On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 09:18:32PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/17/2014 8:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Mon, Feb 17, 2014 at 07:30:23PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> >>But there is a weaker form. However unlikely one thinks strings or
> >>singularities or multiple-worlds are, one may still hypothesize that
> >>there is *some* reality as the explanation for the intersubjective
> >>agreement that is consistently observed.
> >Sure - one may hypothesise so. But does it assist in any scientific
> >experiment to do so? And is there any evidence to support the
> >hypothesis, or is it simply like pre-classical physics - good enough
> >to get the next meal.
>
> The same kind of evidence as for any scientific theory. It not only
> assists, the repeatability of experiments by persons with different
> minds tests it.
I don't see why. It merely tests _inter_subjectivity, not
objectivity. I cannot think of a single test of objectivity, off the
top of my head.
> >>Certainly independent of any single mind. And the science
> >>formulated so far is independent of mind - which is why Liz supposed
> >>that the past existed before it was observed (and constitutes a
> >>block universe past).
> >Supposed, maybe, but certainly not evidence of it. Whose to say that
> >"our" past is not simply hewn out of the primordial Multiverse by our
> >observations, which progressively fix which world (and history) we inhabit?
>
> Why "our" then; why not "my" and why not a brain is a vat? Why not
> nothing but a momentary dream? Some hypotheses are more fruitful
> than others, lead to more predictions, provide a more succinct model
> of the world.
>
Not sure what your point is here. It's our, because we're having this
conversation.
> >>>>The existence of
> >>>>some mind independent reality is always the working assumption.
> >>>>
> >>>Really? I don't think working scientists need to think about the issue
> >>>much at all.
> >>Because it's an assumption so common they only question it unusual
> >>experiments - like tests of psychics.
> >>
> >Assuming the assumption is common for the sake of argument, can you
> >think of a situation where that assumption has any bearing on the
> >experiment being performed?
>
> Sure. The experimenters don't try to think special thoughts about or
> during the experiment to influence the result - contrast prayer.
What does that have to do with whether there is an objective reality
or not?
It _is_ reasonable to assume that one's private thoughts will not
affect the experiment's outcome. But that is not the same as assuming
the phenomena is due to some objective reality.
>
> >
> >>>Whether they assume there is some kind of
> >>>mind-independent reality, or are outrageous solipsists would not
> >>>affect their ability to conduct experiments or do theory.
> >> One could still assume a mind-independent reality while assuming
> >>that one was the only mind. But they could not do either
> >>experiments or theory if they assumed the result depended on what
> >>they hoped or wished or expected.
> >>
> >I certainly have never asserted that. The reality we observe must be
> >compatible with our existence. Any observed reality must be compatible
> >with the existence of an observer. But we suppose that there are many
> >different possible observed worlds.
>
> Real ones?
>
> >Some features of those worlds are
> >accidental ("mere geography"), and only shared by some worlds. Other
> >features are shared by all observable worlds (what we call
> >"physics"). The question is whether any feature shared by all possible
> >observed worlds
>
> Is that possible worlds that are observed or worlds that might
> possibly be observed?
possible worlds that are observed
>
> >is due to some reason other than the fact that
> >observers necessarily exist in those worlds. For there to be a mind
> >independent reality, there needs to be such a facts.
>
> So a world must have physics that *permits* observers in order that
> it be our world. But worlds don't have to have *geography* that
> permits observers, e.g. this universe between inflation and the
> recombination. So they can be mind independent.
>
Just so long as some geography permits the observers, such as on a
rocky planet on a middling start some 13 billion years after those events.
> >It is my position
> >that no such fact exists - but I'd love to be proved wrong, it would
> >make things "interesting".
> >
> >I could believe that mathematical facts (about say the integers) could
> >fit that category, and thus be the basis of a fundamental
> >ontology. But even in COMP, we cannot distinguish between an ontology
> >of Peano arithmetic, or of Curry combinators, say. Once your ontology has
> >the property of Turing completeness, you could choose any such
> >ontology and be none the wiser. Doesn't this make the whole notion of
> >an ontological reality rather meaningless?
>
> Then you would have structural realism.
Yeah - fair enough. That position is largely a defeat of the idea that
we can know an ontological basis of phenomena.
>
> >
> >Anyway, given some fact of our reality about which it is not known
> >whether it is necessary for the existence of an observer, how do we
> >distinguish between mind dependence (perhaps we may discover it to be
> >important later on when we have a better theory of consciousness),
> >mind independent physics or just mere geography?
> >
>
> You seem dismissive of geography, even though it includes us. It
> seems like a too convenient move to deny realism.
>
A mere geographical fact is not evidence of an objective reality. My
geographical facts differ from yours.
--
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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