On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:49:33 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:> > > wrote: > > > >> >> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >> >>> On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an >>>>>> illusion >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not an illusion, an invariant. >>>>> >>>> >>>> If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it >>>> remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means >>>> that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable. >>>> >>> >>> But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of >>> consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the >>> sense that you stipulate. >>> >> >> That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the >> doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied >> into an identical conscious personhood. >> > > No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of > consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. >
But it is directly contradicted by the idea that consciousness is tied to originality. You can't have it both ways. If consciousness can be continued by a computation, then it cannot be considered original. It is no more original than a long IP address. Any computation which can reproduce the complex number must forever instantiate a non-original address of consciousness. > In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world > (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). > The world of comp is what is observed, which is why it can never contain even a single observer. > Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of > observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a > transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). > This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics > of some particular continuation. > Any continuation is a violation of originality/authenticity and is therefore, by my definition, unconscious and impossible. I assure you that there is nothing significant that I misunderstand about comp. You are telling me over and over what I already know, and your responses clearly indicate to me that you are primarily focused on your view being heard rather than considering mine. You are getting some of my view, more than most others on this list have been willing to sit through, but still, your argument is 90% shadow boxing. > > >> >>> Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a >>> sensible context. >>> >> >> Encountered by what? Nonsense? What is a non-sensible context? >> > > There is no precisely apposite vocabulary here. I simply meant the > sufficient conditions for the self-relative actualisation of a who, a > where, a when, a history and so forth. In short-hand: a sensible context. > I understand exactly what you simply meant, but I am challenging you to see that it is too simple. My attack on CTM begins miles beneath the facile assumptions of modal logic and enumerated data fields. I'm talking about screaming, crying, stinking reality here, not a hypothesis of pretty puzzles. Fuck the puzzles. I'm not playing with words, I'm saying simply that it is impossible for sense to be superseded in any way. Every context is a context of sense and nothing else. > >> >>> One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has >>> been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a >>> circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of >>> sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only >>> that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another. >>> >> >> What else could be capable of differentiating one sensible context from >> another besides sense? You are saying that sense is not copied, only >> sense-making is copied. I am saying that nothing is copied except for the >> ratios of distance between experiences. >> > > I am only saying, or trying to say, what follows from the assumptions and > explicit rules of derivation of a particular theory. > You must know by now though that I have no interest in that theory except to show that it is inside out. > I can do no other and no more. > Why? Can't you set aside CTM for a while to contemplate other possibilities? > Under CTM, what might look like arithmetic, computation and logic from the > bird perspective transforms, in terms of those very rules of derivation, > into an inter-subjective Multiverse in the frog perspective. In so doing it > relies implicitly, as I have suggested, on a notion of consciousness as a > transcendent observational invariant. > Why wouldn't arithmetic and computation look like arithmetic and computation from every perspective? What does consciousness add to the already exhaustively effective operations of unconscious mechanisms? > > >> >>> I think that consciousness, transcendently, is a necessary, original and >>> invariant assumption of any theory of itself. >>> >> >> We agree then, but how does that allow for CTM? >> > > Because if we are on the track of a theory of everything (vainglorious > though that may be) we need more than just a transcendent assumption. We > need a robust framework that shows at least some early promise of being > able to address the formidable conceptual and technical challenges that > infest the world-problem, hopefully without sweeping any of them "under the > rug". > What if there can be only one transcendent assumption and that is sense itself? What use it is to make demands of robustness in the face of the inescapable and eternal fact beneath and beyond all possibilities? Once we fully accept that unacceptable truth, we can begin to reconstruct the entire canon of science, philosophy, and spirituality from scratch. That should keep us busy for a while. > > >> >>> As such it is perpetually capable of self-manifestation, given the >>> sufficient conditions of a sensible context. Always in terms of some >>> theory, of course. >>> >> >> Theory is always in terms of a deeper sense-making substrate. >> > > I would say rather that theory must be capable of situating the required > notions of sense both transcendently and contextually. And theory mustn't > cheat by assuming a priori that its postulates are real (as opposed to the > point of departure of an argument). > The thesis of sense is that any theory which does not assume sense as the only real postulate can only ever be a reflector - a departure point of an argument which contains local truth but is ultimately fails at capturing Everything. It is an argument which must, by definition, go beyond sanity. It must embrace all possible states and perspectives, not just normative modern Western perspectives. Craig > > David > > >>>>> >>>>>> and simulation is absolute. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of >>>>> substitution). >>>>> >>>>> Hope that helps. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute. >>>> >>>> I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be >>>> twisted around, dismissed, and diluted. >>>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> David >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can >>>>>> only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't >>>>>> be >>>>>> done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one >>>>>> time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, >>>>>> progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for >>>>>> beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other >>>>>> sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it >>>>>> reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of >>>>>> form. >>>>>> >>>>>> The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the >>>>>> done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem >>>>>> equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking >>>>>> through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior >>>>>> perspectives, >>>>>> and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously >>>>>> measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality >>>>>> is >>>>>> preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we >>>>>> suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within >>>>>> consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we >>>>>> expect. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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