that if I am in a >> transitory world, then I can access to a cul-de-sac world. >> >> OK? >> >> So let us come back in reality, and let us consider our common very small >> multiverse {Helsinki, Washington, Moscou}, or {H, W, M} to be shorter. >> >> We are in the protocol of step 3. And suppose we are told that in M and >> W, we will have a cup of coffee. >> >> Then we would like to say that >> >> "[](we-will have a cup-of-coffee)" >> >> is true in Helsinki. Ou guardian angel G* told us that <>W and <>M is >> true in Helsinki, so it looks like the probability one is well captured by >> the modal box/ in all accessible world, I get a cup of coffee. >> >> But we can't listen to the guardian angel in that way, because <>W and >> <>M, although true in H, are not provable by the little finite creature, >> and we might be already in a cul-de-sac world, from the machine's point of >> view. If we apply G, that is a possible case, and so, to get a decent >> probability, we must assume explicitly some world being accessible. That is >> the "act of faith" I often mentionned. This is what we will do by defining >> probability 1, not by >> >> []p (in G) >> >> but by []p & <>t >> >> The probability of an "event" is one, if that event occurs in all >> accessible worlds AND there is an accessible world. >> >> >> G* proves []p <-> []p & <>t, >> >> so in the "eye of God", nothing changes. >> >> But G, which represents the machine ability, does not prove that >> equivalence, and this entails that []p and []p & <>t will obeys different >> logics. >> >> OK? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> This allows him to identify specifically what makes some computer >> program conscious: it's the ability to do induction and diagnoalization and >> prove Goedel's theorems. >> >> >> OK. But it is not a computable identification. We cannot recognize, >> neither from code, nor from computational activity, is an entity is Löbian >> or not. >> >> >> I think you mean "we cannot *prove*". We can recognize intelligent >> behavior and infer Lobian. >> >> >> No we can't never be sure. We can in some case recognize that a program >> computes the function factorial, but given arbitrary programs and arbitrary >> computations, we can't necessarily infer what is computed. >> (But well, what you say can be true in some context; I can be OK). >> >> >> >> >> We can just prove non constructively that such programs and >> computations exists in a non computable distribution. >> >> >> >> >> My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in >> the sense required for this argument. >> >> >> Then you have to find me two numbers a and b contradicting the axioms >> of RA. >> >> >> >> I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world >> and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize >> consciousness and the "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. >> >> >> This lowers the level only, unless you add something non computable in >> the local environment. >> >> >> >> >> There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would >> be ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes >> dreams (of arithmetic?) >> >> >> >> Once you accept comp, it is standard computer science to show that >> *all* dreams are emulated in Arithmetic. >> >> >> >> ?? But the argument proposes emulating dreams by a physical (but inert) >> computer - not Arithmetic. >> >> >> It cannot be inert then. It might have inert part, fro some computations, >> but that is in the course of the MGA reasoning. >> You jump into another difficulties. >> >> That arithmetic emulated all computations is part of standard computer >> science. >> >> In step 8, it is shown that IF comp is assumed, it makes no sense to add >> anything more than arithmetic at the base level. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another >> way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation >> simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist >> *relative* to that world. >> >> >> I guess we will need to come back on step 8, soon or later. Not sure >> what you mean by "inert computation"? re you alluding to the "inert" device >> in Maudlin and MGA, >> >> >> Yes. >> >> >> OK. But I don't see the relation with the thread. You were assessing >> Clark on step 3. You might have changed your mind and jump on step 8, but I >> suggest we wait everyone grasp steps 1-7, before looking at the more subtle >> step 8. >> But no problem, we will come back at step 8. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> or to the static computations which exist in arithmetic. In that case >> it is the usual argument against block-time or block-universe, and this has >> been debunked repeatedly. Time and activity are indexicals (indeed >> translated into *variants* of G*). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > Alberto. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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