To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or "emergent" from 0 and 1's. So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis.
-Why people make apparently weird distincitions? it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on FPI - Why they believe in God? God is the universal machine. - Yes but why people distinguish between.... god is the universal machine and blah blah blah. -Yes, but why people... . that is FPI as i said before - Yes but... I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are very nice ideas and so on 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal > logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be > justified later, as it is not obvious at all). > > > On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: > > On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: > > On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: > > On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish <[email protected]>wrote: > >> On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: >> > >> > You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! >> :-) >> > >> > (Sorry!) >> > >> > I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's >> > likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string >> theory >> > retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a >> positive >> > result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... >> > >> >> I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable >> facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. >> > > I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it. > > > I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to > simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be > simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes > of one's brain. This is the bet of "saying yes to the doctor". > > > With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We > can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is > preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in > the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. > > > > > But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather > system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are > simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will > be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; > we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must > be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; > > > It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. > > > So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I > think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can > still build a conscious Mars rover. > > > > With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is > in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to distracted > it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to us, notably by > sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness of Mars Rover is a > 1-view, and it is more "a product" of the infinity of computations going > through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with a "single" > machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own entanglement with mars, we can > indeed bet that little Mars Rover share some history with us. > > > > > > > > > > it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths. This explains > why aspects of consciousness are ineffable. It's because conscious > processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that some truths are > unprovable. Bruno takes "qualia are ineffable" and "some arithmetical > truths are unprovable" and postulates "ineffable=unprovable". > > > Not really. > I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but > some logician did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are > related to non communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens > through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1), > > > Don't understand that. > > > Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency modal > logic G into two parts: the provable statements, and the true statements, > it also makes the logic of the differents modalities: > > p > []p > []p & p > []p & <>t > []p & <>t & p > > obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent > extensionnally (they "proves" the same true arithmetical propositions, but > they see them differently. > > Among them, three logics splits into provable and non provable parts: > > []p (gives G and G*, by Solovay theorem) > []p & <>p (gives Z and Z*- > []p & <>t & p (gives X and X*) > > That remains true when we restrict p on the sigma_1 arithmetical reality > (the arithmetical UD, which is a UD, provably). > > That changes G into a modal logic G1 (G + p->[]p) and all hypostases get > changed by this. I change their names by adding a 1. And qualia and quanta > appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*. > > > > > > > > > which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the > UD measure, due to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p & p, or > []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p. > > > > Brent, do you see this? > > Are you OK that in a cul-de-sac world we have []A for all A? > > I repeat two arguments. > > I recall first Kripke semantics: > > All the worlds obeys CPL. And there is some fixed binary relation R on > that set of worlds (called "accessibility"). > > Then, > > []p is true in a world alpha if p is true in all worlds beta such that > alpha R beta > > Or equivalently, (and dually): > > <>p is true in a world alpha if it exists a world beta with p true in beta > and alpha R beta. > > (re-verify that this entails well > > <>p = ~[]~p > []p = ~<>~p > ~[]p = <>~p (jump law 1) > ~<>p = []~p (jump law 2) > > OK?) > > > Now consider some multiverse with zeta being a cul-de-sac world, like > > {alpha, beta, gamma, zeta} with > > alpha R beta, beta R gamma, gamma R zeta. > > And nothing else. In that multiverse zeta is a cul-de-sac world. > > OK? > > Proposition. For any proposition A, []A is true in zeta. > > Proof. > > Imagine that []A is not true in Zeta. Zeta obeys CPL, so if []A is not > true, []A is false. OK? And if []A is false, then > ~[]A is true, by classical logic. OK? > > But if ~[]A is true, then <>~A is true, by the jump law 1 above. OK? > > Then by Kripke semantics above, if <>~A is true in Zeta, it means that > there is a world accessible from Zeta, and in which ~A is true. > > But that is impossible, given that Zeta is a culd-de-sac world. > > Conclusion: []A cannot be false in Zeta. > > Summary: []A is true, for any A, in any cul-de-sac world, of any Kripke > multiverse. This is a direct consequence of the jump law: as []A can only > be false if <>~A is true, and all proposition beginning by a diamond "<>" > are false in a cul-de-sac world. > > In particular []f is true in the cul-de-sac worlds. And in fact []f is > false in any non cul-de-sac world. So []f characterizes the cul-de-sac > worlds in Kripke semantics. OK? > > definition: I will say that a world is transitory iff it is not > cul-de-sac world. > > Now, the G modal logic has curious Kripke multiverse. No worlds can ever > access to itself, but worse, all worlds access to some cul-de-sac world. > (cf the image "you die at each instant in comp or in the little buddhist > theory). > > G proves <>t -> <>[]f. This says, in Kripke semantics, that if I am in a > transitory world, then I can access to a cul-de-sac world. > > OK? > > So let us come back in reality, and let us consider our common very small > multiverse {Helsinki, Washington, Moscou}, or {H, W, M} to be shorter. > > We are in the protocol of step 3. And suppose we are told that in M and W, > we will have a cup of coffee. > > Then we would like to say that > > "[](we-will have a cup-of-coffee)" > > is true in Helsinki. Ou guardian angel G* told us that <>W and <>M is true > in Helsinki, so it looks like the probability one is well captured by the > modal box/ in all accessible world, I get a cup of coffee. > > But we can't listen to the guardian angel in that way, because <>W and > <>M, although true in H, are not provable by the little finite creature, > and we might be already in a cul-de-sac world, from the machine's point of > view. If we apply G, that is a possible case, and so, to get a decent > probability, we must assume explicitly some world being accessible. That is > the "act of faith" I often mentionned. This is what we will do by defining > probability 1, not by > > []p (in G) > > but by []p & <>t > > The probability of an "event" is one, if that event occurs in all > accessible worlds AND there is an accessible world. > > > G* proves []p <-> []p & <>t, > > so in the "eye of God", nothing changes. > > But G, which represents the machine ability, does not prove that > equivalence, and this entails that []p and []p & <>t will obeys different > logics. > > OK? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This allows him to identify specifically what makes some computer > program conscious: it's the ability to do induction and diagnoalization and > prove Goedel's theorems. > > > OK. But it is not a computable identification. We cannot recognize, > neither from code, nor from computational activity, is an entity is Löbian > or not. > > > I think you mean "we cannot *prove*". We can recognize intelligent > behavior and infer Lobian. > > > No we can't never be sure. We can in some case recognize that a program > computes the function factorial, but given arbitrary programs and arbitrary > computations, we can't necessarily infer what is computed. > (But well, what you say can be true in some context; I can be OK). > > > > > We can just prove non constructively that such programs and > computations exists in a non computable distribution. > > > > > My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in > the sense required for this argument. > > > Then you have to find me two numbers a and b contradicting the axioms of > RA. > > > > I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world > and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize > consciousness and the "ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous. > > > This lowers the level only, unless you add something non computable in > the local environment. > > > > > There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be > ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams > (of arithmetic?) > > > > Once you accept comp, it is standard computer science to show that *all* > dreams are emulated in Arithmetic. > > > > ?? But the argument proposes emulating dreams by a physical (but inert) > computer - not Arithmetic. > > > It cannot be inert then. It might have inert part, fro some computations, > but that is in the course of the MGA reasoning. > You jump into another difficulties. > > That arithmetic emulated all computations is part of standard computer > science. > > In step 8, it is shown that IF comp is assumed, it makes no sense to add > anything more than arithmetic at the base level. > > > > > > > > > > are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another > way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation > simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist > *relative* to that world. > > > I guess we will need to come back on step 8, soon or later. Not sure > what you mean by "inert computation"? re you alluding to the "inert" device > in Maudlin and MGA, > > > Yes. > > > OK. But I don't see the relation with the thread. You were assessing Clark > on step 3. You might have changed your mind and jump on step 8, but I > suggest we wait everyone grasp steps 1-7, before looking at the more subtle > step 8. > But no problem, we will come back at step 8. > > Bruno > > > > > > Brent > > or to the static computations which exist in arithmetic. In that case it > is the usual argument against block-time or block-universe, and this has > been debunked repeatedly. Time and activity are indexicals (indeed > translated into *variants* of G*). > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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